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SEX, CULTURE, AND THE BIOLOGY OF RAPE
Sex, Culture, and the Biology of Rape:
Toward Explanation and Prevention
Owen D. Jones
For all that has been written about rape, its multiple causes remain
insufficiently understood for law to deter it effectively. This follows,
Professor Jones argues, from inadequately interdisciplinary study of rape
causation. Specifically, integrating life science and social science
perspectives on sexual aggression can improve law's model of rape
behavior, and further our efforts to reduce its incidence. This Article first
explains biobehavioral theories of sexual aggression, and offers a guide to
common but avoidable errors in assessing them. It then compares a
number of those theories' predictions with existing data and demonstrates
how knowledge of the effects of evolutionary processes on human
behavioral predispositions may help us better understand-without
justifying or excusing-psychological mechanisms that contribute to
patterns of rape. Because increased knowledge of causal influences may
afford law increased effectiveness in deterring rape, the author then
explores ways in which biobehavioral theories could affect analysis of
several current legal issues, from the debate over chemical castration to
the meaning of motive in rape-relevant legislation.
[T]heories of causation are important because they beget strategies
for prevention.1
INTRODUCTION
Rape is a serious and too-frequent crime, worthy of our most con-
certed efforts to curb its incidence. Not only does it harm the subordinated
victim, those who care about her, and those whose fear of rape is increased
by her rape, but it also injures society, which loses the full participation qf
those women who alter their behavior as a function of fear.2 Rape
1. DIANA SCULLY, UNDERSTANDING SEXUAL VIOLENCE: A STUDY OF CONVICTED RAPISTS 53
(1990).
2. While rape has many other important manifestations, such as male-male, female-male, and
female-female violations, in this Article I am concerned primarily with rape involving male-female
penile-vaginal penetration. For a careful analysis of the effects and costs of female fear of rape, see
MARGARET T. GORDON & STEPHANIE RIGER, THE FEMALE FEAR (1989). See also Robin L. West, The
Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIs.
1999]
HeinOnline  -- 87 Cal L. Rev. 829 1999
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:827
contributes to a social, emotional, and political environment in which
women's bodies, lives, experiences, and realities are improperly restrained.
It has meanings at the deepest level of human symbolism, and serves as an
excruciating reminder of how a culture that disinhibits the aggressive exer-
cise of power fosters callous oppression at the cost of female autonomy.
The long history of the law's treatment of rape is a well-chronicled
embarrassment, even tragedy? Against this, feminist writings have argued
successfully for a plethora of improvements in the substance and procedure
of rape law.4 And yet for all the volumes written about rape, and all the
claims that have been made to have captured, categorized, and extracted its
very essences, rape reforms have had far less impact than hoped.' Rape
WoMsEN's L.J. 81, 94 (1987) (exploring how women reconstitute themselves in response to the fear of
male violence).
3. See, e.g., SUSAN ESTRiCH, REAL RAPE (1987) (providing a detailed examination of rape law);
DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER 244-53 (1989) (discussing weaknesses of law's earlier
approaches); STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE
FAILURE OF LAW (1998).
4. Substantive changes include, for example, the elimination of demonstrated nonconsent as an
element of the offense. Procedural and evidentiary changes include, for example, shielding the victim's
prior sexual history. See Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference Between the
Presence of Force and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1780, 1780-85 (1992) (discussing
transformation of rape law). See generally KEITH BURGESS-JACKSON, RAPE: A PHILOSOPHICAL
INVESTIGATION 67-86 (1996); CASSIA C. SPOHN & JULIE HORNEY, RAPE LAW REFORM: A
GRASSROOTS REVOLUTION AND ITS IMPACT (1992); Cassia C. Spohn, The Rape Reform
Movement: The Traditional Common Law and Rape Law Reforms, 39 JURIMETIuCS J. 119, 120-29
(1999).
5. Reformers expected that rape reports, arrests, convictions, and imprisonment would all
increase. See Ronet Bachman & Raymond Paternoster, A Contemporary Look at the Effects of Rape
Law Reform: How Far Have We Really Come?, 84 J. CIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 554, 555 (1993);
Cassia C. Spohn & Julie Homey, Criminology: The Impact of Rape Law Reform on the Processing of
Simple and Aggravated Rape Cases, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 861, 862 (1996). But although
reforms are generally credited with prompting significant changes in the public attention to, and
discussion of, legal issues surrounding rape, see, e.g., Leigh Bienen, Rape Reform Legislation in the
United States: A Look at Some Practical Effects, 8 VICTIMOLOGY: INT'L J. 139, 148 (1983),
researchers have generally concluded that, except in a handful of jurisdictions, legal reforms have not
significantly increased either rape reporting or the probabilities of arrests and convictions for rape. See,
e.g., SCHULHOFER, supra note 3, at ix ("Our laws against rape.., still fail to protect women.");
Bachman & Paternoster, supra, at 556, 573 (claiming rape statute reform "has not had a very
substantial effect on either victim behavior or actual practices in the criminal justice system"); Julie
Homey & Cassia C. Spohn, Rape Law Reform and Instrumental Change in Six Urban Jurisdictions, 25
L. & Soc'Y REV. 117, 149-50 (1991) ("[There is an] overall lack of impact of rape law
reforms .... We have shown that the ability of rape reform legislation to produce instrumental change
is limited."). For a recent discussion of aspects of reform aimed at redefining the elements and crime of
rape, see David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. (forthcoming 1999). See also
Bienen, supra, at 148 (discussing effects of New Jersey rape reforms on incarceration rates as
insignificant); Carol Bohmer, Acquaintance Rape and the Law, in ACQUAINTANCE RAPE: THE HIDDEN
CRIME 317, 326 (Andrea Parrot & Laurie Bechhofer eds, 1991) ("[M]any of these reforms have had
limited effect on the experience of the victim or the likelihood [of] conviction."); David P. Bryden &
Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal Justice System, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1283-94
(1997) (discussing disjunction between hopes of reformers and effects of reforms); Morrison Torrey,
Feminist Legal Scholarship on Rape: A Maturing Look at One Form of Violence Against Women, 2
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN &L. 35,45 (1995) ("[W]e now know that legislative changes have not made
HeinOnline  -- 87 Cal L. Rev. 830 1999
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remains a mystery-insufficiently understood to be effectively prevented.6
For every claim that rape is surely about violence, and not about sex, we
hear a claim that rape is surely about sex, even if it is also about violence.
For every argument that rapists are imbalanced and mentally infirm, there
is an argument that the true rapist is an Everyman, an omnipresent threat.
In recent years, law's model of rape behavior-its theory of where
rape comes from-has increasingly and heavily favored pure social science
theories of causation, uninformed by theories that would integrate social
science and life science perspectives.7 I suspect three causes: (1) few of
today's legal thinkers have studied life science (so the social science theo-
ries seem more accessible); (2) the standard social science theories are
assumed to align more comfortably with the political preferences of our
time; and (3) most people incorrectly assume that life science and social
science theories are incompatible, and that they must choose between one
and the other.
Yet excluding life science perspectives on rape behavior from the le-
gal literature may be ill-advised. For exclusion often follows from insuffi-
cient or outdated understanding of what the life science theories of rape
causation actually say, insufficient analysis of whether those theories are
plausible, and often incorrect assumptions about how the descriptive
any difference in the arrest, prosecution and conviction of rapists. ). Several researchers estimate that
fewer than 5% of rapists are ever convicted. See JULIE A. ALLISON & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN,
RAPE: THE MISUNDERSTOOD CRIME ix (1993); GORDON & RIGER, supra note 2, at 45.
6. See ALLISON & WRGHTSMAN, supra note 5, at 3 (reported rapes increased 59% between
1990 and 1991); Katherine K. Baker, What Rape Is and What It Ought Not Be, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 233
(1999) (rape remains "massively under deterred"); Judith V. Becker & Meg S. Kaplan, Rape
Victims: Issues, Theories, and Treatment, 2 ANN. REV. SEX RES. 267,267 (1991) ("['n spite of all the
attention and special programs, it does not appear that rape rates have declined significantly in this
society."). There is some evidence, however, that rape rates may be declining somewhat. See BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SEX OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS: AN ANALYSIS
OF DATA ON RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT v (1997) [hereinafter DOJ STATISTICS] (reporting decrease in
the rape rates between 1992 and 1995). But rape rate statistics are notoriously difficult to interpret,
since rapes appear to be significantly underreported. See, e.g., PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF RAPE
INVESTIGATION: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH xiii (Robert R. Hazelwood & Ann Wolbert
Burgess eds., 2d ed. 1995) (estimating that less than half of all rapes are reported to police); Mary P.
Koss, The Hidden Rape Victim: Personality, Attitudinal, and Situational Characteristics, 9 PSYCHOL
WOMEN Q. 193, 194-95 (1985) (estimating that 10 to 50 percent of rapes are reported). Comparison of
rates is further complicated by recent redesign of an important survey tool. See MICHAEL R. RAND ET
AL., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 1973-95, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS: NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY 3 (1997) (advising "extreme caution" in
comparing survey results).
7. For an overview of some of the social science research on rape, see Barry Burkhart & Mary
Ellen Fromuth, Individual Psychalogical and Social Psychological Understandings of Sexual Coercion,
in SEXUAL COERCION: A SOURCEBOOK ON ITS NATURE, CAUSES, AND PREVENTION (Elizabeth
Grauerholz & Mary A. Koralewski eds., 1991). Even editors claiming to have compiled
"interdisciplinary" perspectives on sexual aggression routinely (often without self-reflection) omit life
science perspectives in toto. See, e.g., Mary E. Odem & Jody Clay-Warner, Introduction to
CONFRONTING RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT xi, xi (Mary E. Odem & Jody Clay-Warner eds., 1998)
(reflecting assumption that interdisciplinary rape work need only attend to social science literature).
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theories from life science, even if true, would play out in the normative
arenas in which people process descriptions.' Most often, life science per-
spectives on the multiple causes of sexual aggression are either ignored
entirely, caricatured (as "irresistible impulse" arguments, for example), or
simply rejected as improper for polite discourse.9
Given the frequent misuse of biology by governments and lawyers
alike and the notorious attempts by some rape apologists to hide behind
misarticulations of biology, ignoring biology is understandable. The po-
tential for harm demands caution and care. Nevertheless, overcaution also
costs. Wholesale exclusion of life science perspectives may very well
come at the cost of inaccuracy-and the impediments to rape prevention
that inaccurate or incomplete theories of causation might occasion. For it is
unclear that the costs of believing something to be true, when it is not, nec-
essarily exceed the costs of believing something not to be true, when it is.
It is concern for the magnitude of these latter costs, in the context of rape,
that prompts this writing. More specifically, the costs in human misery that
might otherwise have been prevented, of mistakenly believing that the life
sciences offer no constructive perspectives on rape, if in fact they do,
might well exceed the costs of mistakenly believing there are biological
influences on patterns of rape, if in fact there are none.
To be clear: I do not intend to champion biological theories of rape
causation over social ones. For one thing, I am persuaded, for reasons
made clear hereafter, that it is meaningless and misleading to argue about
whether biological or sociocultural theories of rape are correct, for they are
rarely mutually exclusive. For another, data in support of the biological
theories are, on some important points, still inconclusive, though often no
more so than data in support of sociocultural theories. There are, however,
several important reasons-in view of recent rape-relevant developments
in law and in science-why legal thinkers should carefully consider the
possibility that the life sciences can make significant contributions to un-
derstanding rape and speeding its elimination.
First, behavioral models matter. And models that do not integrate so-
cial and life sciences into a seamless web of interconnected knowledge are
8. This is not to suggest that there is no room for informed disagreement about the usefulness of
life science perspectives in the rape context. There is. Nor am I suggesting that legal scholars skeptical
of using biobehavioral insights in other, more general, legal contexts have failed to address the issue
with some care. Professor Deborah Rhode and Dean Herma Hill Kay, for example, have each offered
constructive warnings against unreflective, improperly selective, or simplistic invocations of biology
(particularly those that may rely on passing familiarity or exaggerated media reports to justify
discriminatory treatment). See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, SPEAKING OF SEX: THE DENIAL OF GENDER
INEQUALITY 21-42 (1997); Henna Hill Kay, Perspectives on Sociobiology, Feminism, and the Law, in
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE 74 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 1990).
9. See infra Part III.
[Vol. 87:827
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rapidly obsolescing." The challenge for legal thinkers, as much with rape
as with other law-relevant behaviors, is to assess the competing claims,
from different disciplines, about causes and significance. For while law has
no truly independent theory of rape behavior, its very ability to reduce the
incidence of rape can be no more effective than the behavioral model-the
theory of causation-against which its efforts must lever." Incomplete or
flawed models of rape behavior, unintegrated with or inconsistent with
what is known about the evolution of the human brain's information-
processing patterns, portend in this legal context what incomplete or
flawed behavioral models portend in every other: that all efforts based
upon them are less likely to be successful than would be efforts based on
less incomplete or flawed behavioral models. Consequently, the effective-
ness of policies and programs for punishing and deterring rape will neces-
sarly reflect the choices legal thinkers make, as consumers of behavioral
models offered up by others. Integrative efforts can bring disparate pieces
of knowledge about rape together, to synthesize from the best aspects of
different life science and social science disciplines an organic whole that is
greater than the sum of its parts. This whole would be boundariless in its
applicability, internally consistent, and potentially practical in its applica-
tions for legal thinking.
Second, human behavior is now known to reflect evolved behavioral
predispositions that influence the probabilities of various kinds of behav-
ior. Rape behavior may be one of them. It is increasingly evident to science
that members of the human species, like members of all other animal and
plant species, exhibit a wide variety of behavioral predispositions. In our
case, these are highly contingent, and powerfully affected by environ-
mental conditions and abstract reasoning. These predispositions, as ex-
plored below, tend to reflect the accumulated effects of natural selection,
operating not only on the external form of our distant ancestors, but also on
the brain's neural architecture and information processing pathways.
Through their effects on our perceptions, emotions, and preferences, these
predispositions influence the probability that we will respond to certain
kinds of stimuli with certain kinds of behavior. In sum, the more directly
and substantially a behavior affected the reproductive success of our an-
cestors, human and nonhuman, the greater the likely effect of evolutionary
processes on the current patterns of its incidence. Because rape was
10. See John Tooby & Leda Cosmides, The Psychological Foundations of Culture, in THE
ADAPTED MIND: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE GENERATION OF CULTURE 19, 23 (Jerome H.
Barkow et al. eds., 1992).
11. See Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law: An Introduction and Application to Child
Abuse, 75 N.C. L. REv. 1117 (1997) [hereinafter Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law] (proposing
method by which law's models can be supplemented with life science theories); Owen D. Jones, Law
and Biology: Toward an Integrated Model of Human Behavior, 8 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 167,
167-73 (1997) (exploring the relationship between behavioral models and law).
1999]
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historically more likely to result in reproduction than any number of alter-
native behaviors, such as voluntary abstinence, it is plausible that behav-
ioral biology has something to contribute to an understanding of rape's
complexities.
Third, rape researchers can now point to several notable, and in some
cases startling, patterns of human rape data that seem patently inconsistent
with social science theories unsupplemented by recent life science ad-
vances. These patterns are instead consistent with testable predictions of
the biological theories, as well as with precise patterns of forced copulation
in a number of other species-including some of our closest primate rela-
tives. At the very least, the inability of popular theories to explain these
patterns parsimoniously is puzzling. At most, that inability may highlight
potentially serious weaknesses in conventional theories about the causes of
rape.
Fourth, the scholarly literature exploring the biology of rape in both
nonhuman and human animals has grown dramatically in the last twenty
years. 2 And new works, both in biology and in law, are recently pub-
lished 3 or forthcoming. 4 Given the remarkably common and commonly
perfunctory dismissals of biological theories, the law is now notably un-
prepared to assess this literature, lacking any thorough examination of
what the biological theories of sexual aggression really are.'5
12. See infra Appendix A (collecting selected sources).
13. Following a recent Colloquium on Biology and Sexual Aggression: Investigating Theories,
Data, and Implications for Law (sponsored by the National Science Foundation, The Center for the
Study of Law, Science, and Technology, and the Society for Evolutionary Analysis in Law),
Jurimetrics: The Journal of Law, Science, and Technology published Colloquium papers in two special
issues, Winter and Spring 1999. Those papers include: Katharine K. Baker, What Rape Is and What It
Ought Not to Be; Charles Crawford & Marc A. Johnston, An Evolutionary Model of Courtship and
Mating as Social Exchange; Deborah W. Denno, Evolutionary Biology and Rape; Steven Goldberg,
Statistics, Law, and Justice; Cheryl Hanna, Sometimes Sex Matters; Timothy H. Goldsmith & Owen D.
Jones, Evolutionary Biology and Behavior: A Brief Overview and Some Important Concepts; Martin L.
Lalumi~re & Vernon L. Quinsey, A Darwinian Interpretation of Individual Differences in Male
Propensity for Sexual Aggression; Neil M. Malamuth & Eldad Z. Malamuth, Integrating Multiple
Levels of Scientific Analysis and the Confluence Model of Sexual Coercers; Linda Mealey, The
Multiplicity of Rape: From Life History Strategies to Prevention Strategies; Ronald D. Nadler, Sexual
Aggression in the Great Apes: Implications for Human Law; Craig T. Palmer et al., Is It Sex Yet?
Theoretical and Practical Implications of the Debate Over Rapists' Motives; Cassia C. Spohn, The
Rape Reform Movement: The Traditional Common Law and Rape Law Reforms; Randy Thornhill, The
Biology of Human Rape.
14. See RANDY THORNHILL & CRAIG PALMER, WHY MEN RAPE, WHY WOMEN SUFFER: RAPE,
EVOLUTION, AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (forthcoming 1999) (on file with author).
15. For several useful attempts to begin incorporating these theories into law, see JOHN H.
BECKSTROM, DARWINISM APPLIED: EVOLUTIONARY PATHS TO SOCIAL GOALS 53-65 (1993); RICHARD
POSNER, SEX AND REASON 106-08, 383-404 (1992); and Brian Kennan, Evolutionary Biology and
Strict Liability for Rape, 22 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 131 (1998).
[Vol. 87:827
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Fifth, the motive for rape has recently attained greater legal signifi-
cance. 16 For example, the federal Violence Against Women Act of 1994"7
(VAWA) created a new civil rights cause of action for "crimes of violence
motivated by gender."' 8 To be "motivated by gender," violent crimes must
be: (a) "committed because of gender or on the basis of gender"; and
(b) "due, at least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gender."' 9
Legislative history makes clear that Congress did not, in the end, intend
courts to assume that all rapes were 'Thotivated by gender," and thus at
least partly animated by animus." It left to the courts (informed by legal
reasoning in other civil rights contexts)21 the task of applying these tests on
a case-by-case basis. Understanding why people rape is surely important in
this endeavor.
As scholars predicted,' litigants are hotly disputing the meaning of
"motivated by gender," and the scope of the civil rights remedy.' To date,
at least one federal court has opined that cases in which rape would not
have been "motivated by gender,' with sufficient and prerequisite animus,
"would appear to this Court to be few and far between." 4 And another
court, in the context of an unwanted fondling, has employed a standard for
animus so low that all rapes would seem to qualify.' Moreover, a number
16. See, e.g., Katharine K. Baker, Once A Rapist? Motivational Evidence and Relevancy in Rape
Law, 110 HARv. L. REv. 563 (1997).
17. Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 40111(a)-40611, 108 Stat. 1796, 1903-53 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(a) (1994). VAWA defines "crime of violence" as "an act or series of acts
that would constitute a felony against the person... and that would come within the meaning of State
or Federal offenses described in section 16 of title 18 .... Id. § 1398 1(d)(2)(A).
19. Id. § 13981(d)(1).
20. See, e.g., S. RP. No. 103-138, at 51 (1993) ("Title III does not create a general Federal law
for all ... rapes against women.'); see also Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F. Supp. 531, 541 (N.D. IM. 1997)
(so finding).
21. See, e.g., S. RE. No. 103-138, at 52 (1993) ("Proof of 'gender motivation' ... should
proceed in the same ways proof of race or sex discrimination proceeds under other civil rights laws.
Judges and juries will determine 'motivation' from the 'totality of the circumstances' surrounding the
event.").
22. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105
YALE L.J. 2117, 2200 (1996) C'[T]here will be a struggle over the scope of the civil rights
remedy .... "); see also David Frazee, An Imperfect Remedy for Imperfect Violence: The Construction
of Civil Rights in the Violence Against Women Act, 1 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 163, 182-83, 256 (1993)
(observing that the meaning of "animus" is unclear, and that courts may severely limit VAWA's
scope).
23. See, e.g., Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. and State Univ., No. 96-2316, 96-1814,
1999 WL 111891 (4th Cir. Mar. 5, 1999) (holding that Congress lacks constitutional authority to enact
the VAWA section relevant here); Doe v. Hartz, 134 F.3d 1339 (8th Cir. 1998), rev'g in part, vacating
in part Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp 1375 (N.D. Iowa 1997); Braden v. Piggly Wiggly, 4 F. Supp. 2d
1357 (M.D. Ala. 1998); Anisimov, 982 F. Supp. 531; Mattison v. Click Corp, No. Civ.A.97-CV-2736,
1998 WL 32597 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 1998).
24. Anisimov, 982 F. Supp. at 541.
25. See Doe, 970 F. Supp. at 1375, rev'd on other grounds, Doe 134 F.3d at 1339. The lower
court concluded that "because unwanted or unwelcome sexual advances may be demeaning and
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of legal commentators have started arguing for a rebuttable presumption of
animus in rape cases,26 asserting that "gender animus is an underlying
factor in almost all rapes."'27 Making motive an element of the civil rights
action therefore necessarily raises empirical questions about causation on
which science has much to say.
My goals in exploring the life science perspectives on rape are sev-
eral. Because it is evident that one of the things clouding scholarly dis-
course about the extent of biological influences on rape is widespread
misperception of the biological theories themselves, my first purpose is to
clarify for a legal audience what the main theories positing biological in-
fluences on the patterns of rape do and do not say. That is the task of Part
I.' Part II briefly surveys some of the predictions that these biobehavioral
theories generate, as well as some of the quite provocative evidence that
tests those predictions. My purpose is not to compile all the evidence, for
and against, as if I were attempting here to prove or falsify the theories.
Rather, I provide a short overview of predictions and evidence, exploring
general plausibility. This is to help legal thinkers assess whether they
should bother to study the theories separately-and then, if inclined, cri-
tique them-in greater detail.
In Part III, I offer some recommendations about how legal scholars
can process the emerging information about biobehavioral theories of sex-
ual aggression. Specifically, I explore surprisingly common, but avoidable,
analytic errors. In Part IV, I offer several observations on the vitality of
rape theories without life science perspectives, consider how the life sci-
ence theories, if true, might affect several rape myths, and discuss the pos-
sibility of integrating biobehavioral theories with social science theories.
In Part V, I speculate on concrete legal applications where biobehav-
ioral theories, if true, might make a difference. This latter foray is neces-
sarily conjectural, since one can never legitimately reason from the
explanations of biology to any normative conclusion, without importing
belittling, and may reasonably be inferred to be intended to have that purpose or to relegate another to
an inferior status, even if the advances were also intended to satisfy the actor's sexual desires, the
allegations of the 'animus' element here are sufficient." Doe, 970 F. Supp. at 1408.
26. See, e.g., Jennifer Gaffney, Note, Amending the Violence Against Women Act: Creating a
Rebuttable Presumption of Gender Animus in Rape Cases, 6 J.L. & POL'Y 247 (1997); see also Sally
Goldfarb, The Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act: Legislative History, Policy
Implications, and Litigation Strategy, 4 J.L. & PoL'y 391, 398-99 (1996) (claiming that "the burden on
the plaintiff to show gender-based animus is not as onerous as some have argued," and citing authors
who would prefer that the legislation presume that rape is always gender-motivated). One commentator
has argued that the statute should be amended to strike the animus requirement altogether, and to make
rape perse actionable under VAWA. See Frazee, supra note 22, at 242-43, 245-47.
27. Gaffney, supra note 26, at 264.
28. This Article largely follows the method for conducting evolutionary analysis in law
articulated in Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law, supra note 11.
[Vol. 87:827
HeinOnline  -- 87 Cal L. Rev. 836 1999
SEX, CULTURE, AND THE BIOLOGY OF RAPE
other values?9 No recommendations in law can follow automatically from
theories of biological influence on rape patterns, even if we were per-
suaded that any one of those theories were likely accurate. On the other
hand, given a number of social concerns our legal system already mani-
fests, and the underlying values those concerns reflect, the biobehavioral
theories of rape may soon have legal effects in the contexts of policy
choices, legislative strategies, rape trials and sentencings, and the legal
history of rape law. The better we can understand rape, the better we might
be able, through law, to prevent and deter it.
Of course, the potential for volatile controversy when discussing ei-
ther rape or human behavioral biology, let alone the two combined, rec-
ommends several important caveats. For surely some may suspect that I am
about to defend rapists as mere instruments of biological imperatives, or to
excuse (and thereby somehow to demean the significance of) acts of sexual
aggression, or to argue for mitigation of sentences because "genes made
him do it."
In truth, I intend none of these things. There is no known or antici-
pated theory of rape behavior, biological or otherwise, that excuses or jus-
tifies rape, exculpates its perpetrators, mitigates appropriate punishments,
or requires us to tolerate its existence. So that it may be clear, my purpose
is to explore ways to understand rape that may lead to more effective ways
to prevent it. If the life sciences can help to achieve that goal, then we
should explore them further. If they cannot, we may disregard them. But I
am persuaded that we cannot conclude whether exploration or disregard is
more appropriate without further examination of the life science perspec-
tives themselves.
I
PATTERNS OF RAPE: THEORIES OF BIOLOGICAL INFLUENCE
This Part provides necessary context for careful consideration of
modern life science theories about sexual aggression and forced copula-
tion. Section L.A offers a brief overview of academic research on rape, to
provide both historical perspective and a sense of where rape scholarship is
today. Section I.B describes the conceptual superstructure of behavioral
biology. It provides the essential foundation for understanding the biobe-
havioral theories of rape, which are the subject of Section I.C. In my view,
much of the confusion over biobehavioral theories of sexual aggression
traces to an incomplete grasp of these biology basics and their constituent
terms of art.
29. To do so is to commit the well-known Naturalistic Fallacy-reasoning from an "is" to an
"ought to be." See infra Section III.M.
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A. Theories of Rape: A Short History
Because numerous scholars have more than adequately chronicled the
history of most rape theories and rape law, I can limit my comments to
those that provide context.3" In the beginning, few people really cared.
Rape was considered rare and, in the eyes of many, either excusable or in-
significant.3' Most of the few early rape theorists, in the 1950s and 1960s,
were psychiatrists.32 In their view, rapists were sick individuals (different
from men in general) whose behavior reflected mental illness and
"irresistible impulses" as a function of personality, adjustment, or bio-
chemical abnormalities.33 The law dutifully adopted this perspective, and
30. For sources providing useful overviews, see ALLISON & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 5; LARRY
BARON & MURRAY A. STRAUS, FOUR THEORIES OF RAPE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (1989); BURGESS-
JACKSON, supra note 4; LEE ELLIS, THEORIES OF RAPE: INQUIRIES INTO THE CAUSES OF SEXUAL
AGGRESSION (1989); ESTRICH, supra note 3; GREGORY M. MATOESIAN, REPRODUCING RAPE:
DOMINATION THROUGH TALK IN THE COURTROOM (1993); RAPE (Sylvana Tomaselli & Roy Porter
eds., 1986); RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK (Ann Wolbert Burgess ed., 1985);
RAPE AND SOCIETY: READINGS ON THE PROBLEM OF SEXUAL ASSAULT (Patricia Searles & Ronald J.
Berger eds., 1995); RAPE AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (Jennifer Temkin ed., 1995);
SCHULHOFER, supra note 3; SEX, POWER, CONFLICT: EVOLUTIONARY AND FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES
(David M. Buss & Neil M. Malamuth eds., 1996); SCULLY, supra note 1; SEXUAL COERCION, supra
note 7; SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 4; COLLEEN A. WARD,ATTITUDES TOWARD RAPE: FEMINIST
AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (1995); Ronald J. Berger et al., The Dimensions of Rape
Reform Legislation, 22 L. & Soc'Y Rev. 329 (1988); Bienen, supra note 5; Joan Nordquist, Rape: A
Bibliography, 19 CONTEMP. SOC. ISSUES: A BIBLIOGRAPHIC SERIES 5 (1990).
31. See generally ESTRICH, supra note 3 (providing an overview of developments in rape law);
Camille E. LeGrand, Rape and Rape Laws: Sexism in Society and Law, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 919 (1973)
(same). There was little scholarship on rape before 1965. See ELIZABETH JANE KEMMER, RAPE AND
RAPE-RELATED ISSUES: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY xii (1977). Kemmer notes that
[f]rom approximately 1965 to 1968, rape literature focused on the offender and the unjust
system that convicted the falsely accused male of so heinous a crime. The sympathy of the
public was with the offender, thus making the victim the guilty party in a rape
situation.... Rape was still a fairly silent, secret crime-a crime whose victims were the
most silent of all.
Id.
32. For a short history of early psychiatric approaches to rape, see Richard T. Rada, Sexual
Psychopathology: Historical Survey and Basic Concepts, in CLINICAL ASPECTS OF THE RAPIST 1, 3-10
(Richard T. Rada ed., 1978). See also RON LANGEVIN, SEXUAL STRANDS: UNDERSTANDING AND
TREATING SEXUAL ANOMALIES IN MEN 413, 414-22 (1983) (describing psychiatric theories and
treatments for rapists).
33. See generally Diana Scully & Joseph Marolla, Rape and Vocabularies of Motive: Alternative
Perspectives, in RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT, supra note 30 (discussing vocabulary of motives in
psychiatric, psychopathological models of rape). Rapists were at the time considered to be (like
homosexuals, voyeurs, exhibitionists, and pedophiles) sexual deviants. See Samuel David Smithyman,
The Undetected Rapist 9 (1978) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School); see also
MATOESIAN, supra note 30, at 6-10. For example, Groth, a clinical psychologist and proponent of the
psychiatric perspective on rape, claimed that "[rnape is always a symptom of some psychological
dysfunction, either temporary and transient or chronic and repetitive .... The rapist is, in fact, a person
who has serious psychological difficulties which handicap him in his relationships to other people and
which he discharges, when under stress, through sexual acting out." A. NICHOLAS GROTH, MEN WHO
RAPE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE OFFENDER 5-6 (1979). Consistent with its medical model of rape,
early psychiatric treatments were oriented toward diagnosis, treatment, and rehabilitation, and included
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by 1965 thirty states had enacted sexual psychopath laws that generally
defined a rapist as "a person unable to control his sexual impulse or having
to commit sex crimes."'
As an outgrowth of commentary in the 1970s that brought women's
experiences to the fore, rape received increased scholarly attention outside
psychiatric circles. Susan Brownmiller's Against Our Will is widely cred-
ited as a principal catalyst in making rape an important topic-socially,
legally, and academically." It also helped to initiate a branching and di-
verse collection of perspectives on rape, loosely termed the feminist per-
spectives.36
Any attempt to attribute common elements to feminist perspectives is
difficult, of course, because of differences both large and subtle among
them." The majority of these perspectives, however, grow from the central
idea that rape is the consequence of: (a) social traditions that reflect male
power and dominance, on one hand, and female powerlessness and
such methods as "castration, psychosurgery, electric shock, and hormonal and mind-control drug
therapy, [and] psychotherapy .. " SCULLY, supra note 1, at 36.
34. SCULLY, supra note 1, at 35 (citing Karl M. Bowman & Bernice Engle, Sexual Psychopath
Laws, in SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND THE LAW 757 (Ralph Slovenko ed., 1965)).
35. SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE (1975). Other works
of major import included Susan Griffin, Rape: The All-American Crime, in RAMPARTS 26 (1971) and
DIANA E.H. RUSSELL, THE POLITICS OF RAPE: THE VICTIM'S PERSPECTIVE (1975). See also Craig
Palmer, Twelve Reasons Why Rape Is Not Sexually Motivated: A Skeptical Examination, 25 J. SEX
REs. 512, 513 (1988) (surveying literature). For a view of how feminism drew attention to rape, see
Vicki McNickle Rose, Rape as a Social Problem: A Byproduct of the Feminist Movement, 25 Soc.
PROBS. 75 (1977).
36. On the development of feminist perspectives generally, see JOSEPHINE DONOVAN, FEMINST
THEORY (1985); JUDITH GRANT, FUNDAMENTAL FEMINISM: CONTESTING THE CORE CONCEPTS OF
FEMINIST THEORY (1993); and ROSEMARIE TONG, FEMINIST THOUGHT: A COMPREHENSIVE
INTRODUCTION (1989). Overviews of feminist perspectives on rape include MATOESIAN, supra note 30,
at 5-22; NANCY A. MATTHEWS, CONFRONTING RAPE: THE FEMINIST ANTI-RAPE MOVEMENT AND THE
STATE (1994); RHODE, supra note 3; SCULLY, supra note 1, at 33-61; WARD, supra note 30, at 18-37;
Patricia L.N. Donat & John D'Emilio, A Feminist Redefinition of Rape and Sexual Assault: Historical
Foundations and Change, 48 J. SOC. ISSUES 9 (1992); Mary Ann Largen, The Anti-Rape
Movement: Past and Present, in RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT, supra note 30; and Rebecca M. Ryan,
The Sex Right: A Legal History of the Marital Rape Exemption, 20 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 941, 968-92
(1995).
37. For example, some feminists argue that rape is not sex. See Largen, supra note 36, at 5
(describing how the "Rape Is Violence, Not Sex" motto characterized a number of feminist efforts).
Others are of the view that rape can be sex, at least to the perpetrator, and therefore is often "just" sex
to the law. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND
LAW 160 (1987) ("Women and men know men find rape sexual. ); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON,
TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 180 (1989); see also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism,
Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635 (1983) (discussing
different feminist approaches to the subject of rape). "Some see rape as an act of violence, not
sexuality, the threat of which intimidates all women. Others see rape, including its violence, as an
expression of male sexuality, the social imperatives of which define all women." Id. at 646. For concise
descriptions of the breadth of feminist perspectives, see ALLISON M. JAGGAR, FEMINIST POLITICS AND
HUMAN NATURE 3-13 (1983), and WARD, supra note 30, at 18-37. See also SOURCEBOOK ON FEMINIST
JURISPRUDENCE (Hilaire Barnett ed., 1997); Torrey, supra note 5.
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exploitation, on the other; (b) socially stratified and unequal gender roles;
and (c) cultural attitudes and assumptions about men, women, and rape."8
In this view, patriarchal culture socializes males to be potential rapists. 9
And because rape reflects systemic political and power imbalances be-
tween men and women, rape is largely reconceptualized from a "sex"
crime (motivated by sexual desire) to a "violent" crime (motivated by mi-
sogyny).4
Sociologists, for their part, generally concurred with feminists. As
feminists were attempting to shift attention from individuals to sexist prac-
tices, sociologists were attempting to refocus rape research from rapist
motivations to the contexts in which rape occurs." From the sociological
perspectives, rape is typically a product not of individual pathology, but of
collective cultural determination42 That is, social conditions, such as cul-
tural norms, rules, and prevailing attitudes about sex, mold and structure
the behavior of the rapist within the context of the broader social system,
fostering rape-prone environments and, in effect, teaching men to rape.43
As the feminist and sociologist literature has grown, the psychopathology
model of rapists as sick people needing psychiatric treatment has suffered a
gradual decline.'
This much is widely known. Less known is that efforts to understand
rape in humans as a phenomenon unique to human culture have long been
paralleled by the efforts of biologists and animal behaviorists to understand
38. See WARD, supra note 30, at 10 (citing Rose, supra note 35; and Pamela Lakes Wood, The
Victim in a Forcible Rape Case: A Feminist View, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 335 (1973)); see also LINDA
BROOKOVER BOURQUE, DEFINING RAPE 14-58 (1989).
39. See, e.g., WARD, supra note 30, at 6; Odem & Clay-Warner, Introduction to CONFRONTING
RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT, supra note 7, at xi; Patricia Searles & Ronald J. Berger, Why Men Rape,
in RAPE & SOCIETY, supra note 30, at 1, 51. For a useful summary, see MATOESIAN, supra note 30, at
10-18.
40. See, e.g., WILLIAM B. SANDERS, RAPE AND WOMAN'S IDENTITY 22 (1980).
41. The classic early sociological text is MENACHEM AMR, PATTERNS IN FORCIBLE RAPE (1971).
See also ELAINE HILBERMAN, THE RAPE VIcTnM 28 (1976) (emphasizing the sociocultural context of
rape); SANDERS, supra note 40, at 28 (1980) ("As a focal point and perspective, sociology has taken
over the place of psychiatry in the study of rape."); Mary Beard Deming & Ali Eppy, The Sociology of
Rape, 65 Soc. & Soc. RES. 357 (1981) (same); Lorne Gibson et al., A Situational Theory of Rape, 22
CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY 51 (1980) (sociologists distinguishing sociological perspectives on rape from
prior ones); Kurt Weis & Sandra S. Borges, Victimology and Rape: The Case of the Legitimate Victim,
8 ISSUES IN CRIMINOLOGY 71 (1973).
42. See Anm, supra note 41.
43. See, e.g., SANDERS, supra note 40. There are, of course, a number of different approaches
within the sociological tradition, including cultural approaches (focusing on a society's belief and value
systems); institutional approaches (focusing on medical and justice institutions' reactions to rape); and
situational approaches (collating situational elements in rape). See id.
44. While psychopathology remains today a viable explanation for the behavior of some rapists
in special cases, see infra note 177, it has been unpopular as an explanation for rape behavior generally
since roughly the late 1970s. See MATOESIAN, supra note 30, at 6. For a recent review of psychiatric
perspectives, see Elizabeth Janssen, Understanding the Rapist's Mind, PERsP. PSYCHIATRIC CARE, Oct.-
Dec. 1995, at 9.
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widespread male-female sexual aggression among many other species. The
literature on animal sexual aggression has grown steadily over the last
thirty years as a subset of the massive literature on aggression generally.
Only rarely have researchers on either side of the social science and life
science divide attempted to engage each other directly. And many attempts
have been famously unproductive.4"
Much of this failure to integrate social and life sciences perspectives
on rape traces back to culture and vocabulary, as each of the relevant disci-
plines sports its own goals, traditions, and essential terms of art. Some of
the failure traces to disciplinary xenophobia, with each tribe suspicious of
the motives and meanings of the other. But more important than the early
causes and actual history of this interdisciplinary miscommunication, for
present purposes, is the simple fact that the legal academy faces seemingly
competing claims about the causes of a behavior it must help to stop.
Evaluating these claims requires some scholarly facility in their underlying
logic.
The claims and logic of social science theories of rape are today suffi-
ciently distributed and well-known within the legal community that I will
assume some general familiarity.' I now turn to examine current thinking
in biology about possible influences of evolutionary processes and history
on human patterns of behavior generally, and on sexually aggressive be-
havior in particular.
B. Core Principles of Behavioral Biology
Theories of possible biobehavioral influences on rape patterns in hu-
mans are not free-standing. They rest on, and derive logical support from,
several core principles of modern biology that are uncontroversial within
45. For example, in 1983 psychology Professor Delbert D. Thiessen was invited to give a
"Fellow's Address" at the meeting of the Division for Comparative and Physiological Psychology at
the annual convention of the American Psychological Association. He entitled his talk "Rape as a
Reproductive Strategy: Our Evolutionary Legacy." In advance of the talk, several critics charged that
the title, as publicized, was offensive-in that it suggested that rape was an acceptable method for
procreating. Hostile reaction inspired a small book from the critics: VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: A
CRITIQUE OF THE SOCIOBIOLOGY OF RAPE (Suzanne R. Sunday & Ethel Tobach eds., 1985) [hereinafter
SUNDAY & TOEACH], in which some history of this episode is recounted. In my view, this unfortunate
incident is traceable, in large part, to the cross-disciplinary ambiguity of the term of art "reproductive
strategy"-which has a normative implication in lay minds, and no such implication to evolutionists.
See, e.g., Julie Blackman, The Language of Sexual Violence: More Than a Matter of Semantics, in
SUNDAY & TOBACH, supra, at 115, 126 ("Strategies and legacies are connotatively positive .... ").
There are signs, however, that dialogue bridging the life science and social science perspectives on
rape is successfully re-emerging. For example, the Arizona State University Center for the Study of
Law, Science, and Technology, together with the National Science Foundation and the Society for
Evolutionary Analysis in Law, sponsored an interdisciplinary Colloquium on Biology and Sexual
Aggression: Investigating Theories, Data, and Implications for Law. The Colloquium brought together
academics in law, biology, primatology, sociology, anthropology, psychology, and several other
disciplines. For published papers, see supra note 13.
46. See, for example, sources cited supra notes 3 & 30.
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relevant scientific communities, and without which these theories might
appear simply incomprehensible.47 We look first to the relationship be-
tween brain biology and behavior (which subjects some behaviors to evo-
lutionary processes), then to the principles of natural and sexual selection
(processes that strongly affect the distribution, within a population, of be-
havioral predispositions), and thereafter to the evolution of "species-
typical" or "evolved" psychologies, which biologists tell us are widely
shared within each living animal species, including humans.
1. From Brains to Behavior
At the most general level, the architecture and function of the brain is
as much a product of evolution as the architecture and function of the hand,
heart, or stomach. The brain is an organ adapted to performing certain
kinds of tasks, and certain kinds of tasks better than others. Like all aspects
of animal morphology, it is best at performing those tasks that contributed
to solving problems faced by evolutionary ancestors in various ancestral
environments (commonly termed, for each adaptation, the Environment of
Evolutionary Adaptation, or "EEA").45 It solved these problems in part by
causing different states of the nervous system (which, like hunger, increase
the probability of certain kinds of behaviors) to follow from perception of
different environmental stimuli (which, like locating a high-calorie food,
render some of the many possible responsive behaviors more appropriate
than others). To the extent that ensuing populations of a species encoun-
tered similar environmental challenges, over generations, increasing pro-
portions of the population in each generation tended to share the best
47. A more thorough treatment of this subject is beyond the scope of this Article, of course, and
anything more than an introductory familiarity with behavioral biology principles requires separate
study. A more comprehensive introduction to law-relevant principles of behavioral biology, written
specifically for legal thinkers without biology backgrounds, appears in Part I. A Primer in Law-
Relevant Evolutionary Biology, of Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law, supra note 11, at 1127-57, on
which some portions of the ensuing material draw. See also Goldsmith & Jones, supra note 13. More
thorough treatments of modem behavioral biology for the general audience include: TIMOTHY H.
GOLDSMITH, THE BIOLOGICAL ROOTS OF HUMAN NATURE: FORGING LINKS BETWEEN EVOLUTION
AND BEHAVIOR (1991); MATT RIDLEY, THE RED QUEEN: SEX AND THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN
NATURE (1994); ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND
EVERYDAY LIFE 55-107 (1994). Accessible textbooks, for gaining more technical familiarity,
include: JOHN ALCOCK, ANIMAL BEHAVIOR: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH (6th ed. 1998); MARTIN
DALY & MARGO WILSON, SEX, EVOLUTION, AND BEHAVIOR (2d ed. 1983); SCOTT FREEMAN & JON C.
HERRON, EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS (1998); DOUGLAS J. FUTUYMA, EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY (2d ed.
1986); TIMOTHY H. GOLDSMITH & WILLIAM F. ZIMMERMAN, BIOLOGY, EVOLUTION, AND HUMAN
NATURE (forthcoming 1999); J.R. KRaBS & N.B. DAVIES, AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIOURAL
ECOLOGY (3d ed. 1993); MARK RIDLEY, EVOLUTION (1993); ROBERT TRiVERS, SOCIAL EVOLUTION
(1985).
48. "The mind is a system of organs of computation, designed by natural selection to solve the
kinds of problems our ancestors faced in their foraging way of life, in particular understanding and
outmaneuvering objects, animals, plants, and other people." STEVEN PINKER, How THE MIND WORKS
21(1997).
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available problem-solving, behavior-biasing brain characteristics inherited
from successful ancestors.
It is difficult to see how evolutionary processes shaped the human
brain, increment by increment, without first appreciating evolutionary
time.49 The human species, like every other living species, is the product of
roughly 3.9 billion years of evolution. Our ancestors had evolved into
mammals only 200 million years ago, and into what we think of as pri-
mates only 70 million years ago5 Roughly 6 million years ago (following
64 million years of shared primate history) our earliest hominid ancestors
parted biological ways with the direct ancestors of today's chimpanzees
and bonobos, our closest primate relatives. And yet it was still not until
merely 35,000 years ago that our own subspecies of Homo sapiens (which
we imagine when we think of ourselves) had apparently displaced our
competing subspecies, Homo sapiens neanderthalensis, causing the latter's
extinction.5
During all this time the precursors to our current human brains con-
tinued to evolve. To the extent variation in brain structures affected be-
havior, behavioral outcomes affected changes in brain form and function
across generations. More specifically, to the extent that patterns of infor-
mation processing led to general psychologies that tended, in turn, to in-
crease the probability of useful behaviors, and to decrease the probability
of reproductively unhelpful or harmful behaviors, heritable patterns in the
way human brains process information evolved. During all of evolutionary
time leading to the present, the behavioral predispositions of our ancestors
were sifted according to specific and relentless principles, the details of
which provide a window to the modem human mind.
To see this, remember that every organism alive today is descended
from first life on this planet in an unbroken chain of "reproductively
successful" parents.52 That is, none of our individual ancestors, unlike
49. See generally RICHARD DAWKINS, CLIMBING MOUNT IMPROBABLE (1996) (addressing often
counter-intuitive processes by which complexity can emerge by increments).
50. See RICHARD COWEN, HISTORY OF LiFE 33,284, 390 (2d ed. 1995).
51. See id. at 419-21; see also IAN TATrERSALL, THE FossIL TRItL: How WE KNOW WHAT WE
THINK WE KNOW ABOUT HUMAN EVOLUTION 229-46 (1995); IAN TATTERSALL, THE LAST
NEANDERTHAL: THE RISE, SUCCESS, AND MYSTERIOUS EXTINCTION OF OUR CLOSEST RELATIVES 174-
99 (1995).
52. The term "reproductive success" has very specific meanings. It is often used in the narrow
sense of "direct fitness" (which includes genes replicated only in direct descendants) and is often
distinguished from "indirect fitness" (which includes the genes replicated indirectly by increasing the
reproduction of non-descendent kin). See ALCOCK, supra note 47, at 566-69, G2, G5; see also infra
note 53 (discussing "inclusive fitness"). To avoid confusion, reproductive success is used here in the
broader sense also common in ethological literature. See, e.g., Paul Turke & L.L. Betzig, Those Who
Can Do: Wealth, Status, and Reproductive Success on Ifaluk, 6 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 79, 79
(1985) C'Modem Darwinian theory predicts that human behavior will be adaptive, that is, designed to
promote maximum reproductive success (RS) through available descendent and nondescendent
relatives.") (emphasis added).
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many of their contemporaries, died without offspring that themselves had
offspring. The heritable physical and behavioral characteristics of indi-
viduals that are reproductively successful are simply far more likely to ap-
pear in any later generation than are heritable characteristics of the myriad
individuals that were not reproductively successful. Consequently, herita-
ble traits that persist within species for any substantial length of evolution-
ary time, including traits within brain function that affect the probability of
different behaviors, generally can be understood in relation to their average
effects on the reproductive success of organisms that bear them. 3
2. Natural Selection
Because unchecked reproduction tends to yield geometric increases in
a species' population size at the same time that exploitable resources of the
world are ultimately finite, evolutionary processes are inherently competi-
tive.' The de facto competition for genetic representation in each succes-
sive generation is powerfully influenced by the process known as natural
selection.5 Natural selection effectively punishes characteristics that do not
contribute to their own replication at least as well as do other contempora-
neously existing characteristics, by diminishing their proportional repre-
sentation in future populations.
The essential key to understanding the effects of natural selection's
incessant sifting of physical and behavioral characteristics, over long
53. We know for certain that every creature, at every moment, is the product of ancestors
traceable back in time, generation by generation. Yet not every creature will itself become an ancestor.
Only the heritable physical and behavioral characteristics of ancestors stand a chance of being
replicated into successive generations and of traveling down through time to that slice of time we
happen to be studying. See generally RICHARD DAWKINS, RIVER OUT OF EDEN: A DARWINIAN Vi EW
OF LIFE 1-29 (1995) (highlighting evolutionary significance of ancestors with metaphor comparing
genetically influenced traits to a digital river, flowing through time).
Reproductive success is not measured in offspring alone, however, for offspring are not the only
genetic relatives an individual has. Since other relatives also share genes with an individual, their
reproductive success also contributes to the individual's reproductive success, and one needs to take
account of the extent to which an individual has increased the reproductive success of its relatives
(discounted by their degree of relatedness). This cumulated, additive calculation of reproductive
success is known as "inclusive fitness." See ALCOCK, supra note 47, at 561-69. Consequently, an
organism can be reproductively successful by increasing its inclusive fitness, even if it does not itself
have offspring.
54. As economist Jack Hirshleifer has observed, Darwin's ideas are consistent with universal
economic laws: The patterns of social organization "are the product of scarcity of resources, of the
limited availabilities of materials and energy in the face of the unlimited expansive tendency of life." J.
Hirshleifer, Natural Economy Versus Political Economy, 1 J. Soc. & BIOLOGICAL STRUCuRs 319,
337 (1978).
55. Technically, natural selection is one of four factors influencing gene frequencies. See
GOLDSMITH, supra note 47, at 29-31. The other three are: (1) mutation, involving replication errors in
genetic codes; (2) gene flow, referring to migration of genes between populations due to the movement
of organisms carrying them; and (3) random drift, which describes effects of chance events, such as
accident or disease, on reproductive success. Of these four, natural selection has by far the most
powerful influence. See id.
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periods of time, lies in recognizing the inevitable result of combining three
fundamental features of life on our planet:
(1) Heredity-Genetically influenced physical and behavioral
traits sometimes pass from parent to offspring (in which case they
are called "heritable")5
(2) Variation-Individuals of a species may differ in their physical
and behavioral traits. 7
(3) Differential Reproduction-Some inherited traits will enable
some individuals possessing them to leave more offspring and re-
productive relatives than other individuals."
Organisms that are not genetically identical often will differ in their
physical and behavioral traits (resulting in within-species "variation").
Each genetically influenced (and thus "heritable") trait will prove
"adaptive" (that is, advantageous), "maladaptive" (that is, disadvanta-
geous), or "neutral" with respect to its effect on the reproductive success of
the organism bearing it. 9 When a heritable trait is adaptive, and increases
an individual's reproductive success relative to the reproductive success of
the individual's contemporaries (resulting in "differential reproduction"),
then that trait will correspondingly increase in prevalence in successive
generations of a population, reflecting the awesome power of exponential
growth." For example, even a heritable trait providing its possessor with a
mere 1% reproductive advantage over its contemporaries will swell (all
else being equal) from 1% representation in a population to 99% in a mere
56. See ALCOCK, supra note 47, at 14-16.
57. See id. Variations are the things that prevent us from calling parent and offspring "identical."
Variations relevant to the discussion at this point are those that are genetically heritable. These are
ultimately caused by mutation, and later augmented (in many species) by recombination. See
GOLDSMITH, supra note 47, at 29-30.
58. See ALCOCK, supra note 47, at 14-16.
59. In other words, the trait might (1) promote reproductive success (as through improved
detection of predators); (2) impede reproductive success (as through an urge to run toward, rather than
away from, a predator); or (3) have no effect whatsoever on reproductive success (as through
introduction of genes that never activate, and therefore have no significance for the organism bearing
them). In reality, very few variations are adaptive as there are more ways to worsen something than to
improve it. However, because even infrequently occurring adaptive variations tend, on average, to
supplant less adaptive alternatives over successive generations, physical structures and behavioral
tendencies that most efficiently contribute to individual reproductive success become increasingly
prominent. By this process, "behavioral tendencies which are optimal for maximizing an individual's
reproduction become characteristic of the population." Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, Discriminative
Parental Solicitude: A Biological Perspective, 42 J. MARIAGE & FAM. 277, 278 (1980).
60. As Martin Daly and Margo Wilson explain, "Random variation is ceaselessly generated in
populations of reproducing organisms and is then winnowed by nonrandom differential survival and
reproduction, with the result that the more successful forms proliferate while their alternatives perish,
and adaptive complexity is cumulative over generations." Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, Evolutionary
Psychology and Marital Conflict: The Relevance of Stepchildren, in Buss & MALAMuTH, supra note
30, at 9, 10.
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265 generations.6' Conversely, when a heritable trait is maladaptive, and
decreases the reproductive success of the organism bearing it relative to the
reproductive success of the organism's contemporaries, then that trait, on
average, will decrease in prevalence in successive generations. This phe-
nomenon, which the term "natural selection" captures, therefore can be
understood as one of the principal processes governing the relative propor-
tions of the various physical and behavioral traits that are observable in any
particular generation of a species.62 Although rapid changes in environ-
mental conditions can render historically adaptive traits maladaptive,
species-typical traits will tend to reflect long-prevailing environmental
conditions in that species' ancestry.
For present purposes it is important to underscore that natural selec-
tion affects species-typical behavioral characteristics, as well as physical
ones, because behavior has material causes that lie in the structural proper-
ties of the physical brain. 3 Every behavior has consequences, and natural
selection therefore operates inexorably upon those genetically influenced
behaviors that serve to differentiate individual organisms in ways that af-
fect reproductive success0 The significance of this, for the evaluation of
the biobehavioral theories of sexual aggression in the next Section, is that
evolutionary processes inevitably create species-typical, or in some cases
sex-typical or age-typical, "evolved psychologies." These are physical,
widely shared, information-processing pathways that have probabilistic
effects on behavior, or effects that tend to yield some behaviors (in given
circumstances) more than others.65
61. See TRIVERS, supra note 47, at 28-29; see also PINKER, supra note 48, at 164 ("If a mutant
produces just 1 percent more offspring than its rivals, it can increase its representation in a population
from 0.1 percent to 99.9 percent in just over four thousand generations.").
62. See Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law, supra note 11, at 1137-39, for a useful exercise that
helps to clarify this concept.
63. See ALCOCK, supra note 47, at 57-88; MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA, NATURE'S MIND: THE
BIOLOGICAL ROOTS OF THINKING, EMOTIONS, SEXUALITY, LANGUAGE, AND INTELLIGENCE (1992);
QUANTITATIVE GENETIC STUDIES OF BEHAVIORAL EVOLUTION (Christine R.B. Boake ed., 1994);
TRIVERS, supra note 47; Ralph J. Greenspan, Understanding the Genetic Construction of Behavior, Sci.
AM., Apr. 1995, at 72, 72-78; A Special Report, Genes and Behavior, 264 Sci. 1686, 1686-1739
(1994) (collection of articles).
64. See ROBERT A. HINDE, ETHOLOGY 102 (1982).
65. Randy and Nancy Thomhill describe it this way:
Psychological adaptations are information-processing mechanisms that provided solutions to
information-processing problems that influenced reproductive fitness during human
evolution. As a result of selection during long-term human evolution, human psychological
adaptations are specially engineered for processing nonarbitrary environmental information
and thereby guiding behavior toward adaptive ends.
Randy Thomhill & Nancy Wilmsen Thomhill, Coercive Sexuality of Men: Is There a Psychological
Adaptation to Rape?, in SEXUAL COERCION, supra note 7, at 91, 93.
These pathways can be extremely context-sensitive. As Tim Goldsmith describes the "Garcia
Effect," rats made ill by x-ray doses delivered after eating will associate their delayed distress with the
taste but not with the shape or color of the food. Conversely, if given a shock while eating, rats
remember visual or auditory cues, but not taste cues. As a function of natural selection, eating-related
[Vol. 87:827
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Nonetheless, heritable and ultimately species-typical psychologies
should not be considered genetically "determined." Because circumstances
vary significantly, an ability to shift among a variety of potential behaviors
in response to endlessly shifting environmental conditions is itself adap-
tive.'s For example, genetically influenced behavioral algorithms rendering
an organism's aggressiveness particularly sensitive to the relative value of
the territory it defends (say in food quality and abundance), and to the
relative size of any challenger for that territory, tend to increase in fre-
quency over successive generations compared to similar algorithms that
cause fleeing or fighting behavior insensitive to the value of guarded terri-
tory. Many creatures therefore exhibit relatively simple condition-sensitive
or "conditional" strategies that are continuously honed by natural selec-
tion.67 Additionally, in species that have evolved advanced cognitive ca-
pacities, behavioral plasticity is further increased by an ability to analyze a
very large number of variables, to assess probable outcomes as a conse-
quence of given behaviors, and to choose among them. Our own species is
clearly the best example of precisely how adaptive evolved behavioral
flexibility can be. It is important to recognize that the existence of such
flexibility not only fails to eclipse the influence of condition-dependent
predispositions, but is in fact a manifestation and extension of the same
evolutionary forces that gave rise to them.
Natural selection, then, is a nondirectedyet nonrandom process of dif-
ferential reproduction. Natural selection leads to evolution when there is
genetic variation. Evolution by natural selection tends to make members of
existing species look as if they were designed, both physically and behav-
iorally, to survive and reproduce in the ecological niche in which they have
long existed." To understand the "units" of selection on which natural se-
lection operates, it is important to recognize that typically only those traits
that at a minimum help individuals to improve their reproductive success
can proliferate. Heritable traits that might help the group or species to sur-
vive, at the expense of individual gains to reproductive success, would
cues are far more readily associated with subsequent internal distress than auditory or visual cues. See
GOLDSMITH, supra note 47, at 97-98.
66. A species' increasing behavioral plasticity inevitably carries its own costs, however, in terms
of increased brain size (required by increased computational power), delayed reaction time, and the
like.
67. See, e.g., ALcoCK, supra note 47, at 404-06, 411-20, 446-47, 622-24. Game theory helps to
illuminate the content of these strategies. See, e.g., GAME THEORY AND ANIMAL BEHAviouR (Lee Alan
Dugatkin & Hudson Kern Reeve eds., 1998).
68. Richard Dawkins calls evolution by natural selection the "blind watchmaker," as an implicit
refutation of the creationist argument that such design implies a conscious designer, in the same way
that a watch supposedly implies a watchmaker. See DAWKINS, supra note 49, at 4-5. Though its
influence surrounds us, we know natural selection only by silhouette, as it incessantly eliminates traits
carried by organisms that reproduce less successfully than their contemporaries.
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generally diminish toward disappearance. 69 This means that under most
circumstances natural selection operates primarily at the level of the indi-
vidual or gene and not at the level of the group.70 In other words, it is un-
likely that traits will arise and persist in individuals if they benefit the
group at the expense of an individual's own reproductive success.'
3. Sexual Selection
Natural selection's relentless sweeping away of individuals with rela-
tively low reproductive success inevitably exposes, like rocks at low tide, a
variety of more successful "reproductive strategies" for generating rela-
tives.72 These are simply the different successful combinations of physio-
logical and behavioral pathways to becoming an ancestor that natural
selection has not swept from existence. These include, for example, not
only a wide variety of strategies exhibiting different amounts of offspring
produced and parental effort invested, but also, importantly, the evolved
phenomenon of sexual reproduction itself.73 For species that reproduce
sexually, the process by which evolutionary pressures tend to yield ana-
tomical and behavioral differences between male and female is termed
"sexual selection."'74
69. Think, for example, of a heritable trait in deer predisposing its possessors to raise, during
times of overpopulation, far fewer offspring than they are physically capable of raising, or of a
heritable trait in trees predisposing its possessors to grow less tall-on the chance that all members of
the species would benefit by collecting the same amount of sunlight as they do now if they halted their
competitive, intraspecies height race. Such traits would be at an extreme disadvantage relative,
respectively, to a trait prompting unrestrained reproductive effort, or unrestricted competition for more
sunlight.
70. See RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (1976); FUTUYMA, supra note 47, at 114-31;
HINDE, supra note 64, at 142-53; TRIVERS, supra note 47, at 67-85. See also GEORGE C. WILLIAMS,
ADAPTATION AND NATURAL SELECTION: A CRITIQUE OF SOME CURRENT EVOLUTIONARY THOUGHT
(1966), which is considered to have eviscerated "naive" group selectionism as espoused by V. C.
Wynne-Edwards in ANIMAL DISPERSION IN RELATION TO SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR (1962). But seeELLIOTT
SOBER & DAVID SLOAN WILSON, UNTO OTHERS: THE EVOLUTION AND PSYCHOLOGY OF UNSELFISH
BEHAVIOR (1998), and David Sloan Wilson & Elliott Sober, Reintroducing Group Selection to the
Human Behavioral Sciences, 17 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 585 (1994), which argue for limited
reintroduction of group selectionism.
71. The questions this raises with respect to the evolution of cooperation and altruism are
addressed briefly in Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law, supra note 11, at 1146-51, and sources there
cited.
72. "Reproductive strategies" is plural here because, while natural selection favors physical
structures and behavioral predispositions that together function successfully to transfer genes to
subsequent generations, there are many different successful combinations. These vary according to the
number of offspring one produces, the extent to which each offspring is cared for after birth, whether
reproduction is asexual or sexual, and so forth. See generally sources cited supra note 47.
73. See generally Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law, supra note 11, at 1142-44.
74. Darwin first described sexual selection in Chapter IV of On the Origin of Species by Means
of Natural Selection (1859), and later elaborated on the concept at length in The Descent of Man and
Selection in Relation to Sex (1871). For modem elaboration, see GOLDSMITH, supra note 47, at 43-45,
49-67; JAMES L. GOULD & CAROL GRANT GOULD, SEXUAL SELECTION (1989); ANDERS PAPE MOLLER,
SEXUAL SELECTION AND THE BARN SWALLOW 1-17 (1994); MATT RIDLEY,supra note 47, at 131-69;
[Vol. 87:827
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Sexual selection is one of the most critical and empirically robust
principles in all of biology, and it is impossible to grasp the logical struc-
ture of the biological theories of sexual aggression without understanding
it. The phenomenon of sexual selection arises from the simple facts that
sexual reproduction requires mating, and mating requires mates. The com-
petition to attract mates and to exclude rivals necessarily imposes evolu-
tionary pressures. These pressures often bring individuals within a species
into direct conflict, and often expose areas of conflict even between indi-
viduals, such as mated males and females, that have clearly overlapping
interests.
We can explore this phenomenon by example. In any species that has
evolved to reproduce sexually, to fertilize internally, and to produce live
young, one sex typically must invest more in the creation of a viable off-
spring than must the other sex. Make no mistake, it is possible (and often
preferable from the standpoint of both male and female) for each of the
two parents to invest heavily. But the critical aspect here is that there is a
concrete difference between the sexes in the minimum investment neces-
sary to an offspring's birth.
In addition to mating time and energy, for example, the minimum
(sometimes sole) male investment is typically sperm itself. On the other
hand, if copulation yields conception, the female must continue to invest in
the organism growing within her, frequently for long periods.75 And, in
many species, vulnerable young offspring cannot survive without some
significant postbirth maternal investment, such as nursing. Following con-
ception in such a species, the male investment, although useful, is neither
necessary nor alone sufficient for birth and adequate infant care.
This stark disparity in minimum investment between males and fe-
males in such a species produces a corresponding disparity in potential
cost-benefit payoffs for every act of copulation. From a single act of
copulation, and no more, a male might gain an offspring that carries his
genes into future generations. And he is immediately capable of conceiving
another, with another female. For the female, in contrast, a single act of
copulation might also yield an offspring, but only after it is grown within
her, and later nourished (with or without paternal investment). The mini-
mum necessary investment per offspring by females is vast compared to
TkvERS, supra note 47, at 203-70; Douglas T. Kenrick & Melanie Trost, The Evolutionary
Perspective, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GENDER (Anne E. Beall & Robert J. Steinberg eds., 1993); Robert
L. Trivers, Parental Investment and Sexual Selection, in SEXUAL SELECTION AND THE DESCENT OF
MAN 136 (B. Campbell ed., 1972). Sexual selection is commonly considered to be a sub-aspect of
natural selection, rather than something entirely different. See, e.g., HELENA CRONIN, THE ANT AND
THE PEACOCK: ALTRUISM AND SEXUAL SELECTION FROM DARWIN TO TODAY 234 (1991).
75. The modem availability of abortion in the human context has no bearing on this point, since
only in recent human evolutionary history have females become technologically capable of safely
aborting a fetus.
1999]
HeinOnline  -- 87 Cal L. Rev. 849 1999
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
that by males. Internally gestating females are thus bound by the limits of
their own bodies. The theoretical maximum number of children a female
human could mother, for example, even assuming that each pregnancy
brought multiple births, likely hovers near one hundred, with a practical
limit probably in the vicinity of thirty. The maximum number of young a
male could father, on the other hand, is limited only by the number of fe-
males he can inseminate. The theoretical maximum number of children a
male human could father might number in the thousands.
In all species reflecting this disparity in reproductive maxima, the
variation in lifetime reproductive success among males is far greater than
that among females. Indeed in many mammalian species, such as sea lions,
an average male may die without offspring, while the same is virtually
never true of the average female. Natural selection therefore inevitably fa-
vors behavioral differences between males and females in some reproduc-
tive arenas.' Because maximum male reproductive success is most limited
by access to fertile females (rather than production of sperm), while maxi-
mum female reproductive success is most limited by less frequent, length-
ier, and more energetically costly reproductive episodes (rather than by
sexual access to willing males), two critical features of sexual selection
typically emerge: (1) greater male-male than female-female competition
for mates; and (2) greater female than male choice, on average over a
population, regarding who one's mate will be.T
4. The Evolution of Species-Typical Human Behavior
Thus far, it should be clear that persistent patterns in physical and be-
havioral traits of living things vary as a function of reproductive success."
Reproductive success is then, in turn, mediated by the force of natural se-
lection, the pressure of which yields reproductive strategies. Some of these
76. See generally ALCOCK, supra note 47; FUTUYMA, supra note 47; GOLDSMITH, supra note 47;
GOLDSMITH & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 47; KREBS & DAVIES, supra note 47; MARK RIDLEY, supra
note 47; TRIVERS, supra note 47; Daly & Wilson, Discriminative Parental Solicitude, supra note 59;
Bobbi S. Low, Human Sex Differences in Behavioral Ecological Perspective 16 ANALYSE & KEITIK
38 (1994); Felicia Pratto, Sexual Politics: The Gender Gap in the Bedroom, the Cupboard, and the
Cabinet, in Buss & MALAMUTH, supra note 30, at 179, 202-03. For additional explanations, see MATT
RIDLEY, supra note 47; WRIGHT, supra note 47; Kingsley R. Browne, Sex and Temperament in Modem
Society: A Darwinian View of the Glass Ceiling and the Gender Gap, 37 ARIz. L. REv. 971, 985-1016
(1995).
77. See MOLLER, supra note 74, at 3. Exceptions prove the rule. In seahorses, for example, in
which female seahorses inject eggs into the male's body where they develop, the females are the more
active sex in courtship. See MATT RIDLEY, supra note 47, at 180-8 1. Also, predictably larger and more
brightly colored female phalaropes, such as sea snipes, display and fight for males, who, in these bird
species, provide the larger share of egg-tending. See ALCOCK, supra note 47, at 499-500; TRIVERS,
supra note 47, at 215-19; WRIGHT, supra note 47, at 48. The principle remains the same: the sex that
can invest less in offspring competes for access to members of the sex that must invest more.
78. Recall that "reproductive success" is measured not in offspring, but in copies of genes
appearing in relatives. See supra notes 52-53.
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strategies are sexual, resulting in sexual selection, and all involve delicate
trade-offs regarding the amount and kind of parental investment. The im-
portant point is that these trade-offs introduce into the evolutionary game
varying degrees of intraspecies conflict and cooperation, the varieties and
combinations of which describe much of the vast diversity of animal be-
havior. But how do these concepts affect humans?
To a biologist, all the foregoing is of great significance to the under-
standing of human behavior.79 The general, evolutionary processes order-
ing the existence and persistence of heritable traits, and the increasing or
decreasing prominence of these traits among successive populations, are
not materially controversial topics within the scientific community. Be-
cause all available evidence indicates that these various evolutionary proc-
esses have affected all species that ever lived, and because Homo sapiens
sapiens is descended from pre-existing species, it is at least clear that these
evolutionary processes affected the physical form and behavior of human
ancestors at some time.8 The logic of parsimony mandates a rebuttable
presumption that they still do, even if to a lesser degree.
For legal thinkers, who are charged in part with designing legal
mechanisms to effect specific changes in human behavior, the evolution of
distinctly human psychology and behavior means several things. First and
foremost, it means that it is pointless to conceptualize any law-relevant
behavior as the product of nature or of nurture. Asking whether a particular
behavior is the product of nature (genetic influences) or of nurture
(environmental influences) is like asking whether the area of a field is de-
termined by its length or by its width.' It is necessarily a product of both.
Neither nature nor nurture has any meaning, for any organism, except in
concert with the other. Similarly, behavior, including human behavior, not
only can have but always does have simultaneous proximate (immediate)
and ultimate (evolutionary) causes.82
Second, understanding the evolutionary processes affecting human
behaviors clarifies that combinations of genes may "predispose" without
rigidly "determining." This has consequences for law because we tend to
divide people into those "responsible" for their behaviors and those who
are not, as if responsibility is dichotomous, rather than continuous, in the
79. For further background, see sources cited supra note 47.
80. See Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law, supra note 11, at 1152-55.
81. For cogent attacks on the meaninglessness of the nature versus nurture dichotomy, see MATT
RIDLEY, supra note 47, at 175, 316-20; and Paul R. Abramson & Steven D. Pinkerton,
Introduction: Nature, Nurture, and In-Between, in SEXUAL NATURE, SEXUAL CULTURE (Paul R.
Abramson & Steven D. Pinkerton eds., 1995).
82. "Proximate" and "ultimate" are terms of art in biology. For more on their importance, see
infra text accompanying notes 162-170. On proximate and ultimate causation generally, seeALCocK,
supra note 47, at 2-6; GOLDSMITH, supra note 47, at 3-11, 46-69; John Alcock & Paul Sherman, The
Utility of the Proximate-Ultimate Dichotomy in Ethology, 96 ETHOLOGY 58 (1994); Low, supra note
76, at 40-42.
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presence of biological influences. It is precisely because evolutionary
processes favored behavioral plasticity that (with the exception of reflexes
and the like) genes do not generally determine our behavior as if we were
"hard-wired" to respond inevitably to a certain stimulus with a single,
corresponding act. The species-typical analytic abilities of our human
brains evolved as surely as did the cranial capacity of the skull that shields
them. Gene combinations can provide behavioral propensities that simply
affect the probability that an organism bearing them will behave in some
way. Stated differently, evolutionary processes leave all organisms with
many predispositions to respond to environmental stimuli in various fash-
ions-but how strongly the predispositions affect behavior can vary widely
among species, individuals, and circumstances.83
Third, some behavioral predispositions, including some human ones,
are inherited according to definite rules. Because resources are finite at the
same time that populations can grow exponentially, the relative proportions
within a population of alternative heritable predispositions are inevitably
governed by a process of natural selection. That process tends to favor over
time those among contemporaneously existing predispositions that more
efficiently translate resources into reproduction. That is, when different
heritable predispositions unequally influence the reproductive success of
the organisms bearing them (including the reproduction of genetic rela-
tives), those predispositions tending to increase it by the greatest amount
will tend to appear in increasing proportions of successive populations.
Over many generations, alternative predispositions will tend to dwindle
and disappear. We can use this knowledge in making law because it helps
us understand the patterned relationships between behaviors that we use
the law to change and environmental conditions that law sometimes can
control.
Fourth, the economic nature of such competition tends to yield herita-
ble predispositions toward condition-dependent patterns of cooperation and
conflict (as well as, incidentally, toward condition-dependent deception,
self-deception, and counter-deception). At any given time, most organisms
within a species will share certain evolved psychological mechanisms, with
predictable variations as a function of such things as age and sex, that will
predispose them toward behaviors that were, on average, adaptive for
similarly situated organisms during the environment of evolutionary adap-
tation.
83. Moreover, the influence of genes on behavior, though often manifest, is rarely quantifiable
with precision, like force, mass, or energy. Because there is no single gene "for" any complex human
behavior, even the presence of genes that increase the likelihood of a behavior never guarantees that it
will or will not occur. There is no more a single gene for "altruism," for example, than there is for a
hand or face.
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Consequently, understanding the evolutionary processes by which
species-typical patterns of information processing came to be as they are
today is relevant to the legal system. This relevance turns on the extent to
which modem environmental circumstances affect brain operation in ways
that tend to increase or decrease the probability of law-relevant behaviors
in generally predictable ways. Of course, this contextualized and systemic
understanding of human behavior affords law little predictive power about
the behavior of a single, identified human individual. (In like fashion, even
useful meteorology affords little predictive power about the movement of a
single cloud.)' Instead, an understanding of evolved, species-typical hu-
man psychology affords very powerful predictions about the patterns that
will tend to emerge from the aggregated behaviors of individuals of our
species, numbered in the many millions. And, in turn, such an understand-
ing can facilitate social and legal changes to a population' s environment in
ways intended to effect changes in the incidence of those behaviors.
C. Biobehavioral Theories of Rape
This review of the history of rape theories and the basic principles of
behavioral biology leads us to the matter at hand, the biobehavioral theo-
ries of rape. Alert readers will question whether the word "rape," with its
many nuanced manifestations and meanings, can and should be used in
nonhuman contexts. This is a good question. In the end, I have elected to
use 'rape" for reasons best explored in the footnote below. 5 Generally, I
84. I am grateful to David Faigman for this metaphor. See David L. Faigman, To Have and Have
Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005,
1047 (1989) ("[M]eteorology is [another] example of the value of even uncertain predictions.").
85. Scholars have debated this issue at length. For an overview, see Craig T. Palmer, Rape in
Nonhuman Animal Species: Definitions, Evidence, and Implications, 26 J. SEX RESEARCH 355 (1989).
For the view that "rape" should only be used in reference to humans, see, for example, PHnP
KITCHER, VAULTING AMBITION: SOCIOBIOLOGY AND THE QUEST FOR HUMAN NATURE 184-89 (1985);
Larry Baron, Does Rape Contribute to Reproductive Success? Evaluation of Sociobiological Views of
Rape, 8 INT'L J. WOMEN'S STUD. 266 (1985); Blackman, supra note 45, at 115; Daniel Q. Estep and
Katherine E.M. Bruce, The Concept of Rape in Non-Humans: A Critique, 29 ANIMAL BEHAV. 1272
(1981); Donald FJ. Hilton, Is It Really Rape or Forced Copulation?, 32 BioSci. 641 (1982); Ruth
Hubbard, The Political Nature of "Human Nature", in THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL
DIFFRENCE 63, 67 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 1990); and sources cited in THORNHMILL & PALMER, supra
note 14, at ch. 1. For the view that "rape" can refer to forced copulation in both humans and other
animals, see, for example, Charles Crawford & Birut6 M.F. Galdikas, Rape in Non-Human
Animals: An Evolutionary Perspective, 27 CAN. PSYCHOL. 215 (1986).
"Forced copulation" and "sexual coercion" are among the suggested alternatives, and neither they
nor "rape" have found universal acceptance. I take no independent position in this debate. I use "rape,"
however, for four reasons. First, it is shorter and less unwieldy than "forced copulation," and more
specific than "sexual coercion." Second, lawyers are accustomed to seeing words defined to mean
precisely what the drafter wants them to mean, and little more, in different contexts. So I trust that if I
define my term adequately, its meaning can be limited and understood. Although I need some word to
refer to the behavior itself, I do not intend to diminish the obviously unique meaning and political
significance that rape has in the human context. Third, while I recognize (as all do) the sin of
anthropomorphizing nonhuman behavior, I am persuaded that the inverse-what Frans de Waal terms
1999]
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shall use the word 'rape" to refer only to male behavior that forces an un-
willing female to engage in copulation.
Randy Thornhill, the leading rape researcher in biology, has explained
that there are conceivably four very different kinds of biological theories
about how evolutionary processes might influence rape. 6 Because he and
other biologists consider three of these four highly unlikely, I do not ex-
plore those at any length here.87 The fourth of the four general kinds dis-
cussed below reflects the logic of natural and sexual selection introduced
in the prior Section, particularly the effects of between-sex variance in
copulation costs and benefits, and is itself susceptible of two alternative
forms. Specifically, selection for rape-influencing psychological charac-
teristics could theoretically arise: (1) by direct selection (the so-called
"adaptation" hypothesis); and (2) by indirect selection (the so-called "by-
product" or "incidental effect" hypothesis)." We consider these in se-
quence, and postpone brief evaluation of them to Part II.
1. The Adaptation Hypothesis
Theoretically, a psychological, information-processing predisposition
toward contingent (context-specific) rape behavior could spread by natural
selection if it were adaptive. That is, it could spread if, across all males
bearing the predisposition, it had a net positive effect on the average male
reproductive success in the environment of evolutionary adaptation.89 The
reasons for this trace to natural and sexual selection. Because indiscrimi-
nate copulation is more costly, on average, to females than to males
(because males, but not females, can avoid the costs of internal gestation),
natural selection has generally favored copulation-partner choosiness in
females of internally fertilizing species. Selective females make better use
of a limited number of lifetime reproductive episodes. Because males, but
not females, can increase reproductive success by increasing the number of
partners with whom they copulate, natural selection has generally
"anthropodenial" (the overzealous rejection of likely commonalities in behavioral processes between
humans and other animals)-is an equally insidious danger, equally likely to flaw analysis. See Frans
de Waal, Are We in Anthropodenial?, DISCOVER, July 1997, at 50. Fourth and finally, I consider it
persuasive that noted evolutionary biologist and feminist Sarah Blaffer Hrdy also uses the term "rape"
in both human and nonhuman contexts. See SARAH BLAFFER HRDY, THE WOMAN THAT NEVER
EVOLVED 18 (1981) (referring to orangutan rape). For a brief description of the criteria by which a
female's unwillingness to mate may be inferred, see infra text accompanying note 103.
86. See Randy Thornhill, The Biology of Human Rape, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 137 (1999).
87. These three involve mutation-selection balance, evolutionarily novel environments, and
genetic drift. They are each summarized infra Appendix B.
88. Useful discussion of the distinctions between adaptations and by-products of other
adaptations appears in THORNHILL & PALMER, supra note 14, at ch. 1. Useful discussion of the same in
the context of the evolutionary theories of rape appears in Craig T. Palmer, Human Rape: Adaptation
or By-Product, 28 J. Sax RES. 365 (1991).
89. See each of the Thornhill citations appearing infra Appendix A.
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disfavored an equivalent choosiness in males about partner quality per
copulation.
This means that the different average costs to males and females of
copulating together have yielded different male and female psychologies,
on average, concerning willingness to copulate indiscriminately
(particularly with strangers).' To biologists, this is not just speculation. It
is extremely unlikely that the cumulated economic effects of natural and
sexual selection, across at least 600 million years of sexual reproduction in
our ancestry, could have generated male-typical and female-typical psy-
chologies that happen to be identical in all respects.9
We can therefore expect that unmated males and females in ancestral
environments came into conflict when, for example, a male wanted to
copulate with a female who did not want to copulate with him. In such a
circumstance, a forced copulation could in effect increase male mate num-
ber, potentially increasing male reproductive success. But this gain would
have come at the cost to the female of female mate-choice, potentially de-
creasing her lifetime reproductive success, compared to reproductive suc-
cess she would likely have obtained had she copulated all her life only with
males of her own choosing.'
The mindless and thoroughly amoral effects of natural and sexual se-
lection are therefore such that our here-hypothesized evolved male predis-
position toward contingent rape behavior could spread to more and more
males in each ensuing generation. For when the results of rape increased a
raping male's reproductive success even marginally (compared either to
not copulating at all, or to copulating only with willing females) a predis-
position increasing the probability of forced copulation in certain contexts
could appear in more and more males in successive generations. " Put an-
other way, males in ensuing generations would be increasingly likely to be
90. The existence of differences between male and female psychologies does not, of course,
suggest that either is superior or inferior. See, e.g., David M. Buss, Sexual Conflict: Evolutionary
Insights into Feminism and the "Battle of the Sexes", in Buss & MALAMUTH, supra note 30, at 296,
305. For example, this does not suggest that there will be important differences between men and
women "in intelligence, initiative, or administrative and political capabilities." HRDY, supra note 85, at
190.
91. See Buss, supra note 90, at 301.
92. See Thornhill, supra note 86, at 144. To see this, remember that reproductive success is not
measured simply by how many offspring a female has. It necessarily takes into account the relative
quality of those offspring (quality being affected by the father's, as well as the mother's, genetic
contributions), and the extent to which higher quality offspring can increase her reproductive success
by themselves attracting high-quality mates and producing high-quality offspring. See supra notes 52-
53.
93. A variant on this hypothesis suggests that rape may be an evolved male mechanism unrelated
to fertilizations in the present, but facilitating control over a female to increase the chances of
fertilization in the future. See RICHARD WRANGHAM & DALE PETERSON, DEMONIC MALES: APES AND
THE ORIGINS OF HUMAN VIOLENCE 141 (19961 Barbara B. Smuts & Robert W. Smuts, Male
Aggression and Sexual Coercion of Females in Nonhuman Primates and Other Mammals, 22
ADVANCES STUDY BEHAV. 1 (1993).
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descended from males that had heritable psychological mechanisms
prompting conditional switches among mating behaviors: court when the
prospects are good, and force copulations either when the benefits are high
(as when willing females are not forthcoming) or when the costs are low
(as when the likelihood of injury or reprisals is very low)?4 Obviously,
these mating behaviors, among which males would switch, would exist on
a continuum, bounded by great investments in courtship at one end and
varying across infinite gradations of increasing psychological and physical
coerciveness toward the other end, bounded by rape.
A significant corollary to this reasoning is that because of the dispar-
ity in costs to males and females of forced copulation, if forced copulation
were a significant risk to ancestral females across evolutionary time, natu-
ral selection would have favored a counterstrategy in females: acute psy-
chological predispositions toward avoiding and resisting forced
copulation. 5 In succeeding generations within any internally fertilizing
94. For yet another variation on this hypothesis, see LINDA MEALEY, SEX
DIFFERENCES: DEVELOPMENTAL AND EVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES (forthcoming 1999); THORNHILL &
PALMER, supra note 14, at ch. 2; Linda Mealey, Alternative Adaptive Models of Rape, 15 BEHAV. &
BRAIN Sci. 397 (1992).
95. The general idea is that "human mental pain is an adaptation that is designed to guide
cognition, feelings, and behavior toward solutions to personal social problems that reduced inclusive
fitness in human evolutionary history, and to provide inferences for avoiding such problems later in
life." Randy Thomhill, Rape-Victim Psychological Pain Revisited, in HUMAN NATURE 239, 239 (Laura
Betzig ed., 1997) [hereinafter Randy Thornhill, Rape-Victim Psychological Pain].
This hypothesis views the evolutionary significance of mental pain as analogous to the
evolutionary importance of physical pain. Physical pain serves to draw an individual's
attention to some aspect of anatomy that needs tending and can be fixed by the individual's
attention. Mental pain seems to focus an individual's attention on the significant social events
surrounding the pain and promotes correction of the events causing the pain and avoidance of
these events in the future.... The hypothesis of psychological pain makes the following two
general predictions about the kinds of environmental information that will result in
psychological pain: First, it predicts that the proximate ecological causes of mental pain will
be circumstances that affected inclusive fitness of individuals under social competition.
Second, the hypothesis predicts that the more an event potentially or actually negatively
affects the evolved social tendencies, desires, and aspirations of humans, the more
psychological pain will occur surrounding the event.
Nancy Wilmsen Thornhill & Randy Thornhill, An Evolutionary Analysis of Psychological Pain
Following Rape: L The Effects of Victim's Age and Marital Status, 11 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOO
155, 158-59 (1990) [hereinafter Thornhill & Thornhill, Psychological Pain 1]. See generally Nancy
Wilmsen Thornhill & Randy Thornhill, An Evolutionary Analysis of Psychological Pain Following
Human (Homo sapiens) Rape: IV. The Effect of the Nature of the Sexual Assault, 105 J. CoMP.
PSYCHOL. 243 (1991) [hereinafter Thornhill & Thomhill, Psychological Pain IV]; Nancy Wilmsen
Thornhill & Randy Thomhill, An Evolutionary Analysis of Psychological Pain Following Rape: III
Effects of Force and Violence, 16 AGGRESSIVE BEHAV. 297 (1990) [hereinafter Thomhill & Thornhill,
Psychological Pain 111]; Nancy Wilmsen Thornhill & Randy Thornhill, An Evolutionary Analysis of
Psychological Pain Following Rape: II. Effects of Stranger, Friend, and Family-Member Offenders,
11 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 177 (1990); Thomhill & Thornhill, Psychological Pain I, supra;
Randy Thornhill & Nancy Wilmsen Thornhill, The Evolution of Psychological Pain, in SoclOaIOLOOY
AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 73 (Robert W. Bell & Nancy J. Bell eds., 1989). The potential reduction in
female reproductive success following rape is concisely summarized in THORNHILL & PALMER, supra
note 14, at ch. 4.
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species, an increasing proportion of females would be descended from fe-
males who happened to have psychological predispositions to avoid and
resist rape. That is, to the extent that female-chosen males sired more re-
productively successful offspring, on average, than did raping males, any
heritable indifference to rape risk would inevitably dwindle toward disap-
pearance, leaving future generations of females with an extremely strong,
extremely specific, and sex-wide psychological distaste for rape.
2. The By-Product Hypothesis
The by-product (or "incidental effect") hypothesis can be stated more
succinctly. Whereas the adaptation hypothesis contemplates the existence
of heritable psychological features specific to rape, the by-product hy-
pothesis contemplates a process by which natural selection could affect
patterns of forced copulation indirectly. Specifically, this model's propo-
nents argue that rape may persist within a species not because forced
copulation was itself specifically adaptive, but rather because forced
copulation was a by-product of adaptations to other generalized behavior
that is, on average, adaptive for the organisms bearing them.9" For example,
if eager pursuit of possible sex partners on average increases reproductive
success, and if such pursuit occasionally results in nonconsensual sex
(even at some cost to the raping male) then rape behavior could be a by-
product of a psychology evolved by direct selection to pursue eagerly, and
persist in obtaining, possible sex partners.97 It is worth noting that female
psychological aversion to rape could be a rape-specific adaptation at the
same time that biobehavioral contributions to rape itself are by-products of
other adaptations.
U
BIOBEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVES ON RAPE: PREDICTIONS AND DATA
The relevance, if any, of these theories to legal thinkers must depend
on the extent to which they are robust. Scientific method requires that theo-
ries offer explanations consistent with relevant and already observed phe-
nomena, as well as testable forecasts of patterns in data not yet observed
(together, herein, the "predictions").9" One then gathers data by observation
96. See Thornhill, supra note 86, at 144.
97. See id. This hypothesis seems to have been posed first inDONALD SYMONS, THE EVOLUTION
OF HUiMAN SEXUALITY 284 (1979).
98. See KARL R. POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC
KNOWLEDGE 37 (5th ed. rev. 1992) ("The criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability,
or refutability, or testability."), quoted with approval in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993). In select contexts, the word "pre-dictions' carries a strictly chronological
meaning, referring only to statements about observations not yet made. I here invoke the more common
meaning of predictions--of general statements, logically derived from the premises of the theories,
about the likelihood that specified circumstances will obtain, whether or not such circumstances have
been observed previously.
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and also, where possible, by experimentation. Robust theories, to be ac-
corded in some measure at least temporary status as "true,"99 are those for
which the data fit the predictions, and which are consistent with theories
previously judged to be very robust. Where the data are judged to fit pre-
dictions of two or more theories equally well, scientific method mandates
that one both generally prefer the simpler (more parsimonious) of the two
theories,"°° and meanwhile attempt to derive even more discriminating test-
able predictions as to which the candidate theories differ.
The biobehavioral theories of rape articulated above generate a series
of narrow, testable predictions. Those theories will be worth considering in
future legal scholarship in direct proportion to the number of predictions
supported by the data and the closeness of the "fit" between the predictions
and the data. My purpose at present is not to compile all the predictions
and all the data, as if to prove definitively or disprove the biobehavioral
theories. Not every prediction in the literature is strongly supported, and
further research is advisable. Rather, this Part summarizes some of the
most intriguing and important findings testing the biobehavioral predic-
tions, in an effort to permit a preliminary assessment of the plausibility of
the theory that natural and sexual selection have influenced patterns of rape
behavior in humans. For if they did, our knowledge of this biobehavioral
"truth" may afford law more leverage against rape behavior.
Because the adaptation and by-product hypotheses generate many of
the same predictions, they currently afford little empirical reason to favor
one over the other (indeed, it is possible that the two causal pathways can
operate both independently and in concert)'" However, the specificity and
number of the predictions nonetheless probe the extents to which biobe-
havioral influences affect patterns of rape. If either selection theory accu-
rately describes a process by which male and female brains may differ, on
99. Technically, one never proves that anything is always true (because no number of white
swans can prove that there are no black swans). Whereas one can, with a single example to the
contrary, prove that something is not always true (a single black swan proves that not all swans are
white). For classic articulations of this principle, see generally POPPER, supra note 98. See also KARL
R. POPPER, THE Looic OF ScINTInIc DiscovERY (1959).
100. See generally CARL HEMPEL, PHILOsOPHY OF NATURAL SCIENcE 40-45 (1966).
101. See Thornhill & Thornhill, supra note 65, at 91 ("Current knowledge of the coercive
sexuality of men is consistent with this hypothesis [that the sexual psychology of men contains
psychological design for the purpose of rape] but cannot demonstrate adaptation to rape.") (emphases
added); Nancy Wilmsen Thornhill, Psychological Adaptation to Sexual Coercion in Victims and
Offenders, in Buss & MALAMUTH, supra note 30, at 90, 101-02 ("[C]urrent knowledge of men's sexual
behavior does not provide evidence of psychological adaptation to rape itself. It seems likely that the
occurrence of coercive sexual behavior by men could as easily be the combined effect of species-
typical adaptation to coerce desired rewards and sex-specific adaptation for sexual behavior."); see also
DAVID M. Buss, THE EVOLUTION OF DasiRE 162-63 (1994); Palmer, supra note 88, at 379.
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average, in their processing of encounters when forced copulations might
occur, then these testable hypotheses, among numerous others, follow."°
A. Predictions and Data
Prediction 1: Females (particularly in internally gestating species) will
be "choosier" than males about copulation partners-
avoiding and resisting copulation with males they have not
affirmatively selected.
Rationale: The cost to females of random copulation is greater than
that to males, so natural and sexual selection will favor
predispositions, in females, to choose mates and to resist
rape.
Data: This prediction is overwhelmingly supported.1 3 In all spe-
cies, including humans, in which forced male-female
copulation has been observed to date, there is a marked
distinction between willing and unwilling female behavior.
Unwillingness, obviously, must be inferred; researchers
describe the female as unwilling if the precopulatory and
copulatory behavior is statistically rare and involves, for
example, a female's avoiding particular males, attempting
to flee, struggling when caught, and attempting to prevent
intromission.
Prediction 2: It is unlikely that rape behavior is confined to the human
species.
Rationale: If a predisposition toward increasingly persistent, even
aggressive, sexuality ever arose, and if it afforded males
bearing it even a small reproductive advantage over less
persistent males, that predisposition would spread widely
throughout subsequent populations. While such a predis-
position can spread only under ecological conditions ena-
bling it to contribute to male reproductive success, it is
unlikely that such ecological conditions occur only in hu-
mans.
102. I have attempted to render these selected predictions easily accessible to a legal audience.
Most of them summarize more technical language appearing in various primary sources, such as the
works of Randy Thornhill, Nancy Thornhill, and Craig Palmer, listed infra Appendix A, as well as Lee
Ellis, Gene-Based Evolutionary Theories in Criminology, 35 CRIMINOLOGY 229, 234-38 (1997), and
Neil M. Malamuth, An Evolutionary-Based Model Integrating Research on the Characteristics of
Sexually Coercive Men, in 1 ADVANCES IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE: SOCIAL, PERSONAL, AND
DEVELOPmENTAL ASPECTS 151 (John G. Adair et al. eds., 1998).
103. For overviews of sexual selection, see MALTE ANDERSSON, SEXUAL SELECTION (1994);
CRONIN, supra note 74; DALY & WILSON, supra note 47. For human studies, see, for example, David
M. Buss, Sex Differences in Human Mate Preferences: Evolutionary Hypotheses Tested in 37
Cultures, 12 BEHAV. & BRAIN Sci. 1 (1989); Low, supra note 76.
1999]
HeinOnline  -- 87 Cal L. Rev. 859 1999
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:827
Data: Biologists have long studied examples of unequivocally
forced copulations across the animal kingdom. " Thus far,
the behavior is already widely observable, in both natural
and laboratory conditions, in species ranging from our
closest primate relatives 5 (including orangutans,'l chim-
panzees, °0 and gorillas') to more distant primates,"9 other
mammals, "0 birds, i' and insects.I"
104. See generally THoRNILL & PALMER, supra note 14, at ch. 6 (reviewing literature); Crawford
& Galdikas, supra note 85 (concluding there is considerable evidence for the existence of rape in other
species); Palmer, supra note 85 (reviewing studies of insects; birds; fish; frogs, toads, and lizards; a
worn species; plants; elephant seals; and several nonhuman primates; and concluding that rape appears
to take place in all but the worms and plants).
105. See, e.g., WRANOHAM & PETERSON, supra note 93, at 138 (discussing rape in apes); Lee
Ellis, Neodarwinian Theories of Violent Criminality and Antisocial Behavior. Photographic Evidence
from Nonhuman Animals and a Review of the Literature, 3 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 61, 67
(1998) (citing studies); Nadler, supra note 13; Ronald D. Nadler, Sexual Aggression in the Great Apes,
528 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 154 (1988) (finding sexual aggression among chimpanzees, orangutans,
and gorillas in both natural and laboratory conditions). To date, no one has observed rape among the
bonobos. See Frans de Waal, Keynote Address to the Human Behavior and Evolution Society in
Tucson, Arizona (June 6, 1996); Personal Communication with Prof. Richard Wrangham (Nov. 12,
1998).
106. See WRANOHAM & PETERSON, supra note 93, at 132-43 (summarizing data on orangutan
rapes). Among wild orangutan populations, rape accounts for one-third to one-half or more of all
copulations. See id. at 142. Among the important primary sources are H.D. RUKsEN, A FIELDSTUDY OF
SUMATRAN ORANGUTANS (1978); Birut6 M.F. Galdikas, Adult Male Sociality and Reproductive Tactics
Among Orangutans at Tanjung Puting 45 FOLIA PRIMATOLOGICA (1985) (finding that smaller males
are less attractive to females and more likely to attempt rape); Birut6 M.F. Galdikas, Orangutan
Adaptation at Tanjung Puting Reserve: Mating and Ecology, in THE GREAT APES 195 (David A.
Hamburg & Elizabeth R. McCown eds., 1979); John MacKinnon, Reproductive Behavior in Wild
Orangutan Population, in THE GREAT APES, supra, at 257; John C. Mitani, Mating Behaviour of Male
Orangutans in the Kutai Game Reserve, Indonesia, 33 ANIMAL BEHAV. 293, 396 (1985); Ronald D.
Nadler, Laboratory Research on Sexual Behavior of the Great Apes, in REPRODUCTIVE BIOLOGY OF
THE GREAT APES 191 (Charles E. Graham ed., 1981); Ronald D. Nadler, Sexual Behavior of
Orangutans (Pongo Pygmaeus): Basic and Applied Implications, in THE NEGLECTED APE 223 (Ronald
D. Nadler et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter Nadler, Sexual Behavior of Orangutans].
107. See Nadler, supra note 105, at 154; see also WRANGHAM & PETERSON, supra note 93, at 7,
138, 142, 151. "Even among chimpanzees, where rape is a good deal rarer, it probably still happens as
often as among many human populations." Id. at 142.
108. See Nadler, supra note 105; WRANOHAM & PETERSON, supra note 93, at 138.
109. See ROBERT JAY RUSSELL, THE LEMURS' LEGACY: THE EVOLUTION OF POWER, SEX, AND
LovE 138 (1993) (reporting that rape is not uncommon among lemurs); WRANGHAM & PETERSON,
supra note 93, at 138 (reporting observation of rape in wild howler monkeys).
110. See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 105, at 67 (citing studies); Palmer, supra note 85, at 365-66
(elephant seals).
111. See, e.g., T.R. BIRKHEAD & A.P. MOLLER, SPERM COMPETITION IN BIRDS: EVOLUTIONARY
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES (1992); Alan D. Afton, Forced Copulation as a Reproductive Strategy of
Male Lesser Scaup, 92 BEHAV. 146 (1985); Stephen T. Emlen & Peter H. Wrege, Forced Copulations
and Intra-Specific Parasitism: Two Costs of Social Living in the White-Fronted Bee-Eater, 71
ETHOLOGY 2 (1986) (white-fronted bee-eaters); id. at 20 (citing studies of forced copulations in
albatrosses, cormorants, herons and egrets, gulls, swallows, and purple martins); Douglas E. Gladstone,
Promiscuity in Monogamous Colonial Birds, 114 AM. NATURALIST 545 (1979) (cataloguing a number
of species in which forced copulation occurs outside the pairbond); Pierre Mineau & Fred Cooke, Rape
in the Lesser Snow Goose, 70 BEHAV. 280 (1979).
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Prediction 3: Rape will rarely result in fatal harm, or harm sufficient to
preclude conception and birth.
Rationale: The more heritable rape behavior precluded birth, the more
natural selection would have disfavored it.
Data: In both nonhuman and human animals, it is extremely rare
for raped females to be killed, and quite rare for them to be
injured in ways that prevent possible conception and birth.
In humans, rape-murders are exceedingly rare"' (for ex-
ample, occurring in only 7 rapes out of 1223 in one study,
and 1 of 646 in another study).114 According to a recent re-
port by the National Victim Center, over two-thirds of rape
victims report no physical injuries, 24% report minor
physical injuries, and only 4% sustain serious physical in-
juries.
115
Prediction 4: Rape will be overwhelmingly a male, rather than female,
behavior.
Rationale: A male's reproductive success, far more than a female's,
can be increased by increasing the number of partners with
whom he copulates. Natural selection would therefore fa-
vor forced copulation by males more than it would favor
forced copulation by females.
Data: In all species in which forced male-female copulation has
been observed, the behavior is almost without exception
committed by males upon females, rather than vice
versa. " ' For example, female physical sexual coerciveness
112. See Randy Thornhill, Rape in Panorpa Scorpionflies and a General Rape Hypothesis, 28
ANIMAL BEHAV. 52 (1980); see also WRANORAM & PETERSON, supra note 93, at 138-39. Indeed, some
insects, such as scorpionflies and some water-striders, have physical organs used only during attempts
at forced copulation. See THORNHILL & PALMER, supra note 14, at ch. 3, ch. 6.
113. Statistics, of course, vary. But all agree that the proportion of rape-murders to all rapes is
extremely low. See, e.g., BROWNMILLER, supra note 35, at 198 (noting that only about 0.2%--or 1 in
500-rape victims are murdered); DOJ STATISTICS, supra note 6, at 12 (noting that only about 1% of
all murders involve rape; and that only 5% of victims "suffered a major injury such as severe
lacerations, fractures, internal injuries, or unconsciousness"); GORDON & RIGER, supra note 2, at 9
(noting that only 3% of rape victims are murdered); Richard T. Rada, Psychological Factors in Rapist
Behavior, in CLINICAL ASPECTS OF THE RAPIST, supra note 32, at 51 ("Rapists rarely murder .... ).
Professor Katherine Baker has pointed out that it would be useful to know how the proportion of rape-
murders to all rapes compares to the proportion of robbery-murders to all robberies, and mugging-
murders to all muggings. Personal Communication with Katherine Baker (Sept. 3, 1998).
114. See SEDELLE KATZ & MARY ANN MAZUR, UNDERSTANDING THE RAPE VICTIM 163-64
(1979).
115. See NATIONAL VICTIM CENTER, FORCIBLE RAPES, RAPE IN AMERICA: A REPORT TO THE
NATION (1992).
116. See Crawford & Galdikas, supra note 85, at 227 ("[All known cases of forced matings are
by males."); GOLDSMITg supra note 47, at 61. On the overwhelming predominance of males among
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(of any kind) of unwilling males in human societies is
virtually unknown. It may be tempting to attribute the
strong sex bias among perpetrators to anatomical
differences alone. However, the same bias is present even
in species lacking larger and stronger males. And the bias
similarly obtains not only among species such as mammals
in which an aroused penis is generally necessary for
copulation, but also among species such as birds in which
males have no penises. Moreover, the pan-species sex dif-
ferences in anatomical capacity to rape themselves require
evolutionary explanation.
Prediction 5: The likelihood of rape, by a given male, will be context-
specific and will vary with environmental contingencies in
a way that reflects the relative benefits of alternative mat-
ing behaviors.
Rationale: Copulation with willing partners will generally be less
costly to males than forced copulations. Selection would
therefore favor a context-specific predisposition, if it
arose, that increased the likelihood of aggression as the
likelihood of willing copulation decreased. "7
Data: To demonstrate that an evolved predisposition toward ag-
gressive sexuality or rape can be highly contingent, one
compelling example would suffice. As it turns out, there
are many. Discussed below are two, selected to illuminate
opposite extremes of cognitive capacity. The scorpionfly
(an insect species) demonstrates how little brainpower it
takes to harbor a sophisticated, environmentally sensitive,
decisional algorithm. The orangutan (one of the planet's
smartest species) demonstrates how a similar algorithm is
likely present among near-relatives of humans." 8
human rapists, see, for example, JAMEs T. TEDESCHI & RICHARD B. FELSON, VIOLENCE, AGGRESSION,
& COERCIVE ACTIONS 310 (1994) C'We can think of no other type of coercive behavior, and few other
noncoercive behaviors, in which the sex difference is so strong."); Ellen G. Cohn, The Prediction of
Police Calls for Service: The Influence of Weather and Temporal Variables on Rape and Domestic
Violence, 13 J. ENvTL. PSYCHOL. 71 (1993).
117. In some species, individuals employ a single mating behaviour throughout their lives.
Individuals in other species have the potential to employ different mating behaviors, sensitive to
environmental circumstances. Or, as Crawford and Galdikas put it, "The members of some species
exhibit conditional sexual strategies. All individuals carry genes for all strategies; the particular sexual
strategy employed depends on factors such as what the individual's competitors are doing, resources
available to the individual, and the individual's size and aggressiveness." Crawford & Galdikas, supra
note 85, at 220 (citing KREBS & DAvIES, supra note 47).
118. See generally Thornhill- supra note 112; Randy Thornhill et al, The Biology of Rape, in
TOMASELLI & PORTER, supra note 30, at 102, 108-09; ALCOCK, supra note 47, at 446-47.
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Rape in Scorpionflies
In the scorpionfly, females generally flee from males
who do not offer resources, such as a dead insect (the fe-
male preference) or a salivary mass (an acceptable second-
best created by the male).'19 Males can therefore copulate
in three ways: (1) guarding a dead insect, which attracts a
female, who mates willingly; (2) creating and guarding a
salivary mass, which attracts a female, who mates will-
ingly; and (3) grabbing a female and attempting to force
copulation.' All three techniques have been observed.
In a significant experimental study, Randy Thornhill
demonstrated that these three mating strategies are part of
one conditional strategy, not three alternative strategies re-
flecting three mutually exclusive genetic predispositions.
That is, a given male will predictably adopt one of these
three strategies, depending on circumstances, and switch
among them as circumstances change. ' 2' Typically, the
number of females with whom a male scorpionfly can
copulate decreases from insect offering, to saliva offering,
to rape, in parallel with decreasing male size and con-
comitant decreased ability to best other males in contests
for food offerings. When the large males defending the
few insect offerings were experimentally removed, the
medium-sized males that had previously offered saliva
switched over to defend the insects, and the smallest
males, which had previously raped, promptly took over the
salivary masses thus abandoned, subsequently copulating
with willing females.
The significance of this study for present purposes,
notwithstanding the obvious differences between humans
and insects, is two-fold. It conclusively demonstrates the
119. See Thornhill, supra note 112, at 53.
120. See id. at 53 ("If grasped by such a male's genital claspers, females fight vigorously to
escape. When the female's wings are secured, the male attempts to grasp the genitalia of the female
with his genital claspers. The female attempts to keep her abdominal tip away from the male's probing
claspers.").
121. See i; see also ALCOCK, supra note 47, at 446-47.
122. A useful summary of the experiment appears in JOHN ALCOCK, ANIMAL BEHAVIOR: AN
EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH 418-19 (5th ed. 1993). Alcock writes,
In competing for [dead insects], the larger males won, and as a result, averaged nearly six
copulations each. Medium-sized males generally attempted to lure mates with salivary gifts,
but were much less successful (gaining about two copulations per male). Small males were
unable to claim [dead insects] and appeared incapable of generating sufficient saliva to attract
females. They employed the forced copulation route but were the least successful of all
(averaging only about one copulation per male).
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existence of a highly specialized rape contingency behav-
ior. It also demonstrates that large brains are not required
for sophisticated, algorithmic predispositions such as: "If
in possession of a dead insect, court; if no insect, spit
and court; if no success, attempt rape; repeat." That is,
within a very tiny, nonsentient brain, conditional mating
predispositions can evolve, and "male [scorpionflies] are
able to adopt whichever of the three tactics returns the
highest possible rate of copulations, given the nature of the
competition they face at that moment."' 23
Rape in Orangutans
Male orangutans also appear to vary their sexual be-
havior, from solicitous to forceful, according to circum-
stances. Although a great deal of orangutan mating in the
wild appears to be consensual, it is also well-documented
that male orangutans (particularly those small enough to
pursue the typically smaller females onto slender tree
branches) often rape females.)" In addition, when the fe-
male orangutan's ability to flee an approaching male is ex-
perimentally manipulated in captivity, the very same male
orangutan who will be extremely unaggressive and solici-
tous of a female who can physically escape him, will gen-
erally grab and rape a struggling female if she cannot
escape him."z Although one of course must be careful
123. Id. at 419.
124. See supra note 106. One orangutan even raped a human female, while her friend looked on,
powerless to stop him. See WRANOGHAM & PETERSON, supra note 93, at 137-38.
125. See, e.g., Nadler, supra note 105. Nadler found that "[a]lthough sexual aggression is
relatively rare among mature great apes in their natural habitats, it does occur to some degree." Id. at
158. His lab work revealed extremely context-specific rape behavior. In "Free Access Tests" (FATs)
males and females were housed together. In "Restricted Access Tests" (RATs), each female, but no
males, could control when male and female would mingle. In lab conditions, subjects mated more than
in the wild. But the interesting finding is that
[i]n all three species ... the increased copulation appears to result from increased male
sexual initiative (aggression), male dominance over females, and the inability of the female
to avoid or escape from the male within the limited spatial conditions of the free-access test.
This interpretation is supported by studies using restricted-access tests in which females
control sexual access. These data suggest that male sexual aggression in our closest
biological affiliates commonly occurs when females are rendered vulnerable to the male by
the absence of the normal social constraints and spatial prerogatives typical of the natural
habitat.
Id. at 161.
The data on these species of great apes are similar in revealing that (1) sexual aggression is
carried out to some extent by males of all these species under natural conditions, albeit
relatively infrequently; and (2) sexual aggression occurs at increased frequencies in FATs
conducted in the laboratory as a consequence of test conditions that compromise the females
options for regulating sexual interactions. These data support the interpretation that sexual
aggression to some degree is an inherent characteristic of the behavioral repertoires of our
[Vol. 87:827
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when attempting to generalize from the behavior of cap-
tive animals, these experiments strongly suggest that psy-
chological mechanisms mediating conditional, context-
specific mating tactics may have evolved among species
with advanced cognitive capacities, as well as among less
cognitively advanced species.
Prediction 6: The ages of victims of attempted and completed rape will
be overwhelmingly concentrated into the part of the female
lifespan that is reproductive.
Rationale: Copulation with females outside the age range historically
bounded by puberty and menopause is unlikely to result in
reproduction and is therefore more costly. Natural selec-
tion would consequently favor male predispositions to
copulate, on average, with fertile-aged females.
Data: This prediction is overwhelmingly supported, in both non-
human and human species. 126 In humans, the consistency
of the data with the prediction is particularly striking. The
mean age of rape victims in most data sets is twenty-four
years old. Studies consistently show that although
women of all ages have been raped, victims of forced
copulation are overwhelmingly likely to be in their peak
reproductive years, between thirteen and thirty-five.las
closest biological affiliates and that conditions that render the females vulnerable to such
aggression lead to its increased occurrence.
Id. at 160; see also Nadler, Sexual Behavior of Orangutans, supra note 106. Female-controlled
laboratory tests quickly "revealed that fully adult males that had never displayed nonaggressive form of
sexual solicitation, quickly began to display this behavior when they were prevented from pursuing the
females as they had always done." This suggests this form of behavior is "highly responsive to
environmental conditions." Il at 234 (emphasis added).
John Mitani witnessed 179 matings; 88% were "forcecf' and "involved protracted struggles
between females and males," in which "females whimper, cry, squeal and grunt" while males "had to
grab, bite or slap females before they could copulate. While thrusting, males continued to restrain
struggling females by grasping their arms, legs and bodies." Mitani, supra note 106, at 396.
126. In nonhumans, see, for example, Emlen & Wrege, supra note 111, at 9 (examining
nonrandom patterns of forced copulations, and finding that copulation attempts "increasel] dramatically
on the day that a female lays her first egg, but drop[] just as precipitously when she completes her
clutch").
127. See Thornhill & Thornhill, Psychological Pain IV, supra note 95, at 246.
128. The 1991 National Crime Victimization Survey found that women between the ages of 16
and 19 were at greatest risk of rape, followed by women of 20 to 24 and 12 to 15. See ROB HALL, RAPE
IN AMERICA: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 90-91 (1995); see also ELLIS, supra note 30, at 50 (citing
studies); UNDERSTANDING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 72 (Nancy A. Crowell & Ann W. Burgess eds.,
1996) (reporting statistics from 1993 showing highest rates of rape and sexual assault among women
16 to 24 years of age); PATRICK A. LANGAN & CAROLINE WOLF HARLow, CHILD RAPE VICTIMS, 1992,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS: CRtM DATA BRIEF (1994) (35% of all
victims between 12 and 18); NATIONAL VICTIM CENTER, RAPE IN AMERICA: A REPORT TO THE
NATION 3 (1992) (84% of female victims were under age 25; only 6% older than 29); Arthur Frederick
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(And the data collected on "child" victims, often defined
as girls under the age of sixteen, typically shows a heavy
concentration toward the early puberty years, with a me-
dian age of fourteen.)'29 For example, in a 1983 study by
Randy and Nancy Thornhill of 10,315 rape victims,
eighty-five percent were less than thirty-six years old,3° in
sharp contrast to the female population at large. Women
between the ages of sixteen and thirty-five were dramati-
cally overrepresented.13' As one scholar notes,
By way of comparison, victims of other crimes,
such as aggravated assault and murder, show a
radically different age distribution.... Indeed the
age distribution of rape victims corresponds almost
Schiff, Rape, 6 MED. ASPECTS HuM.SEXUALITY 76, 82 (1972) (finding in one study, the ages of raped
females ranged from I to 88, with the mode at 14; in another study, the range was 6 to 57, with a mode
at 14 and an average at 23). "Without exception, studies throughout the world have found that, while
rape victims can be of any age, their ages are heavily concentrated between 13 and 35." ELLIS, supra
note 30, at 50. In a 25-year study in India, the peak victim age was in the 13 to 17 year old age bracket,
and only 4% of rape victims were older than 35 (despite an age range of 3 years old to 71 years old).
See VIMALA VEERARAGHAVAN, RAPE AND VICTIMS OF RAPE: A SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 21,
94-95 (1987). In a study of sexual assaults in London between 1978 and 1986, the majority of victims
were in their 20s. See S.M. Keating et al., Sexual Assault Patterns, 30 J. FORENSIC SCI. Soc'Y 71, 82
(1990). Fully 53% of the victims were between 18 and 30 years old. Less than 5% were over 50. See id.
at 74; CAROLYN J. HuRSCH, THE TROUBLE WITH RAPE 21-22 (1977) ("The average age of adult rape
victims [i.e., excluding those under 16] was 24 years.... most of the victims were between the ages of
16 and 34. Only 5% of the adult rape victims were between 45 and 74 years old; 23% of the rapes were
of girls 15 or younger.); THOMAS W. MCCAHILL ET AL., THE AFTERMATH OF RAPE 7 (1979) ('Using
census figures for comparison, victims who report rape to the authorities are disproportionally likely to
be 20 to 24 years old and much less likely to be 45 or more years old.').
This study of rape in Denver is typical. Of all the 5-year age groups, those at highest risk of rape
were 15 to 19, followed by 20 to 24. Over 80% of victims were under 35 years of age, with the median
victim age of 21. See DOJ STATISTICS, supra note 6, at 2 (1997) ("Per capita rates of rape/sexual
assault were found to be highest among residents age 16 to 19 .... ). Data from three states using the
new National Incident-Based Reporting System, for the year 1991, indicated that about 80% of rape
victims were under age 30; while roughly half were under age 18, only 15% were under 12, with
roughly 30% between 12 and 17. See i. at 11.
129. See, e.g., HutRSCH, supra note 128, at 25 (reporting an age range of 70 child victims from 3 to
15 years of age, but with the frequency distribution dramatically skewed toward girls 14 and 15, with
roughly 75% in the 12 to 15 range). The median age of raped children was roughly 14. See id. at 24.
130. See Randy Thornhill & Nancy Wilmsen Thornhill, Human Rape: An Evolutionary Analysis,
4 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 137 (1983); see also Richard B. Felson & Marvin Krohn, Motives for
Rape, 27 J. REs. CRIa & DELINQ. 222, 231 (Aug. 1990) (92% of rape victims, in this study, were
under 41 years old).
131. Of course, it is always possible to construct alternative hypotheses to explain data such as
these. For example, it may be that rapists target females strictly according to "vulnerability," and that
reproductive-aged females just happen, for sociocultural reasons unrelated to the biology of sexual
desire to be out and about, unaccompanied, single, or dating more than other women. When a pattern of
human behavior matches the patterns in other species, however, and when those patterns reflect
context-specific behavior predictably favored by evolutionary processes, proponents of hypotheses that
are thoroughly divorced from biology (and that are necessarily less parsimonious) bear the burden of
persuasion. For more on this subject, see infra Section IV.A.
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perfectly to the age distribution of women's
reproductive value, in marked contrast to the age
distribution of victims of other violent crimes.'32
Prediction 7: The probability that a female sexual assault victim will be
raped penile-vaginally (as opposed to orally, anally, or
with digits or *objects) will be higher for females within
their reproductive years than it is for those outside their
reproductive years.
Rationale: In the environment of evolutionary adaptation, penile-
vaginal assaults of reproductive-aged females were more
likely to result in conception than penile-vaginal assaults
of unreproductive females. Evolutionary processes there-
fore would have tended to correlate the kind of sexual ag-
gression with the age of the sexually assaulted victim.
Specifically, it would tend to concentrate penile-vaginal
assaults, compared to other kinds of sexual assaults,
among those victims most likely to be reproductive. We
therefore may expect the percentage of reproductive-aged
victims who were raped penile-vaginally to be higher than
the percentage of non-reproductive-aged victims who were
raped penile-vaginally. Put another way, victims not of re-
productive age are more likely to be sexually assaulted in
ways other than penile-vaginal rape, compared to victims
of reproductive age.
Data: This prediction has received some support. The Thornhills
found that "[r]eproductive-age victims [of sexual assault]
were overwhelmingly more often victims of penile-vaginal
intercourse than were victims in the other age
categories."' 33 Moreover, the likelihood of penile-vaginal
intercourse during sexual assault exceeded 90% when the
victim was of potentially reproductive age (twelve to
forty-four), while the likelihood of penile-vaginal inter-
course during sexual assault was only 46% when the vic-
tim was nonreproductive-aged.'" The disparity was
132. Buss, supra note 101, at 164.
133. Nancy Wilmsen Thornhill, supra note 101, at 96 (citing Thornhill & Thornhill,
Psychological Pain IV, supra note 95).
134. See Thornhill & Thornhill, supra note 65, at 103-04; Thornhill & Thornhill, Psychological
Pain IV, supra note 95, at 247. "Only 9% of reproductive-aged victims were victims of sexual assault
other than penile-vaginal intercourse, including fellatio, cunnilingus, or rectal intercourse." Id. at 249.
Reproductive-aged victims were significantly more likely to be subjects of repeated intercourse than
were nonreproductive-aged women and girls. See id. at 250. Reliable data on anal penetration during
rape are rare. In one British study, anal intercourse was reported in 8% of rapes, but most of these were
accompanied by vaginal rape as well. See Keating, supra note 128, at 80 tbl.7.
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greatest between reproductive-aged women who were
raped and prereproductive-aged girls who were raped, the
latter of whom were more likely not to have experienced
penile-vaginal intercourse than to have experienced it.
35
The difference between reproductive and postreproduc-
tive-aged victims in this study, however, was not statisti-
cally significant.'36
Prediction 8: The trauma of rape victims in the immediate postrape pe-
riod will tend to vary with age, being greatest among fe-
males of reproductive age and less, on average, among
prepubescent and postmenopausal victims.
Rationale: The magnitude of the effect of being raped on female re-
productive success is greater for fertile-aged females than
for females incapable of conceiving and giving birth.
Natural selection would therefore more strongly favor psy-
chological resistance to rape in females of reproductive
age.
137
Data: In a study examining a large and previously compiled data
set of statistics on 790 rape victims in Philadelphia,
"[r]eproductive-age victims were significantly more
psychologically traumatized by rape than were
pre-reproductive-age girls (0-11) or post-reproductive-age
women (45+) .... 113' This study measured trauma by
135. The likelihood that prereproductive-aged girls in this study were not penile-vaginally raped
was 66%. See Thornhill & Thornhill, Psychological Pain IV, supra note 95, at 247.
136. See id. at 246 tbl.1, 247. The authors note that this may be due to the small number of
postreproductive-aged women in the sample. While there were 585 reproductive-aged victims, there
were only 36 postreproductive-aged victims. See id.
137. According to Nancy Wilmsen Thornhill,
[t]he expectation that victim's age should be an important predictor of psychological trauma
following rape stems from the hypothesized fitness consequences of rape for our female
ancestors. The consequences were likely to have been most severe for women of reproductive
age because these women have an increased probability that any sexual interaction will result
in conception.
Nancy Wilmsen Thornhill, supra note 101, at 94. For more on the evolution of psychological pain, see
MICHAEL McGuntP & ALFONSO TRoisi, DARWINIAN PSYCHIATRY (1998).
138. Nancy Wilmsen Thornhill, Psychological Adaptation to Sexual Coercion, supra note 101, at
94; Randy Thornhill, Rape-Victim Psychological Pain, supra note 95, at 239 (offering retrospective on
Thornhill & Thornhill, Evolutionary Analysis of Psychological Pain , supra note 95). The data set had
265 variables, 13 of which were considered relevant to the measurement of psychological pain:
[F]ear of being out on the street alone, fear of being home alone, change in social activities,
change in eating habits, change in sleeping habits, frequency of nightmares, change in
heterosexual relationships (i.e. nonsexual relations with men), change in negative feelings
toward known men, change in negative feelings toward unknown men, change in relations
with husband or boyfriend, change in sexual relations with partner, insecurities concerning
sexual attractiveness, and change in relations with family (other than husband).
Thornhill & Thornhill, Psychological Pain , supra note 95, at 161. For a complete description of the
data set, and its inherent limitations, see id. at 160-62.
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using self-reports about factors including difficulty sleep-
ing, suffering nightmares, being afraid of unknown men,
and having a fear of being home alone.1 39 By contrast,
when psychological trauma experienced by female victims
of robbery is analyzed by victim's age, older victims are
more traumatized than younger victims."4
The difficulty in assessing the reliability of the un-
derlying data on the psychological trauma of some of the
prepubescent rape victims, particularly the youngest ones,
is clearly worth mentioning.' Yet this finding was statisti-
cally significant, and other studies have apparently also
suggested that prereproductive girls are less traumatized,
on average, by sexual assault."
Prediction 9: The trauma of reproductive-aged sexual assault victims in
the immediate postrape period will tend to vary with the
type of sexual assault, with vaginal rape being more trau-
matic, on average, than anal rape, oral rape, or forced
cunnilingus-when these are not also accompanied by
penile-vaginal rape.
Rationale: Vaginal rape had greater reproductive consequences for
ancestral females than other forms of sexual assault. Al-
though natural selection would favor psychological aver-
sion to physical compulsion generally, it also would favor
more strongly psychological aversion to vaginal rape than
to, for example, anal or oral rape.
Data: This seems to be the case. As early as 1979, several re-
searchers noted that penile-vaginal intercourse is associ-
ated with adjustment problems in female rape victims
more frequently than is any other variable relating to sex-
ual acts, such as forced sexual contact without penetration,
139. This finding is not confounded by either the kind of rapist (stranger or acquaintance) or the
degree of violence used. Across the various combinations, victim age remains a statistically significant
predictor of relative trauma. See Thornhill & Thornhill, Psychological Pain I11 supra note 95, at 304-
19 (1990). Moreover, there is some evidence to suggest that younger women are more fearful of sexual
assault than are older women. See Eric Pawson & Glenn Banks, Rape and Fear in a New Zealand City,
25 AREA 55 (1993).
140. See Nancy Wilmsen Thornhill, supra note 101, at 97.
141. For instance, some of the 13 psychological variables (such as "change in sexual relations
with partner") did not apply to the youngest victims. See Thornhill & Thornhill, Psychological Pain I,
supra note 95, at 164. As the Thornhills also note, "the child's caretaker sometimes helped the child
respond to interview questions [and] with very young victims, the caretaker gave the responses to the
questions based on his/her perception of the effect of the sexual assault on the child." lI& at 161.
142. See id. at 166 (citing DAVID FINKELHOR, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: NEw THEORY AND
RESEARCH (1984); A.P. Mannarino & J. Cohen, Psychological Symptoms of Sexually Abused Children
(paper presentation) (1987)).
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fellatio, cunnilingus, rectal intercourse, fondling and
caressing, length of assault, or repeated intercourse. 143
More recently, evolutionists found that the greatest psy-
chological trauma was seen in those reproductive-aged
female rape victims who experienced penile-vaginal inter-
course, compared with similar victims who experienced
only other forms of sexual assault (including forced fella-
tio, anal intercourse, etc.).'44 Moreover, there is evidence to
suggest that non-reproductive-aged females are, in con-
trast, more equally traumatized by penile-vaginal inter-
course and other forms of sexual assault. 1
45
Prediction 10: A disproportionately high number of rapists will be young,
sexually mature males.
Rationale: In their earliest years of sexual maturity, young men have,
on average, less ability than older males to attract willing
sex partners (due, in part, to comparatively lesser acquisi-
tion of resources and status).46 If comparatively lesser ac-
cess to willing sex partners increases the probability of
sexual aggression, young males will likely be overrepre-
sented among rapists.
Data: Rapists are disproportionately young, postpubescent
males.47 Studies often show a median age of twenty-
five,148 with only a small percentage of rapists over
thirty.
1 49 Note that this has remained true, over time, even
143. See MCCAHILL ET AL., supra note 128, at 67.
144. See Thornhill & Thornhill, Psychological Pain IV, supra note 95; see also Nancy Thomhill,
supra note 101, at 96; Randy Thornhill, Rape-Victim Psychological Pain, supra note 95, at 239.
145. See Thornhill & Thomhill, Psychological Pain IV, supra note 95. It also appears that
reproductive-aged rape victims are more likely to have sperm present in their reproductive tracts than
are non-reproductive-aged victims, and that, among reproductive-aged victims, those with sperm in
their reproductive tracts may be more traumatized than those without. See id. at 249-50.
146. See generally sources on sexual selection cited supra notes 74, 76, & 77; Buss, supra note
101; David M. Buss, Sex Differences in Human Mate Selection Criteria, An Evolutionary Perspective,
in PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIOBIOLOGY 335 (Charles Crawford et al. eds., 1987); David M. Buss & David
P. Schmitt, Sexual Strategies Theory: An Evolutionary Perspective on Human Mating, 100 PSYCHOL.
REv. 204 (1993).
147. See, e.g., Buss, supra note 101, at 205; HALL, supra note 128, at 16-17, 38, 74;
VEERARAGHAVAN, supra note 128, at 57 (median age of rapists in 25-year study was 21 years old);
Thorhill & Thornhill, supra note 130. Raping males in other great apes also tend to be young. See
Nadler, supra note 13.
148. See, e.g., JOHN M. MACDONALD, RAPE OFFENDERS AND THEIR VIcTIMs 77 (1975).
149. Although it is rarely explained in social science terms alone, the sharp contrast between the
age distribution of men across the population, and the age distribution of rapists, has long been known.
See, e.g., id.; AMIR, supra note 41, at 52-53 (the majority of offenders fall into the 15 to 24 age group;
only 14% of all offenders are 30 years of age or older; median age for offenders is 23); id. at 57 ("The
literature on rape describing age distributions of offenders, reveals results similar to those found in the
present study."); BROWNMLLER, supra note 35, at 174-76 (typical rapist is about 19 years of age; 61%
[Vol. 87:827
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as different male cohorts age.
Prediction11: The average age of women raped during robbery will be
lower than the average age of all robbed women.
Rationale: If sexual desire is often a component in rapes, then the av-
erage age of female victims of rapes committed in con-
junction with a robbery should be lower than the average
age of female robbery victims, and skewed toward the re-
productive years.
Data: This seems to be the case. In one study of 887 incidents of
robbery, the age of female victims in robbery-rapes was
compared with the age of victims in robberies where rape
was not involved.5 While the average age of female rob-
bery victims was thirty-five years old, the average age of
rape-robbery victims was significantly lower: less than
twenty-eight years old."'1 The significance can be ex-
plained as follows: "When a robber has the opportunity to
rape, he is more likely to do so if the victim is young. "152
This suggests that the overrepresentation of young women
among rape victims is not likely to be simply a function of
greater opportunity to rape young women. Controlling for
opportunity, in the robbery context, reproductive-aged fe-
males are still overrepresented.
B. Discussion
The evolutionary theories generate other predictions as well, and for
these, too, researchers have generally found support.53 But no simple
of rapists are under the age of 25; largest concentration of offenders is in the 16 to 24year age range);
LORENNE M.G. CLARK & DEBRA J. LEwIS, RAPE: THE PRICE OF COERCIVE SEXUALITY 96 (1977).
(nearly 40% between the ages of 25 and 29); DOJ STATISTICS, supra note 6, at 4 (1997) (nearly 40% of
rape offenders are between ages of 18 and 29, with an additional 11% under the age of 18); GODON &
RIGER, supra note 2, at 34 C'Of the men arrested for rape in 1986 ... [f]orty-five percent were under
twenty-five years of age and a third were between eighteen and twenty-four years of age. These
patterns also are similar to those in previous years."); Joan Petersilia, Violent Crime and Violent
Criminals: The Response of the Justice System, in VIOLENCE AND THE LAW 226, 237 (Mark Costanzo
& Stuart Oskamp, eds., 1994) ("Rape offenders ... tend to be young, usually under 25."). While not all
rapists are caught, there appears to be no study in which the age distribution of even suspected rapists is
evenly distributed across the male population, or skewed toward either older men or prepubescent
males.
150. See Felson & Krohn, supra note 130.
151. See id, at 232.
152. Id. at 235.
153. These include, for example, predictions about variations in rape victim trauma according to
mateship (e.g., marital) status. See, e.g., THORNHILL & PALMER, supra note 14, at ch. 4; Thornhill &
Thomhill, Psychological Pain I, supra note 95. For discussion of these and other predictions, see, for
example, ELLIS, supra note 30, at 53; Randy Thornhill,Rape-Victim Psychological Pain, supra note
95, at 239.
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measure exists, of course, to quantify precisely the vitality of a behavioral
theory." 4 In the dynamic context of investigating complex evolutionary
influences on behavior, for example, it is typically not essential that all
predictions be simultaneously supported. Rather, the greater the number of
predictions supported, the narrower the predictions themselves, and the
more relevant species in which data are consistent, the greater the likeli-
hood that a given biobehavioral theory has actual explanatory power. It is
quite possible, for example, that the psychological trauma associated with
rape victimization in females is rape-specific adaptation, at the same time
that rape behavior in males is a by-product of psychological adaptation for
less specific purposes.
From this brief survey, we know the following about the biobehavio-
ral theories of rape causation rooted in natural and sexual selection. We
know that natural selection will favor, over time, any heritable predisposi-
tion in animals that tends, on average, to increase an individual's repro-
ductive success, compared to the reproductive success of its
contemporaries. We know-because the potential costs and benefits of
each copulatory act differ so dramatically-that sexual selection will favor
different predispositions in males and females toward copulating with the
opposite sex. We know that if evolutionary selection pressures have widely
affected the patterns of forced copulation in those animals in which forced
copulation appears, they will generate narrow and falsifiable predictions
(by age, sex, and other variables) of specific circumstances that will be
nonrandomly represented among incidents of forced copulation. We also
know that in a great many species, including primates, males and females
generally behave in ways consistent with these predictions. Moreover,
there is evidence that the primate Homo sapiens sapiens also exhibits a
number of patterns apparently consistent with these predictions.
III
OBJECTIONS CONSIDERED: A GUIDE TO SOME AVOIDABLE ERRORS
If biobehavioral theories are ever to be afforded relevance in the legal
machinery that confronts rape, they must first survive scrutiny of both pre-
dictions and data with a skeptical eye. Ordinarily, one would proceed di-
rectly from the predictions and data to such evaluation. But in this case
making that move too quickly, without pausing to consider objections to
this entire line of reasoning, would be premature. For while the informa-
tion just surveyed may be familiar to behavioral biologists and others com-
fortable with current evolutionary biology, it will likely sound implausible,
perhaps even heretical, to others. After all, a thoughtful skeptic might ar-
gue:
154. See Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law, supra note 11, at 1208-11.
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Any claim that rape is biological, rather than cultural, in
origin-the function of "rape genes" rather than environmental
conditioning-must certainly be wrong. We already know that men
rape to inspire fear, preserve male privilege, and resist female
empowerment. Moreover, the claim that rape evolved because it is
good for the species is patently absurd. Well-documented rapes of
very young girls and very old women, neither of whom could
possibly conceive, render the biological theories purely fanciful. In
addition, there are societies in which rape is unknown. Many rapes
are planned, not products of spontaneous passion. Many rapists are
married, with presumably willing sex partners at home. And not
only are many rapists sexually dysfunctional during the attack, but
raping itself is unlikely to be adaptive. For even those rapes in
which ejaculation occurs inside the victim's vagina are highly
unlikely to result in pregnancy, particularly in an era of widespread
contraception and access to abortion. And given the low likelihood
of fathering a child, the possible penalties for raping make it simply
too risky for procreative purposes. We should therefore resist
evolutionary perspectives on sexual aggression. Accepting those
perspectives will lead to rapists being excused for otherwise
properly punishable transgressions.
This Part addresses each of these objections. 55 I want to make clear,
in the most emphatic terms, that the biobehavioral theories and studies are
not beyond criticism. Nevertheless, these particular objections, common to
many works dismissive of biobehavioral reasoning on which future legal
thinkers may vulnerably rely, typically trace to often-understandable but
nonetheless fundamental misunderstandings about what the biobehavioral
theories do and do not say, and do and do not import, even if true. 15 6 These
objections are likely to cloud accurate assessment, probing critique, and
constructive law-relevant interdisciplinary synthesis. I categorize these
misunderstandings as:
A The Error of the False Dichotomy;
B. The Error of the Damning Determinism;
155. Some of these objections, as well as several objections not covered here, are raised and
considered in Palmer, supra note 35; Randy Thornhill & Nancy Wilmsen Thornhill, The Evolutionary
Psychology of Men's Coercive Sexuality, 15 BEHAV. & BRAuN Sci. 363 (1992) [hereinafter Thornhill &
Thornhill, Evolutionary Psychology of Men's Coercive Sexuality]; Randy Thornhill & Nancy Wilmsen
Thornhill, The Study of Men's Coercive Sexuality: What Course Should It Take?, 15 BEHAV. & BRAiN
Scr. 404 (1992). See also Kingsley R. Browne, An Evolutionary Perspective on Sexual
Harassment: Seeking Roots in Biology Rather Than Ideology, 8 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 5, 47-65
(1997); Browne, supra note 76, at 1083-1101; Neil M. Malamuth, Sexually Explicit Media, Gender
Differences, and Evolutionary Theory, 46 J. COMM. 8, 8-10 (1996) (discussing several regrettable
misunderstandings about evolutionary theory that have caused some researchers to resist it).
156. Whether these sorts of misunderstandings result from widespread unfamiliarity with the
basics of behavioral biology, the failure of biologists to make their theories adequately clear to lay-
people, the sometimes overly reductionist language a biologist may at times employ, or something else
is largely irrelevant for present purposes.
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C. The Error of the Causal Correlate;
D. The Error of the Manifest Motive;
E. The Error of the Sponsoring Species;
F. The Error of the Single Society;
G. The Error of the Failed Fornicators;
1- The Argument from Specious Spontaneity;
I The Argument from Substitute Sex;
J. The Argument from Inconceivable Conception;
I The Argument from Modem Maladaptiveness;
L The Argument from Incomplete Explanation; and
M. "Ought-Is" Errors.
A. The Error of the False Dichotomy
Most commentators who have addressed the biobehavioral theories of
sexual aggression explicitly or implicitly frame them as inevitably com-
petitive with the social-cultural-environmental theories, as if only one set
can be right. "Nature versus nurture," "biological versus cultural," and the
like are popular manifestations of this tendency.'57 As one critic innocently
but wholly erroneously understood it, for example, "[Some biologists] term
rape a 'biological phenomenon,' that is, an evolutionary or genetic
phenomenon rather than a phenomenon derived from psychological,
societal and cultural factors."'58 Another critic rejected "the biologicization
of rape" on the ground that it required "the dismissal of social or 'moral'
factors."' 59
It is simply erroneous to assume that either biology causes rape or
sociocultural environment causes rape.'60 This fabricates a dilemma, and a
157. See, e.g., CLARK & LEWIS, supra note 149, at 28 (considering biological and social
explanations as mutually exclusive); Barbara Findlay, The Cultural Context of Rape, 60 WOMaN LAW.
J. 199, 199 (1974) (same); Julia Siegel Schwendinger & Herman Schwendinger, Homo Economicus as
the Rapist in Sociobiology, in SUNDAY & TOBACH, supra note 45, at 85 (same). Even the most
thoughtful legal commentators can inadvertently reinforce dichotomous thinking in readers. See, e.g.,
ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 118 (1997) (referring to "[n]ecessity-whether biological'or
cultural"); Dripps, supra note 4, at 1781 (expressing disinterest in "[w]hether [rape] originates from
social or biological causes") (emphasis added).
158. Ethel Tobach & Suzanne Sunday, Epilogue to SUNDAY & TOBACH supra note 45, at 132
(emphasis added). This assertion appears without citation and is, of course, an extension of the popular
(and equally misframed) debate, overviewed in DONOVAN, supra note 36, at 60, concerning the origins
of sex differences in behavior. Are they "biologically based, or culturally constructed?"
159. John Dupr6, Blinded by "Science": How Not to Think About Social Problems, 15 BEHAV. &
BRAIN Sci. 382, 382-83 (critiquing Thornhill & Thornhill, The Evolutionary Psychology of Men's
Coercive Sexuality, supra note 155).
160. As the Thornhills put it,
The question of whether rape is a sexual act, a violent act, or an act of male domination of a
woman is a central theme in a large literature that has grown out of the important place of
rape in the feminist movement. The major error in this debate is that the motive behind rape
is viewed as either sexual or violence and domination.
(Vol. 87:827
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contest for disciplinary hegemony, where none need exist. To biologists,
sociality, culture, and learning are all reflections of the human brain and its
abilities, and they are consequently a reflection of our biology and evolu-
tionary heritage. 1' Biology and environment are indivisible, for nothing
lives, grows, or behaves, except within an environment. Biology and cul-
ture are therefore likewise indivisible, since culture can only be perceived,
analyzed, transmitted, and effected through biological (and therefore prin-
cipally evolved) neurological pathways.
False dichotomies, pitting biological explanation against another kind,
typically reflect an often underrecognized confusion about the mechanisms
of causation in living things. "Causation" itself has different meanings in
law and in biology.162 And it is critical that legal scholars evaluating biobe-
havioral theories of rape keep these distinctions in mind. While lawyers
parse distinctions between proximate causes, remote causes, concurrent
causes, contributory causes, intervening causes, superseding causes, and
"but for" causes of phenomena, 3 behavioral biologists draw a single but
crucial distinction between "proximate" causes and "ultimate" causes."6
These are terms of art that have meanings in biology quite different from
any that lawyers might impute to them.6 '
In biology, the term "proximate cause" refers only to the "how" of
behavior. It peacefully coexists with the term "ultimate cause," which de-
scribes the larger "why" of behavior. More precisely, "proximate causes"
describe immediate causes, related to the internal mechanisms and devel-
opment that cause an organism to manifest a particular behavior. They may
be defined in terms of physiology and biochemistry, for example, as well
as, at times, an organism's unique developmental-environmental history."6
Most existing sociological and psychological studies of rape, for example,
focus exclusively on the proximate, environmental causes. 67
Thornhill & Thornhill, supra note 65, at 103; see also THORNHILL & PALMER, supra note 14, at ch. 1
(noting that "it is not even valid to talk about a trait as being 'primarily' genetic or environmental").
161. "Most evolutionary works on humans ... include an extended discussion of the inseparable
and equally important influences of genes and environment in the development (ontogeny) and
inheritance of all traits of individuals, including cultural or socially-learned behavior." THORNHILL &
PALMER, supra note 14, at ch. 5 (emphasis added).
162. Parts of this discussion rely on Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law, supra note 11, at 1127-
28. See also Owen D. Jones, Genes, Behavior, and Law, 15 POL. & LIFE Sci. 101 (1996) [hereinafter
Jones, Genes, Behavior, and Law].
163. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART & TONY HONOR9, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (2d ed. 1985).
164. On proximate and ultimate causation generally, see ALCOCK, supra note 47, at 2-6;
GOLDSMITH, supra note 47, at 3-11, 46-69; Alcock & Sherman, supra note 82; Low, supra note 76, at
40-42.
165. See Jones, Genes, Behavior, and Law, supra note 162, at 101.
166. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 47, at 6-11.
167. See id. at 64-65.
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"Ultimate causes," on the other hand, describe evolutionary processes
by which the same behavior came to be commonly observable 68 They
help to explain why given environmental stimuli tend to yield certain kinds
of behaviors, rather than certain alternative behaviors, or indeed randomly
responsive behaviors. Ultimate causes may be defined in terms of the his-
tory and reproductive consequences of behavior. Proximate and ultimate
causes operate together, with all behavior depending on ultimately shaped
proximate mechanisms. 69 Hence biologists studying sexual aggression un-
derstand the proximate causes in light of the evolutionary causes. They
believe that proximate causes are simply acontextual without consideration
of the way ultimate causation shapes the human brain, with the result that
certain kinds of proximate causes are more likely to give rise to certain
kinds of behaviors than to others.
The importance of this distinction warrants a further clarification.
Suppose one were to ask why a male robin sings. One answer would be,
"Because hormonal changes triggered by the lengthening of successive
days cause the robin to force air over appropriately shaped vocal chords."
But this answer, using terms of proximate causation, leaves many ques-
tions unanswered. It does not explain, for instance, why it came to pass that
lengthening days instead of shortening ones spark these hormonal changes
instead of others, or why it came to be that these particular hormonal
168. See ALCocK, supra note 47, at 2-6; GOLDSMITH, supra note 47, at 6-11.
169. Indeed, as Goldsmith puts it: "Nothing of importance in biology can be said to have but a
single cause." GOLDSMITH, supra note 47, at 8. As Nancy Thornhill states,
Proximate explanations for the existence of adaptations focus on genetic, biochemical,
physiological, developmental, social, and all other immediate causes leading to the
expression of adaptations. Ultimate explanations of adaptation have their theoretical
foundation in causes that operated during evolutionary history to lead to
adaptation... Proximate and evolutionary explanations of causation do not conflict. Both
proximate and ultimate explanations are needed for complete understanding of adaptations.
By understanding the evolutionary purpose of an adaptation, one should be able successfully
to predict and understand the proximate causes that affect the expression of the adaptation.
Nancy Wihnsen Thornhill, supra note 101, at 90. As Martin Daly and Margo Wilson write,
Also impeding an infusion of evolutionary sophistication among social scientists is the false
dichotomy of "social" versus "biological" explanations. Subscribers to this dichotomy equate
biology with its mechanistic subdisciplines such as genetics and endocrinology and think of
biological influences as intrinsic and irremediable, to be contrasted with extrinsic and
remediable social influences. Moreover, since putative biological influences are invariant and
constraining, those who propose their existence (the so-called nature crowd) are unmasked as
pessimists and reactionaries, while the advocates of "alternative" social influences (the so-
called nurture crowd) are optimists and progressives. This ideology, predicated on a profound
incomprehension of evolutionary biology, pervades the social sciences, in which it is often
accepted by nature advocates as thoroughly and thoughtlessly as by their nurture foes. A
presumption of this prevalent worldview is that biology (falsely defined as the study of the
invariant innate) is mute about aspects of sociality and behavior manifesting
developmentally, experientially, and circumstantially contingent variations. The very
demonstration of any such contingency is seen as an exercise in the alternative, antibiological
mode of explanation. The irony is that developmentally, experientially, and circumstantially
contingent variation is precisely what evolutionary biological theories of social phenomena
are about.
Daly & Wilson, Evolutionary Psychology and Marital Conflict, supra note 60, at 24.
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changes cause singing rather than, say, one-legged hopping. These latter
questions concern the historical origins of currently manifested gene com-
binations, and thus require an inquiry into ultimate causation. The ultimate
cause of singing behavior, evolutionary analysis reveals, reflects the fact
that the remote ancestors of today's singing males, through their singing,
claimed territory, attracted mates, and left more offspring than did contem-
poraries not predisposed to sing. To the extent the ability to sing and the
urge to sing in response to certain environmental cues were influenced by
heritable predispositions, the proportion of male robins in successive gen-
erations that sang inevitably increased over time until the trait became
typical of males of the species.
In the same fashion, virtually all behavior-including many human
behaviors-is most completely understood in terms of complementary
proximate and ultimate causes. 7 That is, when people exhibit law-relevant
behaviors, there are often two very different kinds of causes operating si-
multaneously. If rape is significantly correlated with attitudes dismissive of
female autonomy, for example, an evolutionary perspective suggests why
such attitudes are likely to manifest, in part, in forced copulation, rather
than in any of a whole host of other nonsexual activities (say, forced tat-
toos, forced sushi, or forced motorcycle-washing).
Consequently, it is thoroughly consistent with biological theories of
causation that variations in the environment, such as cultural attitudes, af-
fect the incidence of rape. That point cannot be overemphasized, because
of common assumptions to the contrary. Biologists do not dispute that
many correlations to rape identified by social scientists indeed contribute
to rape behavior. They do dispute, much more narrowly, that rape can be
fully understood or explained absent supplementation with biologically
informed perspectives."'
B. The Error of the Damning Determinism
Legal scholars writing on rape encounter social science claims that
biobehavioral theories generally, and rape theories in particular, at least in
170. See Thornhill et al., supra note 118, at 103.
171. Such a view is making increasing headway in the context of gender differences. Pratto, for
example, argues,
[C]ulture is part of our nature. It is thus pointless to build theories that refuse to examine
either nature or culture as having influence on the gender gap.... [B]ecause we are still a
sexually reproducing organism and exhibit a species-specific psychology... biological
factors cannot be relegated to ancient history. The view I take is that nature and culture
cannot be meaningfully separated: they are mutually influential on each other and jointly
influential on the nature of the gender gap.... Evolutionary theories are not alternative
explanations to "situational" (e.g., cultural, social psychological, historical, structural)
theories-in fact, they might be considered the grandparent of situational theories in that they
predict that organisms will change their behavior and their features in different environments.
See, Pratto, supra note 76, at 181-82, 200.
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the human context, are "genetically deterministic."'' 2 Some authors have
understood the theories to suggest that male sexuality is
"uncontrollable,"'' and assume that they inexorably lead people to think in
terms of the old and properly discredited "irresistible impulse" theories."
Rarely has so much been said about subjects that have not been raised. For
in properly rejecting genetic determinism, social scientists would find few
more zealous allies than evolutionary biologists and theorists of biobehav-
ioral influences on rape patterns.
We can trace the confusion about genetic determinism to at least two
sources. The first, like The Error of the False Dichotomy, is a failure to
appreciate the complementariness of proximate and ultimate causation.
Evolved predispositions operate probabilistically and are observable in
species-typical, environment-sensitive patterns. Because probability is not
inevitability, predispositions simply do not guarantee any behavior from
any individual. And even high probabilities about patterns likely to emerge
from some small subset of a population tell us little reliable about how a
single individual is likely to behave.
The second source of confusion traces to the all-too-common failure
to distinguish between two very different aspects of behavioral biol-
ogy: (1) behavioral genetics; and (2) evolved or "species-typical" psy-
chology. 75 Behavioral genetics involves efforts to trace the different
behaviors of different individuals to different versions (alleles) of genes.
For some behaviors this is an appropriate approach, occasionally law-
relevant. By contrast, the evolutionary psychology aspect of behavioral
172. See, e.g., ALLISON & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 5, at 36 (commenting on "the biological
deterministic theory"); Ethel Tobach & Betty Rosoff, Preface to SUNDAY & TOBACH, supra note 45, at
v (describing the volume as "the first in a series exposing the application of genetic determinism to
justify racist and sexist theories and activities"); Ethel Tobach & Suzanne R. Sunday, Prologue to
SUNDAY & TOaACH, supra note 45, at xi ("[G]enetic determinism is the basic concept of
sociobiology."). Often, such assumptions come packaged in the language of "programming." See, e.g.,
TIMOTHY BENEKE, MEN ON RAPE (1982) (quoting Sanday as saying: "It's important to understand that
violence is socially and not biologically programmed"); Sarah Lenington, Sociobiological Theory and
the Violent Abuse of Women, in SUNDAY & TOBACHI, supra note 45, at 13, 15-16 (claiming that
evolutionary psychologists "assume ... that these behaviors are 'genetically programmed"). For a
popular media account describing biobehavioral theories as about genetic programming, see Mary
Batten, Why Men Rape, 90 Sc. DIGEST, July 1982, at 64.
173. See, e.g., SUE LEES, RULING PASSIONS: SEXUAL VIOLENCE, REPUTATION AND THE LAW 6
(1997) (characterizing the theories as "the idea of male sexuality as natural and therefore
uncontrollable"); Andrew Futterman & Sabrina Zirkel, Men Are Not Born to Rape, 15 BEHAV. &
BRAIN Sci. 385, 385 (critiquing Thornhill & Thornhill, The Evolutionary Psychology of Men's
Coercive Sexuality, supra note 155) ("[The Thornhills' article] is yet another attempt to attribute the
cause of a complex human social behavior, in this case rape, to uncontrollable biological forces.").
174. On the origins of the irresistible impulse concept, see Scully & Marolla, supra note 33, at
294,295-96.
175. An example of this confusion appears in Susan B. Sorenson & Jacquelyn W. White, Adult
Sexual Assault: Overview of Research, 48 J. Soc. IssUES 3 (1992) ("If [biological processes influenced
rape], the many 'normal' men who perpetrate dating violence would be expected to
harbor... defective genetic structures, imbalanced endocrine systems, or brain dysfunctions.").
[Vol. 87:827
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biology, instead of investigating differences between individuals, investi-
gates the sameness of individuals across a species in order to predict and
discover which behavioral patterns are most likely to emerge and why.
That is, it is an effort to trace the different behaviors of different individu-
als not to different genes, but rather to different environmental stimuli
encountered by neurologically similar brains, sporting similar, evolved,
contingent, and highly conditional decisional algorithms.'76 Evolutionary
psychology predicts species-wide (in some cases sex-wide) physical,
information-processing commonalities that have evolved to yield predis-
positions toward certain behaviors, in the face of certain categories and
confluences of stimuli.
The tendency to assume that all biobehavioral theories trace sexual
aggression to genetic differences between males tends, in turn, to increase
apprehension of genetic determinism. This is unfortunate for two reasons.
First, while it may be the case that some differences between rapists in
propensity to rape can trace to genetic differences (such as a generalized
heritable psychopathy), such differences are unlikely to account for any but
a small percentage of rapes."7 Second, neither this explanation, nor the not
incompatible one that traces the larger percentage of rapes to male-typical
evolved psychology, is genetically deterministic.'
But as feminist evolutionary biologist Barbara Smuts put it,
[Saying that] male aggression against women reflects selection
pressures operating during our species' evolutionary history... in
no way implies that male domination of women is genetically
determined, or that frequent male aggression toward women is an
immutable feature of human nature.... [F]ar from being an
immutable feature of human nature, male aggression toward
women varies dramatically depending on circumstances.'79
176. An excellent discussion of the differences between behavioral genetics and evolutionary
psychology appears in Linda Mealey, Kinship: The Tie That Binds (Disciplines) (1999) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
177. Selection for heritable psychopathy would be frequency-dependent. Thus, heritable
psychopathy would likely be adaptive and maintained in a population only so long as it remained rare
(i.e., only so long as it appears at low frequencies, such as 1% to 3%). See, e.g., Linda Mealey, The
Sociobiology of Sociopathy: An Integrated Evolutionary Model, 18 BEHAV. & BRAIN Sm. 523 (1995);
see also THoRNHILL & PALMER, supra note 14, at ch. 3. Because heritable psychopathy would be
polygenic, breeding would yield genetic variation even among psychopaths, which may in turn lead to
heritable variances in rape propensities. Personal Communication with Randy Thornhill (Dec. 16,
1998).
178. See THORNHiLL & PALMER, supra note 14, at ch. 3.
179. Barbara Smuts, Male Aggression Against Women: An Evolutionary Perspective, 3 Hum.
NATURE 1, 2, 24 (1992) (citations omitted); see also Pratto, supra note 76, at 179, 220 ("Thus, a
biological view does not need to lead to deterministic predictions, but it suggests that the extreme
version of cultural determinism-that absolutely any cultural arrangement is possible-may be
wrong.")
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Genetic determinism, as it is popularly understood and feared, is a social
construct, a mythical state of mind attributed to behavioral biologists
(typically without citation)'80 and then cathartically demolished.
C. The Error of the Causal Correlate
One of the most significant hindrances to integrating proximate and
ultimate explanations of rape behavior, in pursuit of a more robust model
on which to base legally facilitated deterrence, is that many scholars claim
that the important questions have already been satisfactorily answered.
They already know why men rape.
Perhaps. On close scrutiny, however, many supposed explanations for
why men rape overdeduce cause and intent from effect, function, and cor-
relation. These several aspects of rape, all important and related, are none-
theless logically distinct. Mixing them together unreflectively can therefore
obscure the systematic discovery of causation in fact.
Brownrniller's often-imitated mistake serves as an example of rea-
soning that inadvertently conflates function and intent: "From prehistoric
times to the present, I believe, rape has played a critical function. It is
nothing more or less than a conscious process of intimidation by which all
men keep all women in a state of fear."'"' It is a simple matter to quote such
a passage without full context. And, in fairness, Brownmiller offers much
detail in attempting to bolster this bold claim. But my narrow point here is
that consumers of rape scholarship, such as legal thinkers, should not mis-
take claims about the meanings of rape to be facts about the causes of rape.
180. See, e.g., JAGOAR, supra note 37, at 106-13. Many of the points Jaggar makes, in her
intelligent rejection of determinism, are certainly shared by the large majority of credible behavioral
biologists. Indeed, I am aware of no biologists today that would significantly disagree with her
conclusions that biology and culture are inextricably intertwined as explanatory mechanisms for
producing complex human behavior.
181. BROWNMILLER, supra note 35, at 15; see also Odem & Clay-Warner, Introduction t o
CONFRONTING RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT, supra note 7, at xi (asserting that "rape is a means of
inducing fear in women, limiting their movements, and reinforcing their dependence on men")
(emphasis added); Wendy E. Stock, Feminist Explanations: Male Power, Hostility, and Sexual
Coercion, in SEXUAL COERCION, supra note 7, at 61, 72 (arguing that sexual coercion by men serves
the function of creating a state of sexual terrorism for women, with the intent and effect of maintaining
social control of women). Brownmiller's message has not changed. See, e.g., Susan Brownmiller,
Making Female Bodies the Battlefield, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 4, 1993, at 37 (describing rape as, in part,
caused by the rapisfs need "to give vent to his submerged rage against all women who belong to other
men"). A resolution of the U.N. Security Council proclaims, "Rape is an abuse of power and control in
which the rapist seeks to humiliate, shame, embarrass, degrade, and terrify the victim. The primary
objective is to exercise power and control over another person." The Situation of Human Rights in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia: Note by the Secretary-General, U.N. General Assembly Security
Council, 48th Sess., Agenda Item 115(c), U.N. Doc A/48/92, S/25341 (1993) cited in BEVERLY
ALLEN, RAPE WARFARE: THE HIDDEN GENOCIDE IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA AND CROATIA 119
(1996). In a chapter entitled "Why Do Men Rape Women?' two co-authors build conclusions about
why men rape upon "women's experiences." ANDREA MEDEA & KATHLEEN THOMPSON, AGAINST
RAPE (1974). There is of course a possible link between victim experiences and perpetrator intent, but
not a properly presumptive one.
[Vol. 87:827
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Meaning is a construct created by the analyst and offered in hope that its
characterization of an act is somehow insightful. Causation is a scientific
concept describing a particular relationship between a behavior and its an-
tecedents.
Rape scholarship does not always make it easy to disentangle mean-
ing and causation. Consider, for example, the following passage from a
study of wartime rapes in the former Yugoslavia:
A rape is an aggressive and humiliating act, as even a soldier
knows, or at least suspects. He rapes because he wants to engage in
violence. He rapes because he wants to demonstrate his power. He
rapes because he is the victor. He rapes because the woman is the
enemy's woman, and he wants to humiliate and annihilate the
enemy. He rapes because the woman is herself the enemy whom he
wishes to humiliate and annihilate. He rapes because he despises
women. He rapes to prove his virility. He rapes because the
acquisition of the female body means a piece of territory con-
quered. He rapes to take out on someone else the humiliation he
has suffered in the war. He rapes to work off his fears. He rapes
because it's really only some "fun" with the guys. He rapes
because war, a man's business, has awakened his aggressiveness,
and he directs it at those who play a subordinate role in the world
of war."82
The passage has great moral force, but readers may take very different
things from it. By explaining why rape is wrong, the words properly pro-
voke outrage at rape, and they help readers to understand what rape means
to women and soldiers, and possibly to other men. At the same time, the
unqualified language of "is," "because," and "to" seems to make state-
ments of fact about why men rape. (The very etymology of "be-cause"
suggests a claim about causation.)" 3 And it is all too easy to slide from so-
cial meaning to causation, without realizing the leagues one has crossed in
doing so.
Nevertheless, functional effect is not necessarily intended effect. Evi-
dence proffered in support of these conclusions about motivation typically
extrapolates from a small number of individual (and admittedly powerful)
rape episodes without convincingly demonstrating, or often even attempt-
ing to demonstrate, that the parts are truly representative of the whole-
that what was correlated with some rapes is correlated, generally, with
most or all rapes. Committing The Error of the Causal Correlate would be
182. Alexandra Stigimayer, The Rapes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in MASS RAPE: THE WAR
AGAINST WONMEN IN BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA 82, 84 (Alexandra Stiglmayer ed. & Marion Faber trans.,
1994) (emphasis added); see also Rhonda Copelon, Surfacing Gender: Reconceptualizing Crimes
Against Women in Time of War, in MASS RAPE, supra, at 197, 198 ("Rape is sexualized violence that
seeks to humiliate, terrorize, and destroy a woman based on her identity as a woman.").
183. 1 THE OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 746 (1961).
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more easily dismissible as journalistic license were it not for the frequency
with which it resurfaces in legal scholarship,'" often in support of concrete
legal implications.8 5 If claims about causation underlie behavioral models,
upon which legal strategies will be built, we should be more careful, early
on, in examining those claims.
Moreover, correlation is not causation. Consider, for example, the
correlation in many contexts between aggression and sex. As a logical
matter, sex could be a vehicle for aggression, as commonly assumed and
asserted, or aggression could be a vehicle for sex. Only scientific method
and rigorous hypothesis-testing can establish which causes what. Similarly,
it could be that rape is an epiphenomenon of sociocultural messages that
devalue women. But it could also be the case that devaluing women is
simply a precondition for rape. That is, respect may be an inhibiting factor
that suppresses otherwise more persistent sexuality, and where society in-
sufficiently fosters respect, rape is a result. That does not automatically
mean that rape is primarily a vehicle for expressing lack of respect, any
more than eating is primarily a vehicle for expressing chewing. Legal
thinkers should be skeptical of all conclusions that reason, without sub-
stantially more, from correlate to cause.
D. The Error of the Manifest Motive
Just as it is easy to confuse correlation with causation, it is easy to
overentwine causation with motivation. This can lead to the assumption
that identifying motives for rape will alone provide sufficient insight into
the causes of rape."6 For example, that assumption may lead one to
184. An example often invoked as evidence of why men rape, rather than why some men, or this
man raped, concerns the infamous My Lai Massacre, after which a dead and presumably raped woman
was left spread-eagled-with an 11th Brigade patch between her legs. (As Baker notes in her article,
supra note 16, at 570 n.35, this incident is recounted in BROWNMILLER, supra note 35, at 103-05).
Compare what this might imply with this passage, from DREw WESTEN, PSYCHOLOGY: MIND, BRAIN,
& CULTURE 717 (1996):
The most common and least violent of rapists are usually solitary, socially inadequate men
with low self-esteem, whose primary aim is to reassure themselves of their sexual adequacy
and masculinity by exercising power over their victim. When interviewed months or years
later, they typically report the fantasy that the women they rape will fall in love with them,
and their behavior during the rape reflects this fantasy: They tend to kiss and fondle their
victims, to compliment them on their beauty, to avoid violence, and to become distressed if
the woman becomes too manifestly upset or struggles too much.
Clearly, if one is going to make generalizable inferences about why men rape, the behavior of the
many, rather than the few, is more significant. Of course, identifying the relative frequencies of
different rape behaviors is likely to remain a difficult empirical issue.
185. See, for example, the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§
40111(a)-40611, 108 Stat. 1796, 1903-53 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 28, and
42 U.S.C.), which is discussed infra text accompanying notes 323-340.
186. This can also lead to debates, some more useful than others, over what is the "primary" or
"dominant" motive for rape. See, e.g., GROTH, supra note 33, at 2 ("Forcible sexual assault is
motivated more by retaliatory and compensatory motives than by sexual ones."); Murray L. Cohen et
al., The Psychology of Rapists, 3 SEMINARS IN PSYCHIATRY 307, 311 (1971) (discussing "primary"
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conclude that if a rapist is not consciously motivated by a desire to father a
child through the victim then theories of biobehavioral influences on rape
that build on the potential reproductive significance of rape must be wrong.
It is then a short step to the seemingly related conclusion that if a rapist
himself manifests a motive for rape other than sexual desire (such as a de-
sire to humiliate) then sexual desire is also unrelated to rape."1
The problem with this reasoning is that it overestimates the impor-
tance of conscious motivation in biobehavioral theories and reflects a deep
misunderstanding of the process by which evolution affects behavior.'88
Natural selection affects behavior by having favored, over time, those
brains that increased the probability of certain kinds of behaviors in re-
sponse to certain kinds of environmental stimuli, whenever those behav-
iors, on average, increased reproductive success (however indirectly). For
example, those organisms whose brains gradually increased the urgency of
food acquisition in response to neural stimuli signaling an empty stomach
tended to leave more descendants than those organisms whose brains did
not, or whose brains, in response, increased the probability of other kinds
of behavior unlikely to provide nutrition gains. Brains have a variety of
mechanisms by which to increase the likelihood of certain behaviors; in-
spiring a conscious motive to achieve the adaptive result is merely one of
them, often unnecessary.'89 The urge to eat can exist quite independently of
aims and "dominating" motives); Janssen, supra note44, at 12 ("The primary motive is to control the
victim .... ); Ken Plummer, The Social Uses of Sexuality: Symbolic Interaction, Power and Rape, in
PERsPEcrvs ON RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT 37, 42 (June Hopkins ed., 1984) ("In single rape, in
group rape and in wartime rape, it seems that sex per se is rarely (probably never) the dominant factor;
rather domination, anger and male camaraderie seem to be the central concerns."); Richard T. Rada,
Psychological Factors in Rapist Behavior, in ALAN SOBLE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF SEX: CONTEMPORARY
READINGS 21, 24 (2d ed. 1991) ("The primary motive in the rapist is the desire to control the victim in
the specific instance of rape and, by extension, all women."); Tamara L. Tompkins, Prosecuting Rape
as a War Crime: Speaking the Unspeakable, 70 NOTRE DAME L. Rv. 845, 855 (1994/95) ("The
primary goal of the typical rapist is not achieving sexual satisfaction, but rather fulfilling a need to
exercise control over a woman and thereby dominate her."). Some authors have developed systems to
classify rapists, according to the proportions of sexual and aggressive motives for the act. See, e.g.,
GROTH, supra note 33; see also Mary Koss & Kenneth E. Leonard, Sexually Aggressive
Men: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Implications, in NEIL M. MALAMUTH & EDWARD
DONNERSTEIN, PORNOGRAPHY AND SEXUAL AGGRESSION 213, 232 (1984) (citing, as examples, Cohen
et al., supra; A. Nicholas Groth et al., Rape: Power, Anger, and Sexuality, 134 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY
1239 (1977)). For an overview, see Raymond A. Knight et al., Classification of Sexual
Offenders: Perspectives, Methods, and Validation, in RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT, supra note 30, at
222.
187. See Florence L. Denmark & Susan B. Friedman, Social Psychological Aspects of Rape, in
SUNDAY & ToBACH, supra note 45, at 59, 61.
188. See, e.g., Neil M. Malamuth, The Confluence Model of Sexual Aggression: Feminist and
Evolutionary Perspectives, in Buss & MALAMUTH, supra note 30, at 269, 272 (explaining how sound
evolutionary theories of behavior simply do not require conscious motivation).
189. Indeed, evolutionists have frequently gone to great lengths to clarify that conscious
motivation toward adaptive ends is unnecessary for adaptation. Daly and Wilson, for example, write:
[E]volutionists are misunderstood to claim that fitness itself is what people and other animals
strive for. In actuality, fitness consequences are properly invoked not as direct objectives or
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any conscious motive to acquire nutrition, and the urge to have sex can
exist quite independently of any conscious motive to reproduce. The ab-
sence of the conscious motive to achieve a biologically useful result does
not make either eating or sex incapable of being understood in biological
terms. And the closer the nexus between the behavior at issue and behavior
that was adaptive during the environment of evolutionary adaptation, the
more powerfully human evolved psychology likely affects the patterns of
that behavior, regardless of subjective awareness that it does so.
Proximate and ultimate causation operate simultaneously, and a vari-
ety of proximate desires can also operate simultaneously. Consequently,
the hypothesis that rape is motivated by hostility or a desire to humiliate is
not necessarily incompatible with the hypothesis that evolutionary influ-
ences on sexual behavior contribute to rape patterns. Not all causes are
manifested in motives.
E. The Error of the Sponsoring Species
Legal thinkers are apt to encounter commentators who frequently (if
unintentionally) caricature the view that evolutionary processes affect the
incidence of rape by saying that "[t]his [biological] view argues that rape is
a male instinctive reaction that is a drive to perpetuate the species."'" The
view so characterized-that rape exists because it is good for the species-
must be incorrect, one could quickly conclude, for two reasons. First, all
experience makes clear that humans are not mindless automata, governed
by instinct. Second, if behavior did evolve to perpetuate the species (as the
author quoted above thinks biologists think), then women should have the
same drive as men and would willingly copulate whenever reproduction
was possible. Since they do not... Q.E.D. Authors who advance such ar-
guments adduce evidence "inconsistent with the proposition that rape is the
motivators, but as explanations of why certain proximal objectives and motivators have
evolved to play their particular roles in the causal control of behavior. Selection designs
organisms to cope with particular adaptive problems that have been sufficiently persistent
across generations, both in their essential forms and in their significance, to have favored
particular solutions. These evolved solutions necessarily entail contingent responsiveness to
environmental features that were statistical predictors of the average fitness consequences of
alternative courses of action in the past. Adaptation is not prospective; adaptive performance
in contemporary environments depends on the persistence of essential features of past
environments.
Daly & Wilson, supra note 60, at 23-24.
190. HARvEY WALLACE, FAMILY VIOLENCE, LEGAL, MEDICAL, AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVEs 256
(1996) (offering this characterization in his discussion of "Women and Sexual violence"). The error is
not limited to critics, however, as even the sympathetic or agnostic often innocently misunderstand the
biological theories, as well. See, e.g., W.L. Marshall & H.E. Barbaree, A Behavioral View of Rape, 7
INT'L J. L. & PSYCHOL. 51 (1984) C'There is some evidence to suggest that the potential to engage in
forced heterosexual acts (rape), may serve to enhance species-survival ... ").
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result of a need to perpetuate the species," assuming that they are then
done with the matter.191
This often-encountered summary of the evolutionary perspective suf-
fers from two distinct fatal flaws. First, characterizing psychological pre-
dispositions as "instinctive reaction" implies a mindless reflexiveness and
inevitability in human behavior that biologists simply do not believe exists
in the context of such complex behavior as sexual aggression. Second, and
more significantly, it is inconsistent with the most fundamental principles
of evolutionary biology to say that a trait evolves "to perpetuate the spe-
cies."" Modem biologists do not make this claim.
The key mistake here is as destructive to discourse as it is easy to
make. Mainstream biology abandoned this particular brand of "group-
selection" thinking some time ago (in 1966) in favor of the more theoreti-
cally and empirically robust model of selection operating at the level of the
smallest heritable traits (generally genes).' 93 What this means (as foreshad-
owed earlier) is that heritable behavioral predispositions persist and spread
for any significant length of time only if they increase, on average, the re-
productive success of the individuals bearing them. 94 Observable traits are
therefore the product of de facto competition between individuals of a spe-
cies, rather than the product of individual contributions to the success of
the species that may come at significant costs to the individual. Nothing in
contemporary behavioral biology suggests that rape (or any other trait)
evolved to perpetuate the species, because when species persist it is only as
an epiphenomenon of the aggregated success of individuals' traits that are
effective at replicating themselves. Whether rape is good for the species is
irrelevant to critical assessment of the life science theories of rape.
F. The Error of the Single Society
Some early rape scholars reasoned that biobehavioral theories about
evolutionary influences on patterns of sexual aggression are disproved by
the existence of even a single human society in which rape does not ex-
ist.9 ' This line of reasoning continues to surface in modem rape litera-
ture.'96 Such a claim makes sense if two things are true: (1) biological
191. Allison and Wrightsman make this error, after noting that sometimes rape victims are men.
See ALLISON & WvmGHTSMAN, supra note 5, at 36-37.
192. See, e.g., id at 17 (misascribing to biologists the contention that "[s]ocial behavior evolves
because it is adaptive to propagating the species"); Blackman, supra note 45, at 118 (claiming that
those "who advance biological explanations for social characteristics [argue that these] are adaptive for
the species").
193. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
194. See supra note 53.
195. See, e.g., Griffin, supra note 35, at 27 (purporting to refute theories of biological influence
with the claim: "But in truth rape is not universal to the human species."). Nothing in biobehavioral
theories of behavior suggests that the incidence of rape will be constant across all human societies.
196. For example, Sanday writes,
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theory predicts complete universality across the human species; and (2) a
society without rape exists. Both conditions are necessary, but neither is
true.
First, biobehavioral theories are probabilistic. Because they are not
about "always," they cannot be disproved by a "sometimes." This is not
evasiveness, but rather a necessary by-product of the fact that behavior is
plastic and can be influenced by predispositions (not predeterminations)
that are environmentally sensitive. 197 While the absence of rape from so-
cieties encompassing a large percentage of the human population would
make more difficult the case for evolutionary influences specific to sexual
aggression, the existence of evolutionary influences would not be signifi-
cantly undermined by the absence of universality alone. Second, and de-
spite continued popular belief that Margaret Mead and Peggy Reeves
Sanday discovered societies where rape was unknown,'98 it has been dem-
onstrated convincingly that this is untrue.' 99
G. The Error of the Failed Fornicators
Some authors claim that the theory that sexual desire influences pat-
terns of rape "has been discredited... [because] high levels of sexual
dysfunction have been reported.' The argument is that the high number
Cross-culturally the incidence of rape varies considerably .... To explain such variation in
the incidence of rape we cannot fall back on ethnocentric assumptions about the 'animal' or
rape-prone nature of men. Innate tendencies do not explain the incidence of rape. Whatever
the biological basis for sexuality may be (and I do not deny a biological component), the
variation in the incidence of rape cross-culturally demonstrates that culture is a powerful
force in channelling the human sex drive.
Peggy Reeves Sanday, Rape and the Silencing of the Feminine, in TOMASELLI & PORTER, supra note
30, at 84, 84-85. Sanday then goes on in the balance of her chapter to suggest that variation between
cultures that can be correlated to sociocultural contexts and ideology of male dominance renders
biological arguments incorrect. See also Ruth Seifert, War and Rape: A Preliminary Analysis, in MASS
RAPP, supra note 182, at 56 ("Ethnological research offers a further argument against considering rape
in any biologistic or 'naturalizing' way, for some societies have a high incidence of rape and others a
low one.").
197. See supra Section I.B.
198. For the continued influence of Sanday's study, see, for example, its republication, to
favorable comments, in CONFRONTING RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT, supra note 7, at 93.
199. See, e.g., DEREK FREEMAN, MARGARET MEAD AND SAMOA: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING
OF AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL MYTH 849 (1983) (estimating that the rape rate in Samoa is actually higher
than that in the U.S.); see also ELLIS, supra note 30, at 6 ("In West Sumatra, one of the reputed 'rape-
free' societies ... Sanday ... found the actual rape rate was about 19 per 1 million females, low by
most Western standards, but not entirely 'rape-free."); Craig Palmer, Is Rape a Cultural Universal? A
Re-Examination of the Ethnographic Data, 28 ETHNOLOGY 1 (1989). Samoa, which Margaret Mead
reported in the 1930s to be essentially rape free, has since been shown to have an official rape rate
twice as high as that for the United States. See WRANGHAM & PETERSON, supra note 93, at 282-83;
Palmer, supra, at 6; Patricia D. Rozte, Forbidden or Forgiven? Rape in Cross-Cultural Perspective, 17
PSYCHO. WOMEN Q. 499, 512 (1993) (concluding, after cross-society random sample of 35 societies,
that "It]he notion of a rape-free culture was not supported by this study").
200. Adrian Furnham & Natalie Boston, Theories of Rape and the Just World, 2 PSYCHOL, CRIME
& L. 211, 214 (1996) (citing A. Nicholas Groth & Ann Wolbert Burgess, Rape: A Sexual Deviation,
[Vol. 87:827
HeinOnline  -- 87 Cal L. Rev. 886 1999
SEX, CULTURE, AND THE BIOLOGY OF RAPE
of failed fornicators suggests that sex is not a significant motive in rape. By
some reports, thirty-four percent of assailants fail to ejaculate in the vic-
tim."' Certainly, there is some percentage of dysfunction high enough to
present a significant challenge to the evolutionary theories. But this is not
it. Theories of evolutionary influence do not require that every assailant
successfully ejaculate. That the majority of rapists apparently do ejaculate
is amply sufficient. It is necessary only that in the environment of evolu-
tionary adaptation the reproductive success benefits of accumulated rape
attempts exceeded the costs of those attempts (on average, across all indi-
viduals bearing psychological, context-specific predispositions affecting
the likelihood of rape). Dysfunction during individual assaults, even
consistent dysfunction of some rapists during sequential assaults, in no
way falsifies the theories.
H. The Argument from Specious Spontaneity
Legal thinkers should be aware that many scholars misattribute to the
biological theories of sexual aggression the necessity of spontaneity in
rapes. 2 A premeditated rape is thought to be conclusive proof that the bi-
ology of sexual desire is irrelevant. The logic, apparently, is that any
planned sex would be non-sex, since sexual desire is impulsive." 3 As oth-
ers have pointed out, however, we have no trouble accepting that many
consensual liaisons are sexual in function and purpose, even when one or
both of the participants planned the preliminaries.2 In dating, for example,
one party's planning for sex does not make subsequent consensual sex
nonsexual. The biological theories of evolutionary contributions to rape
causation require only that males, as a function of evolutionary processes,
be highly motivated to pursue or create opportunities for copulation-not
that they do so on sudden impulse.
47 Am. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 400 (1977)); see also ALLISON & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 5, at 36
(suggesting theory undercut by evidence that "some [rapists] were unable to achieve erections, or do
not ejaculate during the rape'); TEDasCHi & FELSON, supra note 116, at 313 (noting that the fact that
some rapists experience sexual dysfunction has been cited as evidence against sexual motivation).
201. See HALL, supra note 128, at 76.
202. See, for example, BROWNMILLER, supra note 35, at 183, who in commenting on Axmtn, supra
note 41, notes, "Far from being a spontaneous explosion by an individual with pent-up emotions and
uncontrollable lusts, [Amir] discovered the act was usually planned in advance and elaborately
arranged by a single rapist or a group of buddies."
203. Richard T. Rada writes,
Rape is a crime of control, power, and dominance. The primary motive in the rapist is the
desire to control the victim in the specific instance of rape and, by extension, all women. In
this sense, the aggressive component appears to be more dominant in rape than the sexual
component. In fact, for many rapists the sexual act itself appears to be less important than the
ritual of the rape event, which is more often carefully planned than impulsive.
Rada, supra note 32, at 24.
204. For further discussion of this point, see Palmer, supra note 35, at 516.
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L The Argument from Substitute Sex
Legal thinkers should also avoid the commonly observed presumption
that biological theories of sexual aggression are disproved by evidence that
many rapists have consensual sex partners available. 05 Some
commentators that rape scholars may encounter have gone so far as to
claim that the ready availability of masturbation, as a substitute for sex,
exposes a weakness in the biobehavioral theories.2"
It is a mistake to understand those theories to be about sexual re-
lease-as if any release will do-rather than sexual desire.' 7 At the same
time that natural selection might have favored a general predisposition to-
ward increasingly aggressive sexuality, in the face of unsuccessful mating
efforts, natural selection certainly favored a general predisposition to in-
crease the number of sex partners, not just the number of sex acts per part-
ner. (Recall that male reproductive success, in contrast to female
reproductive success, tends to increase as the number of sex partners in-
creases.) Biobehavioral theory suggests that males without consensual
mating opportunities might be most likely to rape, but it does not suggest
that available sex with one female will necessarily preclude rape of other
females. In the white-fronted bee-eater bird, for example, raping males
(who narrowly target females during the fertile part of their individual cy-
cle) often have contemporaneously willing and reproductive mates.20 8 This
is consistent with the hypothesis that "forced copulation is an additional
mating tactic rather than a substitute."2°9
205. See, e.g., AMIR, supra note 41, at 321 ("If it is 'sexual hunger,' we already alluded that lower-
class boys are not deprived of sexual outlet."); GORDON & RiGER, supra note 2, at 45 (asserting that sex
drive is not an important constituent of rape causation, since "[r]esearch on rapists in prison indicates
that about a third are married and were sexually active with their wives at the time of the assault [and]
[o]f those not married, the majority were involved in consenting relationships"); LANGEVIN, supra note
32, at 393 ("About 6-in-10 rapists are married at the time of the offence and some writers assume that
sexual deprivation is not a factor in the commission of the act.'); Richard T. Rada, Psychological
Factors in Rapist Behavior, in CLINICAL ASPECTS OF THE RAPIST, supra note 32, at 21-22 (arguing that
rape cannot be only sexual, since rapists have other sexual outlets); Stock, supra note 181, at 62
("[S]exual coercion is motivated by power, not lust" because in a clinical study of 500 identified
offenders, "one-third of the offenders were married and sexually active with their wives at the time of
their assaults; the majority of the nonmarried sample were actively involved in a variety of consensual
sexual relations with others at the time of their offenses."). But see Palmer, supra note 35, at 516
(critiquing this line of reasoning).
206. For example, Stock writes, "When this [feminist approach] is applied to rape ... it becomes
evident that rape is not only the result of uncontrolled lust... [because that does] not sufficiently
explain why rape occurs when alternative sexual outlets are always available, including
masturbation ..." Stock, supra note 181, at 62.
207. As one evolutionist noted, "[m]ost patrons of prostitutes, adult bookstores, and adult movie
theatres are married men, but this is not considered evidence for lack of sexual motivation." Palmer,
supra note 35, at 516 (quotingDONALD SYMONS, THE EvOLUTION OF HUMAN SEXUALITY 280 (1979)).
208. See Emlen & Wrege, supra note 111, at 10-11.
209. R. ROBIN BAKER & MARK A. BELLIs, HUMAN SPERM COMPETITION: COPULATION,
MASTURBATION, AND INFIDELITY 37 (1995) (citing ELLIS, supra note 30).
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J. The Argument from Inconceivable Conception
It is not uncommon to encounter, during research on rape causation,
the claim that the low likelihood of pregnancy from individual rapes dis-
proves evolutionary arguments.2"' The following statement is typical of
such criticisms: "[The biological theories are] improbable because rapes
rarely lead to the birth of a viable child."'" Such a view is intuitively ap-
pealing. And rapes rarely do lead to conception and birth. But the conclu-
sion that rare benefits are insufficient to have widespread evolutionary
significance is, though understandable, biologically naive.
Over evolutionary time, even small increases in reproductive success
can have powerful effects?22 As mentioned earlier, a trait offering a meager
1% reproductive advantage over an alternative trait can swell from 1% rep-
resentation in a population to 99% representation in 265 generations?13 The
truth of this point, demonstrable in computer simulations as well as in
laboratory demonstrations with simple organisms, is essential to the evolu-
tion of complex morphology and behavior. Pregnancy rates from rape are
estimated at roughly 1% to 5% across all victims, and roughly 5% for fe-
males of reproductive age. 4 For comparative purposes, the chances of
pregnancy resulting from an individual act of intercourse with a willing
partner in her twenties is typically estimated at only 2% to 4%.2 5 These
figures not only fail to falsify the biobehavioral theories, but are amply
consistent with them. In the United States, among adult females alone,
there are more than 32,000 rape-related pregnancies each year.216 Given the
probability that a number of raped women were using contraception at the
time, the percentage of rapes that resulted in conception and birth was
likely higher in nontechnological ancestral environments, providing ample
differences in reproductive success for natural selection to operate.217
210. See, e.g., Baron, supra note 85, at 271; see also THORNHILL & PALMER, supra note 14, at ch.
5 (collecting and critiquing additional sources using this line of reasoning).
211. Eckart Voland, Selection for Rape or Selection for Sexual Opportunism?, 15 BEHAV. &
BRAIN Sci. 402, 402 (critiquing Thornhill & Thornhill, Evolutionary Psychology of Men's Coercive
Sexuality, supra note 155); see also Travis Langley, Empirical Criteria for Evaluating Rape as an
Evolutionary Phenomenon, 15 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCL 393, 393 (same; also noting that
"[c]osts ... could well outweigh benefits because rape is highly unlikely to produce offspring").
212. For a book devoted entirely to making this point clear, see DAWKINS, CLIMBING MOUNT
IMPROBABLE, supra note 49.
213. See supra note 61 and accompanying text; see also ThtvEas, supra note 47, at 28-29.
214. See, e.g., ELLIS, supra note 30, at 47 (1% to 3%) (citing studies); UNDERSTANDING VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOEN, supra note 128, at 76 (5%) (citing studies); Melisa M. Holmes et al., Rape-Related
Pregnancy: Estimates and Descriptive Characteristics from a National Sample of Women, 175 AM. J.
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 320, 320 (1996) (less than 1% to 5%) (citing studies); id. at 322 tbl.2
(pregnancy rates for rape victims in their reproductive years found to be 5%).
215. See ELLIS, supra note 30, at 47.
216. See Holmes et al., supra note 214, at 322. Roughly 40% of the rape-related pregnancies
resulted from multiple assaults rather than from a single attack. See id at 323.
217. As one set of authors put it, 'In considering this evolutionary view of rape, it is important to
keep in mind that very small consistent differences in fitness among individuals may have large
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Moreover, commentators commonly mistake the statistically relevant
reference group. The key question is not whether rapes result in a large
number of pregnancies, but whether rapes result in a larger number of
pregnancies than do alternative forms of sex behavior available to the
rapist. Brownmiller and Mehrhof argued, as recently as 1992, that evolu-
tionary theories of rape were "fanciful" because "[i]n terms of successful
reproductive strategy, the hit or miss ejaculations of a single-strike rapist
are a form of Russian roulette compared to ongoing consensual mating. '218
But this misses the point entirely. Ongoing consensual mating is not an
option for every male, at all times. Compared to unwanted abstinence, even
conditional predispositions that provide rare reproductive benefits would
provide an evolutionary advantage. 9 Even a male with a willing sex part-
ner who also raped other females could increase total pregnancies com-
pared to males who copulated only with one partner at a time.
Consequently, it is at least plausible that natural selection would have fa-
vored a context-contingent predisposition to use increased force in further-
ance of copulation when the alternative was likely to yield smaller
increases in reproductive success . 2" A hypothetically contemporaneous
predisposition simply to accept one's current reproductive lot, successful
or not, would appear in a decreasing proportion of individuals in subse-
quent generations.
K. The Argument from Modem Maladaptiveness
Another common error is the assumption that if today's rapists gain
no reproductive advantage over nonrapists, or are in fact decreasing their
inclusive fitness, then the biobehavioral theories of rape are wrong.2 For
example, one critic argued that, for the theories to have even the slightest
claim of validity, behavioral biologists would have to establish that a
long-term effects. A small difference in fitness between men who raped when other avenues of
reproduction were closed compared to men who did not rape in this context during human evolutionary
history would be expected to lead to major evolutionary change." Thornhill et al., supra note 118, at
115.
218. Susan Brownmiller & Barbara Mehrhof, A Feminist Response to Rape as an Adaptation in
Men, 15 BEHAV. & BRAIN Sci. 381, 381-82 (1992) (critiquing Thornhill & Thornhill, Evolutionary
Psychology of Men's Coercive Sexuality, supra note 155).
219. In a totally different context, Stephen Pinker extends the roulette metaphor in a way useful
here.
Imagine a game of Russian roulette where if you don't get killed you have one more
offspring. A gene for joining in the game could be selected, because five-sixths of the time it
would leave an extra copy in the gene pool and one-sixth of the time it would leave none. On
average, that yields .83 more copies than staying out of the game.
PINKER, supra note 48, at 514.
220. See Thornhill et al., supra note 118, at 115 ("Thus the adaptiveness of rape must be viewed in
relation to the adaptiveness of other, alternative strategies."); see also supra text accompanying notes
117-124 (discussing existence of evolved, context-specific strategies).
221. See, e.g., ADRIAN RAINE, THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF CRIME: CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR AS A
CLINICAL DISORDER 42-46 (1993).
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modem rapist's reproductive success actually increases as a result of his
raping behavior. 2
The reasoning is tempting, but incorrect. Evolutionary arguments are
grounded in evolutionary time. Because natural selection cannot look for-
ward and anticipate future environmental changes, individuals of existing
species are typically best adapted to their ancestors' environments. The
faster an environment changes (if at all) and the lengthier a species' aver-
age generation, the more quickly historically adaptive morphology and be-
havior can fall out of step with one another, and a once adaptive trait can
soon become maladaptiveY'
Take, for instance, our taste for highly caloric sweets. All across the
species, we perceive chemical stimuli associated with certain high energy
foods to be "sweet" and pleasurable (rather than, for instance, bitter and
unpalatable). This species-typical sensory artifact is undoubtedly a product
of our evolutionary history. Ancestral primates even marginally more
likely than their contemporaries to seek and consume high energy foods
(such as ripe fruit) would leave more descendants than those who were less
motivated, perhaps finding high calorie foods distasteful, and who there-
fore procured fewer calories per unit of energy invested in foraging. To-
day, our evolved tastebuds and psychology encounter an evolutionarily
novel environment, with refined sugar. It is now possible, for virtually the
first time in evolutionary history, to so overconsume sweets that obesity
and adverse health effects may follow. Yet it would be nonsensical to ar-
gue that the modem maladaptiveness of sugar craving renders it not sus-
ceptible to sound evolutionary explanation.
Consequently, the robustness of an evolutionary argument cannot
logically be jeopardized by modem maladaptiveness alone.' While a per-
suasive argument that forced copulation tended, on average, to reduce the
inclusive fitness of modem rapists would require explanation, the viability
of an evolutionary theory is always best measured by how a behavior
probably worked in our past, rather than by how it happens, in thoroughly
new environments, to work in our present.
222, See Suzanne Sunday, Introduction to SUNDAY & TOBACH, supra note 45, at 4.
223. Randy Thornhill and his colleagues summarize the importance of ancestral history to sound
evolutionary analysis in this way:
An adaptation is a feature of a living organism that is the product of the direct action of
selection. These features, however, may or may not be presently jadaptive. That is, the
definition of adaptive must include a consideration of the relevant environmental conditions.
If the relevant environmental features change, then it is possible that previously adaptive
traits may be rendered maladaptive.
Thornhill et al., supra note 118, at 104.
224. This point is elaborated in THORNILL & PALMER, supra note 14, at ch. 1.
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L. The Argument from Incomplete Explanation
Critics of the theories of evolutionary influences on patterns of rape
quite frequently fault them for failing to explain all incidences of rape. For
example, Akins and Windham reject biological hypotheses both because
rape occurs in many contexts where reproduction seems not to be a big
component and because biologists have "failed to establish that rape is one
kind of act. "I Gavey and Gray say the theories cannot work because, after
all, we know that some pre- and postreproductive females are raped, some
victims are killed, and some are only raped anally" 6 And Baron adds that
instances of male-male rape, oral rape, and penetration by objects are also
known. 7
There are four problems with this reasoning. First, biologists and non-
biologists often mean different things by the term "rape" (for example,
penile-vaginal intercourse, on one hand, and sexual penetration of any ori-
fice, by any object, on the other), so it is not surprising that each often
finds the other's explanations inadequate to explain rape as they choose to
define it.
Second, critics often misascribe the claims of evolutionists, and then
measure the supposed failings of their theories by the yardstick of still un-
explained phenomena that the theories never purported to explain in the
first place. This comment is typical: "Still, if a primary motive is repro-
duction, it is harder to understand instances of child sexual abuse, homo-
sexual rape, or sexual harassment that occur without sexual intercourse. '' 2 8
Since the evolutionary theories have never claimed even to explain all in-
stances of penile-vaginal rape (what theory, life science or social science,
explains all instances of any human behavior?), it is nonsensical to fault
them for not explaining more. Behavioral theories stand or fall on their
consistency with, and on their ability to make accurate predictions about,
patterns (not individual people) and specific kinds of phenomena (not all
phenomena a species is capable of generating). A theory is properly judged
225. Kathleen A. Akins & Mary E. Windham, Just Science?, 15 BEHAV. & BRAIN Sc. 376, 376-
77 (critiquing Thornhill & Thornhill, Evolutionary Psychology of Men's Coercive Sexuality, supra note
155); see also RAINE, supra note 221, at 42-46.
226. See Nicola J. Gavey & Russell D. Gray, Rape: The Perfect Adaptationist Story, 15 B13HAV.
& BRAIN Sci. 386, 387 (1992) (critiquing Thornhill & Thornhill, Evolutionary Psychology of Men's
Coercive Sexuality, supra note 155).
227. See Baron, supra note 85, at 266, 271-72. Similar objections are raised in Val Dusek,
Sociobiology and Rape, SCIENCE FOR THE PEOPLE, Jan.Feb. 1984, at 10, 15.
228. Elizabeth Grauerholz & Mary A. Koralewski, What is Known and Not Known About Sexual
Coercion, in SEXUAL COERCION, supra note 7, at 187, 192; see also ALLISON & WRiGHTSMAN, supra
note 5, at 36 (arguing that the biological theories are insufficiently supported, because "children, post
menopausal women, and men, are also raped," and some victims are killed); KITCHER, supra note 85,
at 187 (Rape "frequently takes place on juveniles, on women past the age of menopause, and on
members of the same sex. Sometimes the victims die as a result of the rape. Actions of all these kinds
contribute nothing to the spread of the rapist's genes.").
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by whether its own predictions are met, not by whether it meets the predic-
tions of other theories.
Third, the charge of incomplete explanation is deceptively rhetorical
(and perhaps deeply hypocritical). Most credible social scientists them-
selves readily admit that rapes come in a variety of kinds, not every
instance of which is explainable by whatever theory a theorist proposes.19
Lines are properly drawn (such that, for example, rape theorists do not feel
compelled to explain all acts of violence, including arson). Evolutionists,
like all other theorists, are entitled to draw lines where they want, inas-
much as the ultimate check on overly aggressive and narrow boundary set-
ting is perceived irrelevance in the marketplace of ideas.
Fourth, and perhaps most significantly, this reasoning from counter-
examples fails without recourse to frequency distributions. In statistical
terms, it emphasizes the range and ignores the median.2 0 Since the biobe-
havioral theories predict relative frequencies of different kinds of activity,
it will hardly serve to discredit the theory that some observable activities
could serve no useful reproductive function. For example, while it is true
that some women are raped anally, it also appears to be true, as predicted
by biobehavioral theories, that rapes involving anal penetration are far less
prevalent than rapes involving vaginal penetration-comprising only a
small fraction (two percent by one measure) of all rapes. 1
M. "Ought-Is" Errors: The Naturalistic and Moralistic Fallacies
Arguments reflecting ought-is errors come in two forms: The
Naturalistic Fallacy and The Moralistic Fallacy. Common to each is the
assumption that there is an automatic connection (running in either of two
possible directions) between descriptive facts and normative conclusions.
229. Allison and Wrightsman, for example, argue that biologically-based theories are unlikely to
be true, because they fail to explain many instances of rape. See, e.g., ALLISON & WRIGHTSMAN, supra
note 5, at 36. Yet the major theme of the book is that in all likelihood rapists differ from one another,
and that different rape scenarios require different explanations. See, e.g., id. at 4 C'[W]e argue that the
act of rape would be better understood if... everyone recognized the multiple motivations for sexual
assault.").
230. Even careful scholars make this error. See, e.g., Stock, supra note 181, at 65 (concluding that
rapists see women "as a gender class rather than as having individual characteristics.... [because of]
the age range seen in female rape victims, extending from infancy to extreme old age"); see also
HuascH, supra note 128, at 78 ("Since the recorded rapes for the full year cover an age range of
victims from age three through seventy-four, and other sexual assaults were committed on victims from
age two through eighty-six, it is clear that sexual attractiveness per se plays no part in many of these
attacks."). In many cases, the emphasis on range over frequency distribution is implicit. See, e.g.,
GROTH, supra note 33, at 7 ("victims of rapists include males as well as females and occupy all age
categories from infancy to old age").
231. See MAcDONALD, supra note 148, at 68; supra note 134.
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The Naturalistic Fallacy is committed whenever one assumes that
"ought" follows from "is," such that what is is what ought to be. 2 Nine-
teenth century Social Darwinists, for example, bastardized the Darwinian
reasoning of biologists by claiming, for political purposes, that those peo-
ple at society's political and economic top deserved to be there by virtue of
nature's design. 3 The Naturalistic Fallacy inherent in such reasoning has
long served as a warning to biologists and nonbiologists alike. However,
when critics reject biological perspectives on the grounds that such per-
spectives explain rape "as a phenomenon that lies outside the realm of
moral judgment"'  and that therefore "[the] need and drive to reproduce by
any and all means would sanction rape," 5 they are simply incorrect. 6 It is
as incorrect to assume that biologists will commit The Naturalistic Fallacy
as it is to commit it oneself. For while it is wise to be vigilant for this error
in reasoning, 7 one cannot legitimately conclude that if evolutionary theo-
ries of sexual aggression were true it would necessarily follow that rapists
are not legally or morally responsible for their acts. Scientists exploring
possible effects of evolutionary processes on the patterns of rape behavior
in humans and other animals have gone to great lengths to underscore that
the worlds of information and legal or moral implication operate independ-
ently."s
The Moralistic Fallacy, in mirror image, is committed whenever one
assumes that "is" follows from "ought," such that what ought to be is what
is." Here, reality is somehow expected to conform to one's normative
232. The term was coined by G.E. Moore in PRINCIPIA ETHICA 62, 89-110 (Thomas Baldwin ed.,
2d ed. 1993), but the concept traces to the 1888 edition of DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN
NATURE 469-70 (L.A. Selby-Bigge & P.H. Nidditch eds., 2d ed. 1978).
233. It was the Social Darwinist Herbert Spencer who coined and popularized the phrase "survival
of the fittest"--which Darwin long resisted, because of its misleadingness. On Social Darwinism
generally, see RICHARD HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT (1992).
234. Akins & Windham, supra note 225, at 376-77.
235. Ethel Tobach & Suzanne Sunday, Epilogue to SUNDAY & TOBACH, supra note 45, at 136.
236. Sarah Blaffer Hrdy believes that many modem thinkers, including feminists, have steadfastly
resisted biological perspectives, in part, because they confuse Social Darwinian thinking with
Darwinian thinking.
Social Darwinism has, almost indelibly, tainted most people's understanding of evolutionary
theory-certainly as it applies to human beings. Yet social Darwinism differs from
Darwinism-without-adjectives in one all-important way, and ignoring this distinction has
been one of the most unfortunate and long-lived mistakes of science journalism. Darwinism
proper is devoted to analyzing all the diverse forms of life according to the theory of natural
selection. Darwinists describe competition between unequal individuals, but they place no
value judgment on either the competition or its outcome.... By contrast, social Darwinists
attempt tojustify social inequality.
HRDY, supra note 85, at 12-13.
237. For example, it is not irrational to be concerned that the public may commit The Naturalistic
Fallacy when processing the evolutionary theories. But compare Dupr6, supra note 159, at 382-83
(concluding that the danger is sufficientiy great to reject the theories outright).
238. See, e.g., THORNHILL & PALMER, supra note 14, at ch. 1, ch. 5.
239. For discussion of The Moralistic Fallacy, see Charles Crawford, The Theory of Evolution in
the Study of Human Behaviour: An Introduction and Overview, in HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY
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preference for the way reality best would be. While we may wish, for ex-
ample, that patterns of human rape were unaffected by evolved brain ar-
chitecture and predispositions, we cannot suppose that explanation follows
inclination, and that facts follow preferences. Thus, while it obviously
would be unsound to conclude that rape is acceptable simply because other
species rape too, it is equally invalid to conclude that there are no biobe-
havioral influences on rape, simply because it may be offensive or undesir-
able that there be such influences.
N. Summary
Biobehavioral theories of sexual aggression are not beyond construc-
tive critique. Yet many of the most commonly encountered objections,
categorized and explained in this Part, reveal unfortunate and generally
counterproductive misunderstandings of evolutionary theory and behav-
ioral biology. Avoiding them may help us identify what is useful in be-
havioral biology and employ that knowledge in efforts to reduce the
incidence of rape.
IV
BIOBEHAVIORAL THEORIES OF RAPE: EVALUATION TO INTEGRATION
Avoiding the many pitfalls detailed in the prior Part, we turn, in
Section IV.A of this Part, to compare the current biobehavioral and so-
ciocultural perspectives on rape. Upon concluding that the biobehavioral
perspectives may be more useful than commonly supposed, Section IV.B
considers how increased acceptance of those theories might affect several
of the many tenets central to popular and law-animating theories of the
causes and effects of rape. Section 1V.C addresses how the life science and
social science perspectives on rape-biobehavioral theories of ultimate
causation and sociocultural theories of proximate causation-might be in-
tegrated and blended into a more accurate and comprehensive model of
rape behavior, drawing on the strengths of each. Possible practical applica-
tions follow thereafter.
A. How Life Science and Social Science Theories of Rape Compare
One problem with comparing social science and life science theories
of rape causation is that the two traditions have a different meaning of the-
ory. In the former tradition, a theory can be an idea or opinion that is plau-
sibly argued. In the latter, plausibility is measured more strictly: A theory
worth its title must generate predictions that are testable or falsifiable. And
PSYCHOLOGY: IDEAS, ISSUES AND APPLICATIONS 9 (Charles Crawford & Dennis L. Krebs eds., 1998);
Charles Crawford, Book Review, Genetic, Ethological, and Evolutionary Perspectives on Human
Development, EVOLUTION & Hum. BEHAV. (forthcoming 1999).
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in life science, among competing theories that explain the data equally
well, the simplest and most parsimonious (the one requiring the fewest
number of discrete assumptions) is generally considered the most likely."4
Rather surprisingly, the overwhelming bulk of rape literature never
articulates, or attempts to test, testable predictions.24' So it is very difficult
to assess how well the social science theories of rape measure up, in their
current form, to life science theories. But the life science theories have
generated a number of narrow and falsifiable predictions, which to date
seem to receive support from existing empirical data on a wide variety of
human and nonhuman species. Dispassionate assessment therefore sug-
gests that the biobehavioral approach may be both accurate and parsimoni-
ous. Future studies may find contradictory data. But in the meantime, the
continuity of data between nonhuman and human animals, on many differ-
ent predictions, is sufficiently striking that if we were considering almost
any context other than rape we might quickly credit it as persuasive. More
than one respected scholar to look into the matter seriously has concluded
that the biological evidence strongly suggests that rape is not independent
of men's evolved sexual psychology. 42 Moreover, many of these apparent
patterns of data, undiscovered or underemphasized before studies of forced
copulation informed by behavioral biology appeared, are seemingly not
predicted by popular sociocultural theories of rape alone.
For example, I can locate nothing in the social science rape literature
that convincingly addresses or explains why the large-scale patterns of rape
in humans demand a completely nonbiological theoretical foundation (and
thus a necessarily less parsimonious one than the large-scale patterns of
rape in other species require). Statistical outliers obviously can require dif-
ferent explanations, and human rapes can include multiple layers of causa-
tion in addition to those apparently operative in many other species. But
the wholesale rejection of evolved male-typical behavioral predispositions
is, as yet, inadequately defended.
Existing theories of human rape that do not include at least some
measure of life science perspectives (integrating ultimate with proximate
240. See HEMPEL, supra note 100, at 40-45.
241. See Del Thiessen & Robert K. Young, Investigating Sexual Coercion, Soc'y, March/April
1994, at 60. The authors report on their study of over 1610 studies of sexual coercion published
between 1982 and 1992 in over 400 different journals or books, from the fields of psychology,
educational psychology, anthropology, and sociology. They conclude that "scientific methods are not
being applied to the understanding of sexual coercion," id. at 62, because, in part, "[hiardly ever is a
specific hypothesis tested," id. at 60. Only 9% of the studies tested hypotheses, and less than 10% were
directed at understanding causes of coercion. See id. at 61; see also BOURQUE, supra note 38, at 19
(noting that, for example, "few explicit tests of hypotheses reflecting a feminist perspective have been
made"). Two notable exceptions include James V.P. Check & Neil Malamuth, An Empirical
Assessment of Some Feminist Hypotheses About Rape, 8 INT'L J. WoMEN's STUD. 414 (1985); and Lee
Ellis & Charles Beattie, The Feminist Explanation for Rape: An Empirical Test, 19 J. Sax REs. 74
(1983).
242. See, e.g., Buss, supra note 101, at 164.
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causation) also leave at least the following important questions unan-
swered:
1. Why is rape overwhelmingly a male rather than female behavior in all
species in which it is observed?243 If evolutionary processes had no in-
fluence whatsoever, we would expect greater variability. Culture alone
cannot explain this, because forced copulation occurs even in species
to which culture is not typically attributed. Size alone cannot explain
this (though sexual dimorphism itself must and can be explained in
biological terms, but that is another matter) because males attempt to
force copulation even in species in which males are no larger than fe-
males. Hostility, sex-role stereotypes, and exploitative intent cannot
explain this, because these are functions of higher cognitive capacities,
not exhibited by many species in which males rape.
2. Why does rape so rarely result in serious physical injury or death,
across all populations of species in which it is observed, and across all
the world's many human cultures?2' If rape were just another kind of
violence, we would expect greater variability in the extent of physical
harm. The overwhelming absence of major physical damage in humans
is particularly odd, given: (a) the possible penalties (rape is one of the
three most harshly punished crimes in most societies);245 (b) the typi-
cal use of some force to overcome victim resistance; (c) the supposed
hostility underlying the rape; (d) the extent to which close proximity
increases the probability that a victim can identify her attacker to
authorities; and (e) the extent to which eliminating the witness could
minimize the risk of being caught and punished. Men commonly maim
or kill each other during hostile encounters. And they often kill wit-
nesses to severely penalized crimes. Why so little of this with rape?246
3. Why are reproductive-aged victims of rape, in other species as well as
our own, and across all human cultures, so overrepresented, compared
to the population of all possible victims of rape?247 If there were no
evolutionary influence, one would expect far greater variability among
species, and, indeed, among human societies that differ in so many
other respects. For example, if rapists selected females based primarily
243. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 113-115 and accompanying text.
245. See TEDESCHI & FELSON, supra note 116, at 334.
246. Even if men, all across the planet, reached the common conclusion that rape was an even
more intimidating form of disrespect than murder, it would beg the question why women all across the
planet, for as long as any record exists, consider vaginal rape to be just about the greatest insult a
woman can experience.
247. See supra notes 126-132 and accompanying text.
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on physical vulnerability, this is precisely the age group that rapists
would tend to avoid. If rapists selected females to punish for their ex-
ercise of power and political influence, this is again not the age distri-
bution we would expect.
4. Considering all the different kinds of sexual assaults on females of all
ages, why are rapists more likely to rape reproductive-aged females
penile-vaginally than they are to rape non-reproductive-aged females
penile-vaginaly?45 This pattern does not appear to be derivable from
the premises of those theories maintaining that sexual desire is irrele-
vant to rape.
5. Why do reproductive-aged victims of penile-vaginal rape appear to be
more traumatized, on average, than similar victims who are older or
younger? 9 This pattern does not seem to follow from the theories that
reject the influence of evolutionary processes on human psychology.
6. From among all sexual assaults, why is vaginal rape, on average, ap-
parently more traumatizing than oral or anal rape?"0 Absent evolu-
tionary explanations, we would expect from the prevailing theories that
either no pattern would emerge, or that, perhaps, anal rape would be
more traumatizing (because it is equally invasive and more likely to re-
sult in physical injury).
7. Why does the mean age of rapists remain at about twenty-five over
time, when most rapists are never caught or punished?"' If society
alone socializes men to rape, it must also be extremely effective at re-
versing that process as they age. Otherwise, why would former rapists
so uniformly stop raping, and all at about the same age? That is, why
do young rapists, almost never apprehended, not become middle-aged
and old rapists? 2
8. Why does the age distribution for raped women differ so markedly
from the age distribution of robbed women?" If the sexual psychology
of rapists played no role in the selection of rape victims, one would
248. See supra notes 133-136 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 137-142 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 143-145 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 146-149 and accompanying text.
252. I am aware of very few works in the social sciences that even address this question, let alone
answer it. For example, Brownmiller & Mehrhof, supra note 218, at 382, attempt to explain this away
by asserting, without evidence, that "[t]he forcible rapist... retires from the field when his legs give
out." I find this hypothesis highly unlikely to explain why there are not significantly more former
rapists continuing to rape in their 30s, 40s, and 50s, at the very least.
253. See supra notes 150-152 and accompanying text.
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expect the distributions of female victims by age to be relatively simi-
lar in rape and robbery contexts.
9. Why does the age distribution for raped women differ so markedly
from the age distribution of murdered women?' If rape were primarily
a function of hostility toward women, one would expect the distribu-
tions in rape and murder contexts to be quite similar.
These are significant challenges. They suggest that a partnership be-
tween life sciences and social sciences is necessary to construct an ade-
quate model of rape behavior, useful to law in helping to prevent rape. For
even if scholars explain these phenomena by proffering theories that con-
tinue to reject behavioral biology (as I have found, in discussions, that
some colleagues do), the theories still must survive scrutiny for parsimoni-
ousness, and not appear to be completely ad hoc.
For it is always possible to explain any phenomenon, let alone these
patterns of phenomena, with a more complicated theory than any given
theory under consideration. And the ability to articulate a theory that can
explain a pattern is still, from the scientific standpoint, a long way from
qualifying as a theory worth scientific respect. What other falsifiable pre-
dictions does such a theory generate? How well do those fit with observ-
able data? How well does the proposed theory connect into the large body
of existing theories already deemed robust and reciprocally reinforcing?
We must not lose sight of the fact that a theory that rape is caused by
sociocultural phenomena alone is necessarily less parsimonious, less sim-
ple, and less connected to the larger body of scientifically robust theories
than one positing the combination of interconnected evolutionary influ-
ences. A purely sociocultural theory therefore carries a heavier burden of
persuasion than one that incorporates both the species' genetic history and
its patterns of sociality and culture. This is so for two reasons. First, a
purely sociocultural theory fails to explain strikingly similar patterns of
rape in other species without similar cultures, and therefore erects a com-
pletely novel, disconnected, and additional assumption to explain causation
in this one species all alone. Second, such a theory is simply ahistorical
and without scientific foundation. It requires some plausible scientific ex-
planation, not yet credibly tendered, of how the human brain evolved com-
pletely beyond the reach of the biological predispositions (sexual or
otherwise) that not only played an undeniable role in human ancestors, but
also continue to play a role in every other species on the planet. This is a
big obstacle to a theory rejecting biology-something akin to explaining
how one might begin construction of a building with the twentieth floor.
254. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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If the challenges of data explanation and parsimony cannot be met by
theories unsupplemented by behavioral biology, two conclusions follow.
First, there are several common assumptions, some of which undergird the
law's behavioral models of rape and rape victimization, that may be un-
true. Second, legal thinkers should pursue more aggressively the creation
of an integrated model of rape behavior-one that blends social and life
science perspectives.
B. "Metamyths" of Rape
Rape researchers in the social sciences have quite usefully identified a
large number of rape "myths" about causes and effects of rape, many of
which are now popularly known." Although it is extremely rare for the
term "myth" to be defined in the rape literature, 6 it is generally clear from
context that labeling something a myth is equivalent to saying that it is
"false" 7 or "fictional,""5 has "no basis in fact," 9 or is the product of
255. The following are among the many rape myths so identified: (1) rape is rare or statistically
insignificant; (2) women not only provoke rape, they enjoy it; (3) women "cry rape" only when
they've been jilted or have something to cover up; (4) only bad girls get raped; and (5) any healthy
woman can resist a rapist if she really wants to. See HURSCH, supra note 128, at 74, 76; Martha R. Burt,
Cultural Myths and Supports for Rape, 38 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 217 (1980); Jeffery Scott
Mio & Jacqueline D. Foster, The Effects of Rape upon Victims and Families: Implications for a
Comprehensive Family Therapy, 19 Am J. FAM. THERAPY 147, 148 (1991); Libby 0. Ruch, Review
Essay, Sexual Violence Against Women, 2 . HIST. SEXUALITY 634, 634 (1992); Morrison Torrey,
When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1013 (1991).
256. For sources using but not defining the term "myth:' see, for example, LISA M. CUKLANZ,
RAPE ON TRIAL: How THE MASS MEDIA CONSTRUCT LEGAL REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE 14-32
(1996); HILBERMAN, supra note 41, at 3; SUE LEES, RULING PASSIONS: SEXUAL VIOLENCE,
REPUTATION AND THE LAW 6 (1997); PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF RAPE INVESTIGATION, supra note 6, at
xiii-iv; CATHY ROBERTS, WOMEN AND RAPE viii (1989); SALLY K WARD ET AL., ACQUAINTANCE AND
DATE RAPE: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 3, 9 (1994); Halla Beloff, Foreword to PERSPECTIVES ON
RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT, supra note 186, at x, x; Edward Donnerstein & Daniel Linz, Sexual
Violence in the Mass Media, in VIOLENCE AND THE LAW 9, 22 (Mark Costanzo & Stuart Oskamp eds.,
1994); Julius A. Gylys & John R. McNamara, Acceptance of Rape Myths Among Prosecuting
Attorneys, 79 PSYCHOL. REP. 15 (1996); Mary P. Koss, The Measurement of Rape Victimization in
Crime Surveys, 23 CRIM. JUST. &BEHAV. 55 (1996); Diana E.H. Russell, Pornography and Rape: A
Causal Model, in MAKING VIOLENCE SEXY: FEMINIST VIEWS ON PORNOGRAPHY 120, 136-38 (Diana
E.H. Russell ed., 1993); Seifert, supra note 196, at 55; Suzanne R. Sunday, Introduction to SUNDAY &
TOBACH, supra note 45, at 2, 6, 8; Ethel Tobach & Betty Rosoff, Preface to SUNDAY & TOBACH, supra
note 45, at xiii-iv.
257. See, e.g., GROTH, supra note 33, at 1; RUTH E. HALL, ASK ANY WOMAN: A LONDON
INQUIRY INTO RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT 69 (1985); DIANA E.H. RUSSELL,supra note 35, at 257-60;
CAROL TAvRIs, THE MISMEASURE OF WOMAN 243 (1992); Ann Wolbert Burgess, Public Beliefs and
Attitudes Toward Rape, in PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF RAPE INVESTIGATION: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY
APPROACH, supra note 6 at 3, 8; Mio & Foster, supra note 255, at 148 ("falsity"); Ruch, supra note
255, at 634 ("debunked"); Torrey, supra note 5, at 47 ("false beliefs and stereotypes about rape"); Julie
A. Wright, Using the Female Perspective in Prosecuting Rape Cases, THE PROSECUTOR, Jan./Feb.
1995, at 19, 22.
258. See, e.g., CUKLANZ, supra note 256, at 14-32; HURSCH, supra note 128, at 67, 69.
259. See, e.g., HURSCH, supra note 128, at 74; Griffin, supra note 35, at 27.
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erroneous or mistaken beliefs.2" For example, it is undeniably a myth that
women as a group enjoy being raped.
Legal scholars have used the existence of these many myths to garner
much-needed support for a variety of progressive rape reforms, which have
helped to overcome unfair prejudices that disadvantage women and treat
rapists more leniently than they deserve. This surely is a good thing. But as
the political power of the myth label has grown, so have-perhaps
inevitably-the number of beliefs seeming to warrant it. It is no longer
clear who, if anyone, is assessing the accuracy of labeling beliefs myths. In
some cases the use seems loose. And in some contexts scholars and writers
in the popular press appear to have used a standard for applying the term
myth that focuses more on the potentially detrimental effect of a belief on
women's political progress than on the truth, falsity, or partial truth of the
belief itself.26 ' Obviously, these "function" and "falsity" tests for myth
status often concur; many of the ideas that ill serve women are indeed
false. But it is error to assume that this is always so.262
Because the term "myth" is so rarely defined and so unevenly used,263
we have likely reached the point at which claims of myth status should be
evaluated individually, rather than accepted on faith as an extrapolation of
currently popular theories of rape. If the biobehavioral theories, which
260. See, e.g., CuKLANz, supra note 256, at 16; GROTH supra note 33, at 1; MATOEsIAN, supra
note 30, at 13. This comports, in the main, with definitions, where they do appear. See, e.g., Denmark
& Friedman, supra note 187, at 60 (comparing rape myths to other myths: "imaginary, make-believe,
unverifiable people or things, legend, tradition, phantasy, fiction and falsehood"); Mary Margaret
Fonow et al., Feminist Rape Education: Does It Work?, 6 GENDER & Soc'Y 108, 109 (1992) ("A myth
is a traditional story with ostensibly historical content that is neither a total fabrication nor the only
story that can be told."); Odem & Clay-Warner, supra note 7, at xvi (rape myths "are commonly held
assumptions about rape that are untrue but that allow individuals to deny that forced sex is actually
rape").
261. See, e.g., Susan Stefan, The Protection Racket: Rape Trauma Syndrome, Psychiatric
Labeling, and Law, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 1271, 1319 (1994) (rape myths are a "set of social assumptions
about rape and the way raped women behave"). Some of this may be traceable to the disjunctive in
Martha R. Burt's influential definition in Burt, supra note 255, at 217 (rape myths are "prejudicial,
stereotyped, or false beliefs about rape, rape victims, and rapists") (emphasis added). For an unusually
blunt recognition of the extent to which myth status may not depend on actual falsehood, see Kimberly
A. Lonsway & Louise F. Fitzgerald, Rape Myths: In Review, 18 PSYcHOL WOMEN Q. 133, 136
(1994), who write,
Although there may be a statistical 'kernel of truth' to [some] myths ... their status as myths
rests on their emphasis, exaggeration, and most importantly, possible function. The belief that
only certain types of women are raped functions to obscure and deny the personal
vulnerability of all women by suggesting that only other women are raped.
262.. Consider that normative judgments and facts exist independently. See supra Section III.L.
Consequently, one cannot validly assume that beliefs about rape that are politically unpalatable,
because of their potential for misuse, are necessarily false.
263. Two scholars who have studied the subject concluded that "[a] review of [the rape myth]
literature reveals that researchers have generally failed to develop a thorough, theoretically based
definition of rape myths, and in addition, have failed to use any definition consistently.... [The
literature on rape myths] is characterized by considerable unevenness." Lonsway & Fitzgerald, supra
note 261, at 134, 155.
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posit evolutionary influences on the way the human brain processes rape-
relevant information are true, then they may help to further refine what are
and are not myths or falsehoods about rape. Specifically, they may separate
beliefs quite accurately labeled as false and mythical from what we might
label metamyths. I suggest this term to describe popularly maintained but
false or inadequately demonstrated assertions, used in the otherwise
laudable war on rape myths, that have been extrapolated beyond reality.2"
Here are some likely candidates.
(1) The Metamyth that Only Humans Rape
Although it is still common in legal literature to encounter the
assertion that "[n]o zoologist has ever observed animals raping their
female mates in the wild or in captivity," '265 (that is, that nonhuman
rape is a myth) it has been long clear that such a statement can be
true only if one has implicitly defined rape so narrowly that it can-
not, by definition, occur in another species. Forced copulation is
commonly observable in many species, and has been for many
years.2"
(2) The Metamyth that Sexual Desire is Irrelevant to Rape
It is extremely common to encounter assertions that it is a
264. In some contexts, metamyths may include things that are prematurely or inaccurately labeled
as falsehood and myth. In other words, a metamyth may also be the myth that something else is a myth,
and thus something that has been falsely labeled false or mythically considered myth. These have
sometimes been referred to as "so-called 'myth[s]"' or "myth[s]-that-may-not-be-myth[s]." Bryden &
Lengnick, supra note 5, at 1344. In my view, metamyths are probably the by-products of an
overzealous myth-identifying process. They presumably emerge from an academic telephone game, in
which a narrowly identified and palpably false idea has, through the accumulation of many subtle
changes during repetition, swelled to encompass even some true ideas, without shedding the label of
falsity at the proper time. In the process, these metamyths accrue a secondary meaning, typically
aligning more and more, over time, with the political preferences of those who repeat, and often
unwittingly modify them.
265. WALLACE, supra note 190, at 251. This metamyth of rape is likely traceable to Susan
Brownmiler, who stated in BROwVNMLLER,-supra note 35, at 12, that "[n]o zoologist, as far as I know,
has ever observed that animals rape in their natural habitat, the wild." However, Lisa A. Binder notes
that a court claimed the following as early as 1964, suggesting that this false belief has been around for
some time. "With More Than Admiration He Admired": Images of Beauty and Defilement in Judicial
Narratives of Rape, 18 HARv. WOMEN's L.J. 265 (1995). The court wrote, "Man is the only member of
the animal family of which we have any knowledge that is bestial enough to forcibly rape a female."
Sims v. Balkcom, 136 S.E.2d 766, 768 (Ga. 1964).
Unfortunately, the metamyth persists. See, for example, JOANN BREN GUERNsEY, THE FACTs
ABOUT RAPE 10 (1990), a book for young adults in which the following passage
appears: ' Myth: Rape is a natural form of aggression. Fact: Rape is not natural behavior; it is learned,
apparently only by humans. No matter how aggressive they are, animals have not been observed to
rape." This metamyth continues to resurface in legal scholarship. See, e.g., Linda Robayo, Note, The
Glen Ridge Trial: New Jersey's Cue to Amend Its Rape Shield Statute, 19 SETON HALL LEGIs. J. 272,
279 (1994) (citing Brownmiller in support of proposition that animals have never been observed to
rape).
266. See supra notes 104-112 and accompanying text.
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"fact" that rape has nothing to do with sex.267 Observable patterns in
existing rape data illuminated by biobehavioral theory, such as the
striking parallel between risk of rape victimization and the female
fertility curve,2 68 make this conclusion highly suspect. It is important
to stress that rape is not a sexual encounter of the consensual kind,
and that rape should be punished as an impermissible act of aggres-
sion. But it does not follow from this that sexual desire is not an im-
portant causal factor in most rapes. Existing data have not yet been
parsimoniously explained without recourse to the variable of general
sexual attractiveness as measured, in part, by being of reproductive
age.
(3) The Metamyth of Equivalent Risk
Rape commentators often state or imply that, because rape has
nothing to do with sex, and because very young and very old women
have been raped, all women are equally likely to be attacked.269 This
is inconsistent with decades of statistics on victim age, and likely
maintains, as an externality, a greater fear of rape among women
outside the ages of high rape vulnerability than the statistical risk
warrants.270
(4) The Metamyth of Equivalent Harm
Some rape researchers claim that "[t]he effect of rape is the
same whether the victim is a young girl, virgin, mother, or old
267. For example, Professor Susan Estrich has reportedly stated that"[judges] have to deal with
the fact [that rape] is not [a] crime of sexual desire but brutal violence of the worst sort short of
murder." ALLISON & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 5, at 240.
268. See supra notes 126-132 and accompanying text.
269. See, e.g., ROBERT FERGUSON & JEANINE FERGUSON, A GUIDE TO RAPE AWARENESS AND
PREVENTION 16 (1994) ("Be aware, it can happen to anyone, anyplace, and at anytime. No one is
exempt or excluded from rape."); HURsCH, supra note 128, at 78 ("Since the recorded rapes for the full
year cover an age range of victims from age three through seventy-four, and other sexual assaults were
committed on victims from age two through eighty-six, it is clear that sexual attractiveness per se plays
no part in many of these attacks."); Brownmiller & Merhof, supra note 218, at 382 ("'Attractiveness' is
not a dynamic in rape except in myth .... Victims range in age from 3-month-old infants to 87-year-
old grandmothers."); Stock, supranote 181, at 65 (arguing that rapists see women "as a gender class
rather than as having individual characteristics. This accounts for the age range seen in female rape
victims, extending from infancy to extreme old age."). In one survey of studies, in which the
disproportionately small numbers of elderly victims was routinely present, an author, already
convinced that sexual desire has nothing to do with rape, felt obliged to theorize why all the elderly
rape victims were so much less likely to report being raped. See GROTH, supra note 33, at 164-65, 173-
74. The focus on range over frequency distribution can lead to overbroad prescriptions. See, e.g.,
Brande Stellings, The Public Harm of Private Violence: Rape, Sex Discrimination and Citizenship, 28
HA-v. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 185, 198 (1993) ("Because one in five women will be raped, all women must
conduct their lives in ways designed to minimize the risk of rape.").
270. See supra notes 126-132 and accompanying text.
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woman.""27 This is speculation. It is important to note that some
studies have found that the effect varies according to demographic
variables (such as age and presence of vaginal intromission) pre-
dicted by behavioral biology.2
(5) The Metamyth of Equivalent Fear
There are a number of valuable discussions about the signifi-
cance of the fear of rape. Scholars uninformed of behavioral biology,
however, typically do not anticipate, look for, or find apparently ex-
isting patterns in varying magnitudes of fear. Therefore, they typi-
cally assume that fear varies only in random or culturally-created
ways across the female population.273
(6) The Metamyth of Wholly Learned Fear
It is common to encounter the assertion that women would not
fear rape were they not taught and socialized to do so. 4 Again, this
271. Deena Metzger, It Is Always the Woman Who Is Raped, 133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 405, 406
(1976).
272. See supra notes 137-145 and accompanying text.
273. General statements are the norm, and the term "women" comprises an undifferentiated
supercategory. For example, while Gordon and Riger note in passing that there is some variation
among women in fear, see GORDON & RiGER, supra note 2, at 21, they generally imply that such
variation is idiosyncratic, rather than patterned. They write that rape is "a fear shared by women of all
ages," id. at xi, and that "[tihe only crime women fear more than rape is murder.... Every woman has
it to a degree, and all women are affected by it." Id. at 2-3; see also CLARK & LEwls, supra note 149, at
23 ("The fear of rape affects all women. It inhibits their actions and limits their freedom, influencing
the way they dress, the hours they keep, and the routes they walk. The fear is well founded, because no
woman is immune from rape."); cf. Mark Warr, Fear of Rape Among Urban Women, 32 Soc. PROBS.
238 (1985) (finding that fear of rape is highest among women aged 19 to 35, nearly double their fear of
murder), cited in Wright, supra note 257, at 21.
Professor Deborah Denno has begun to explore the extent to which sex asymmetries in evolved
fear of rape may be relevant in legal contexts in Deborah W. Denno, Evolutionary Biology and Rape,
39 JuR mETRIcs J. 243 (1999).
274. According to two leading authors on the subject, female fear
is a rational phenomenon resulting not only from women's personal backgrounds but also
from what women as a group have imbibed from history, religion, culture, social institutions,
and everyday social interactions. Learned early in life, female fear is continually reinforced
by such social institutions as the school, the church, the law, and the press. Much is also
learned from parents, siblings, teachers, and friends.
GORDON & RiGER, supra note 2, at 47. This and other passages reflect the implicit assumption that you
have to "teachI women to worry about rape." Id. at 67. Furthermore:
To show power and anger through rape-as opposed to mugging or assault-men are calling
on lessons women learn from society, from history and religion, to defile, degrade, and
shame in addition to inflicting physical pain. Rapists have learned, as have their victims, that
to rape is to do something worse than to assault; this sexualization of violence adds a range of
long-term emotional consequences to the physical injury.
Id. at 45. This notion has a long pedigree in rape literature:
It is men, and not women, who have defined rape as the worst thing that can happen to a
woman. For a man to have his exclusive sexual property defiled by an intruder is one of the
worst things that can happen to him, but it most assuredly is not the worst thing that can
happen to a woman, even though it frequently verges on this because of its accompanying
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is speculation. The fact that the reactions to threat of rape and rape
are uniformly extreme across all human societies, as well as the fact
that extreme reactions are both predicted by evolutionary theory and
consistent with the behavior of females across the rest of the animal
kingdom, makes this assertion unlikely to be true. That is not to sug-
gest that society cannot augment fear of rape. But it is to suggest that
the fear of rape is a psychological predisposition in females.
(7) The Metamyth of Wholly Learned Rape
Scholars often assume that rape behavior must be "learned."'275
For example, in her 1990 book, Understanding Sexual Violence,
Diana Scully states, "I assume that rape, for the most part, is socially
learned behavior.... In contrast to the psychopathological model,
risk. What woman would not rather have a penis inserted in her vagina, even against her will,
than suffer death or mutilation? Women accept the judgment that rape is a disgrace because
they, too, have been brainwashed into placing pre-eminent value on their sexuality, and
because they know from experience that rape will, in fact, lead to their social and personal
devaluation.
CLARK & LEwis, supra note 149, at 160. News accounts supposedly "reinforce[] what every woman
has been taught from childhood-rape is the worst thing that can happen to a woman." Id. at 23. See
also Griffin, supra note 35, at 47, who writes,
Learning to fear is a process that begins at birth for women and continues throughout their
lives. As is shown in Figure 9.1, the fear each woman experiences is the product of her own
personal background as it intersects for her-in her own particular time and geographical and
social space--with the forces of history and trends of contemporary times. It is striking that
women respond so similarly to the threat of rape, both in their fear and in the precautionary
strategies they adopt. Female fear has become a social fact.
A more recent articulation of this same view appears in H.E. Baber, How Bad is Rape?, in SOBLE,
supra note 186, at 243, 256:
I suggest that the primary reason why rape is regarded as one of the most serious harms that
can befall a woman is precisely because women are regarded as sex objects, beings who have
little of value beyond their sexuality. Further I suggest that women who would regard being
raped as the supreme violation and humiliation are implicitly buying into this view. If these
are indeed the reasons why rape is seen as supremely harmful to women, as I suggest they
are, then it follows that the suggestion that rape is the worst harm that can befall a woman is a
consequence of sexist assumptions about the character and interests of women.
275. This conception dates back at least to 1971, and remains viable today. See, e.g., ALLISON &
WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 5, at 16-17 (summarizing the social learning theory of rape); TAvRjs, supra
note 257, at 243 (calling it a "myth" that "male sexuality is natural, unlearned"); Griffin, supra note 35,
at 27 (comparing with study of other cultures suggests that "in our society, it is rape itself that is
learned"); Metzger, supra note 271, at 405-06 ("The rapist is educated to his behavior by his society,"
and the cultural artifacts of rape images in literature, art, and myth, are "social customs" that "teach
rape as a learned cultural activity"). It seems to be rooted primarily in the early feminist and
sociological traditions. See, e.g., Aatm, supra note 41, at 335 (the sociological viewpoint stresses that
crimes are "socioculturally learned behavior, committed within socioculturally defined situations");
Stock, supra note 181, at 68 ("Feminist theory contends that sexual coercion is learned.").
For concise descriptions of how evolutionists understand these theories, see ELLIs, supra note 30,
at 12-14,33-41; and Malamuth, who writes,
Since feminists attribute the origins of rape and other forms of violence to socialization
within patriarchal cultures, they view individual differences among men as reflections of
varied learning experiences, varied degrees of internalization of patriarchal values, and the
extent to which violence is required and available to create and maintain dominance.
Malamuth, supra note 188, at 269, 270.
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this book is grounded in... the assumption that sexual violence is
sociocultural in origin: men learn to rape."276 Although what
"learned" means in the rape context is rarely clarified,2" it is gener-
ally clear from context that "learned" is intended to refer to a process
uninfluenced by biology (except to the obvious extent that the
learning takes place in the physical brain). 7 That is not to say that
proponents of biological theories of sexual aggression reject the sig-
nificance of learning. 79 Indeed, they embrace it, but within a context
in which the brain's ability to learn is itself considered an evolved
species-typical trait, with patterned information processing.28
Law works best when its predicates are sound, not when these predicates
are based in myth. Flawed behavioral models bring flawed remedial plans.
And uncritical acceptance of the popularly drawn lines between myth and
fact may lead lawmakers into unproductive side eddies of legal effort. The
276. SCULLY, supra note 1, at 59, 162.
277. Scully, for example, added that "[t]he fundamental premise is that all behavior is learned in
the same way-socially through direct association with others as well as indirectly through cultural
contact." Id. at 59.
278. This is a dated conception for two reasons. First, forced copulation in patterns quite similar to
that in humans is quite common in the animal kingdom, even among species, such as insects, with
precious little capacity to "learn." See supra notes 104-112 and accompanying text. So the fact that it
can exist in the absence of "culture" places a significant burden of proof on those who would assume
and assert that, in humans, culture alone explains it. Second, and more importantly, learning is itself
biological. The capacity to learn is an evolved trait. The brain is no longer thought to be a general-
purpose information processor, as if it had the capacity to do anything equally well, and simply awaited
instructions. The brain is an organ that must be understood in light of evolutionary history, just like
every other aspect of human physiology. It evolved to process information in historically adaptive
ways, and it analyzes, sorts, remembers, and discards information in decidedly nonrandom ways.
Learning is itself influenced by evolutionary history, and that history explains, in part, why some things
are easier to learn than others. See supra note 65 (describing Garcia effect). See generally PINKaR,
supra note 48, at 19 (protesting against the idea that there is "some single master force or mind-
bestowing elixir like 'culture,' 'learning").
279. See, e.g., Thornhill & Thornhill, supra note 65, at 95 ("We emphasize that the view of men's
sexual psychology proposed by the hypothesis of adaptation to rape does not imply the absence of
learning...."); Thornhill & Thornhill, Evolutionary Psychology of Men's Coercive Sexuality, supra
note 155, at 364-65 ("The hypothesis of rape-specific adaptation does not assume that there is no
learning or sex-specific socialization in the development of human sexuality.").
280. See, for example, Malamuth, supra note 188, where the author claims:
Theories emphasizing the role of learning or culture are not alternatives to theories
encompassing the role of evolutionary processes since what can be learned and how learning
takes place are determined by the characteristics of the evolved mind of a species.... [A]
comprehensive theory needs to incorporate understanding of the design of the mind, as
formed by evolutionary processes and as it interacts with the physical and social
environment, including the cultures created by those minds.... [T]he role of learning can
only be properly understood in the framework of the mind that translates environmental input
into behavior, both throughout the lifespan and in the immediate situation.
l at 273,280; see also Thornhill & Thornhill, Coercive Sexuality of Men, supra note 65, at 95 ("[The
learning process involved is not arbitrary but instead is guided by evolved sexual psychological
adaptations that bring about selective perception, cognition, memory, and information evaluation
specific to rape.").
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many false and damaging beliefs properly labeled myths should continue
to be fought by all who oppose rape. But so should the metamyths of rape,
for these too may hinder the very efforts to reduce the incidence of rape
that their proponents support. Biobehavioral theories may help bring a
clarifying light to distinguishing the substantively real from the simply as-
serted.
C. Toward an Integrated Model of Rape
In sum, we have passed the point of pitting life science and social sci-
ence theories of law-relevant behaviors, including rape, against each other.
Although the legal community has been slow to realize it, there simply
cannot be a meaningful gulf between these supposed extremes. The human
brain cannot develop adequately without rich environmental stimuli, but
stimuli cannot be perceived and analyzed except through a brain every bit
as evolved to function in patterns reflecting adaptive evolution as the rest
of the organs in the body. Because they are more accurate and provide a
better fulcrum against which law can lever, behavioral models that ensure
consistency between life and social science insights are necessary to law.
Moreover, there is no longer a question whether humans have evolved
psychologies that predispose us to nervous system states (emotional and
otherwise) that increase the likelihood of some behaviors and decrease the
likelihood of others. There are simply too many findings consistent with
robust life science principles to maintain otherwise.
Instead, the questions now are two: (1) how might we periodically
identify and integrate the best principles of biobehavioral theories with the
best from other theories; and (2) how might such integration improve our
abilities to reduce the incidence of behavior we judge to be unacceptable?
The remainder of this Section takes up the first question, while Part V, be-
low, takes up the second.
A number of influential scholars have already begun attempting to
integrate previously isolated life science and social science rape theories.281
And these efforts may prove useful to law. But legal thinkers will need a
framework for understanding how integration of life and social science
perspectives on rape can proceed.
The purpose of integration, from law's perspective, is to construct a
generally superior theory and model of the behavior that legal reform can
address. Such a model would unify existing knowledge, be historically ac-
curate, and use a basic understanding of evolved psychology to bridge the
281. See, e.g., ELLIS, supra note 30; Lee Ellis, A Synthesized (Biosocial) Theory of Rape, 59 J.
CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 631 (1991); Cheryl Hanna, Can a Biological Inquiry Help Reduce
Male Violence Against Women?, 22 VT. L. REv. 333 (1997); Malamuth, The Confluence Model, supra
note 188; Malamuth, An Evolutionary-Based Model, supra note 102; Malamuth & Malamuth, supra
note 13.
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distance between the subjects that evolutionary biologists study and the
subjects that sociologists, feminists, economists, and historians study.
Whichever biobehavioral theories of rape happen to emerge as most
persuasive over time, it is overwhelmingly likely that they will derive from
the principles of natural and sexual selection. From law's perspective, life
science insights about the processes and patterns of sexual selection may
provide a missing piece of the explanatory puzzle or even an overarching
framework that enables patterns of rape in humans to make sense-anse
not only within the context of rape, but also within the whole universe of
animal behavior.
An integrated, blended, holistic understanding of rape would catego-
rize some rape behavior (remember we are focusing on forcible male-
female intercourse) within the larger context of mate-seeking behavior,
mate-seeking behavior within the larger context of overlapping but
nonidentical reproductive strategies of males and females, and those strate-
gies themselves within the larger context of evolutionary processes, in-
cluding natural and sexual selection. Taking it from the top, natural
selection rewarded with persistence through time those traits that contrib-
uted toward their own replication. These traits, mixed in varying combina-
tions, yielded genetically influenced patterns of morphology and
behavioral dispositions constituting reproductive strategies, the distinctions
among which mark the boundaries of what we now call species. Our own
species reflects both sexual reproduction, enabling male-female conflicts in
mating interests, as well as unusually high maternal investment per off-
spring in gestation and nursing, virtually guaranteeing them.
Most males and females will seek mating opportunities with the oppo-
site sex, but they will tend to do so in ways that reflect the differences to
each sex in the potential costs and benefits of each copulation. These dif-
ferences were inescapable during the long precontraceptive environment of
evolutionary adaptation. And because females provide a larger minimum
investment in each offspring, they are choosier about their mates than vice
versa.
Historically adaptive female selectivity in choosing sexual partners
can optimize female reproductive success only by imposing limits on indi-
vidual male reproductive success. Since male reproductive success can in-
crease more easily as mere mate number increases, there typically have
been more males seeking copulations from unwilling females than females
seeking copulations from unwilling males. Sexual selection is therefore
powerfully likely to contribute to the emergence, from the collected be-
haviors of many individuals, of nonrandom patterns of sexual coercion and
victimization: more male than female sexual coercion, and sexual coercion
directed primarily by males toward reproductive-aged females.
[Vol. 87:827
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But these processes of ultimate causation will intertwine with proxi-
mate causes. Things that increase a male's unattractiveness (such as pov-
erty) or that increase his perceptions of impunity (such as political power
or legally favorable conditions) may exacerbate biobehavioral predisposi-
tions toward sexual aggressiveness, because they are likely to be condition-
dependent.2" So, too, may things that disinhibit violence against women,
such as alcohol and drugs, easy access to intimidating weapons,2 3 cultural
factors undermining respect for women and bodily autonomy, prior vic-
timization at the hands of sexual abusers,' and widespread messages that
sexual aggression is insignificant, desired by women, or otherwise unob-
jectionable. Similarly, environmental factors that decrease female power,
such as isolation, unequal economic and political clout, and ineffective
enforcement of anti-rape prohibitions, may tend to increase the incidence
of sexual aggression.2
5
This view is, in part, compatible with some social science perspec-
tives. But the real breakthrough of a behavioral model that integrates life
and social sciences is that it significantly increases our ability to view rape
in contexts that illuminate causal influences. Rape is no longer viewed as
an isolated and discrete behavior, as has been the case historically, or sim-
ply as a subset of violent behaviors, as has more recently been the case.
Instead, it can be seen as but one behavior among many, all organizable
and understandable (though not, of course, excusable) as a function of an
evolved, species-typical psychology. The next Part explores some possible
implications such a view may have for law.
V
LEGAL APPLICATIONS
Suppose that biobehavioral influences do indeed contribute to the in-
cidence and patterns of human rape, and that the legal system ultimately
incorporates a model of rape behavior that blends life science and social
science perspectives into a seamless whole of integrated knowledge. What
then? A scientific explanation has no independent normative content, and
therefore offers no guidance by itself on appropriate policy. Explanation is
not justification, and evolutionary analysis is only useful where we want it
to be, helping us reach our goals, not setting them.
Nevertheless, this potential to assist our pursuit of separately formu-
lated legal goals is quite palpable. As I have argued elsewhere,286
282. See supra notes 117-125 and accompanying text.
283. My thanks to Professor Todd Zywicki for this observation.
284. See DOJ STATIsTIcs, supra note 6, at vi ("Sexual assault offenders were substantially more
likely than any other category of offenders to report having experienced physical or sexual abuse while
growing up.").
285. Nadler offers similar conjectures in Nadler, supra note 13.
286. See Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law, supra note 11, at 1226-41.
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evolutionary analysis in law can prove useful in at least four general ways.
First, it can help us to refine the models law uses to predict the incidence of
law-relevant behaviors reflecting human evolved psychology. For exam-
ple, it helps us integrate proximate and ultimate causes of behavior into a
more holistic framework. In doing so, it adds historical dimension; it fa-
cilitates a deeper appreciation of the complex and dynamic interaction of
genetic and environmental factors that affect the behaviors law seeks to
regulate; it more narrowly identifies environmental conditions likely to
increase or decrease the probability of behaviors; and it reveals opportuni-
ties to improve prevailing theoretical models. Second, these improvements
in behavioral models can, in turn, help generate new legal strategies for
addressing behaviors lawmakers seek to regulate. Third, evolutionary per-
spectives can often clarify cost-benefit analyses regarding the implementa-
tion of legal policies by identifying previously unnoticed connections
between policies, and by helping us quantify the trade-offs that may arise
when zealous pursuit of one policy may impede effective pursuit of
another. Fourth, evolutionary analysis in law can help point legislatively
funded research in directions that may provide further utility to law's
regulatory efforts.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to identify every diverse legal
implication that might follow from the formulation of a robust biobehavio-
ral theory of rape. It is also beyond the scope to explore, in light of the
many contemporaneous policy goals that exist in some tension with one
another, the wisdom of specific changes to the legal system that evolution-
ary analysis could arguably further. Some preliminary speculation, how-
ever, may be useful in suggesting topics for further scholarship that may
mine these potentially rich and effective applications.
Let us briefly suppose that either of the two most viable theories is
accurate. That is, let us suppose that natural and sexual selection have op-
erated over long periods of evolutionary history to preserve and spread
psychological predispositions, in males, to correlate psychological states
tending to increase the likelihood of forceful copulation with circum-
stances that would, on average, have made forced copulation more adap-
tive than alternative behaviors during the environment of evolutionary
adaptation.
If so, I believe that what does not automatically follow, for law, may
be equally important to articulate as what might follow. It does not follow,
for example, that rape is inevitable. It does not follow that rape should be
tolerated.V7 It does not follow that the legal system should be less aggres-
sive about preventing rape, encouraging victims to report it, or prosecuting
its commission. It does not follow that accused rapists should be allowed to
287. It is unfortunate that "evolutionary explanations of rape have been repeatedly confused with
justifications for rape." THORNHILL & PALMER, supra note 14, at ch. 5.
[Vol. 87:827
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raise biology in furtherance of exculpatory arguments, claiming that male
evolved psychology absolves them from gult.2 It does not follow that the
legal system should be more lenient toward convicted rapists. It does not
follow that victims should be blamed for their rape. It does not follow that
evolutionary psychology will have much to contribute to criminal trials, in
which specific males are being charged with the commission of specific
rapes. And it does not follow that political, social, and legal changes will
have little effect on rape.
Let us also suppose that natural and sexual selection have long fa-
vored and spread predispositions, in females, to respond to forced copula-
tion and the threat or risk thereof in ways sensitive to demographic
variables, such as age, historically associated with the reproductive conse-
quences rape can create. It does not follow that the fear or pain of rape is
likely to be lesser, or any less real, for victims using contraceptives. It does
not follow that any individual victim, outside the reproductive ages, will
necessarily be less traumatized than those within them. It does not follow
that the legal system should limit female rather than male behavior, as an
acceptable pathway for reducing rape.
Here are, however, a few brief illustrations of the variety of possible
contexts, worthy of future discussion, in which evolutionary analysis might
affect the law of rape. Topics discussed below include: (a) probation and
parole alternatives, such as in the debate over chemical castration;
(b) contextualizing victim trauma; (c) rape motivation legislation and liti-
gation; (d) rape classification in criminal statutes; (e) hidden policy ten-
sions in prostitution; (f) evidence at civil rape trials; and (g) the legal and
comparative history of rape law. It is also possible that evolutionary psy-
chology will have useful things to contribute in the context of interpreting
the competing perspectives, in the date-rape context, of whether or not a
woman consented to intercourse. It also may offer a basis for considering
whether, given the likely fact-patterns and psychologies involved, and the
goals lawmakers seek to achieve, statutory rape language should be gender
neutral or gender specific..
It bears repeating, at the outset, that in each context a biologically in-
formed model of rape behavior leads to no automatic policy position-
conservative, liberal, or otherwise. Such a model provides raw information,
the utility of which depends on typically preexisting values and goals, such
as reducing the incidence of rape, fostering cost-effective government,
288. See, e.g., Oliver R. Goodenough, Biology, Behavior, and Criminal Law: Seeking a
Responsible Approach to an Inevitable Interchange, 22 VT. L. Rnv. 263 (1997). Professor Deborah
Denno also provides a comprehensive treatment of why biology will typically not exculpate or mitigate
criminal responsibility in Deborah W. Denno, Human Biology and Criminal Responsibility: Free Will
or Free Ride?, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 615 (1988).
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basing legal decisions on empirically accurate truths, and the like. These,
clearly, will vary among legal thinkers.
A. Probation, Parole, and Sentencing Schedules
Several of the clearest applications of this evolutionary analysis of
rape behavior are likely to be in the context of probation, parole, and sen-
tencing schedules. This Section explores two possible applications, one in
the context of the chemical castration debate, and the other in the context
of statutorily prescribed rape sentencing schedules that vary with victim
age.
1. Example: The Chemical Castration Debate
Rapists are sentenced, and sometimes paroled, in furtherance of sev-
eral different goals, such as retribution, rehabilitation, deterrence, and the
like. The content and form of judicial sentencing (which may include the
imposition of probationary measures), as well as typically administrative
parole decisions, each of which are often the subject of state statutes, are
undoubtedly often affected by prevailing theories of why sexual aggression
occurs. Perhaps the most direct application of biobehavioral theories of
rape to postconviction contexts is in the area of so-called chemical castra-
tion, 9 which reduces male sex drive, in furtherance of law's efforts to re-
duce recidivism.
Whether chemical castration is both effective and legally permissible
for rapists has been hotly debated for years.2 O (The first convicted rapist to
289. Chemical castration involves regular chemical injections of, for example,
medroxyprogestrone acetate (commonly known as Depo-Provera). These injections shrink the testicles,
inhibit the release of testosterone and other hormones that affect the brain's ability to sexually
fantasize, and reduce sex drive in men. The effects are thought to be reversible. See Daniel L. Icenogle,
Sentencing Male Sex Offenders to the Use of Biological Treatments, 15 J. LEGAL MED. 279, 286
(1994); Karen J. Rebish, Nipping the Problem in the Bud: The Constitutionality of California's
Castration Lmv, 14 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. RTs. 507, 516-17 (1998).
290. See, e.g., William L. Baker, Castration of the Male Sex Offender A Legally Impermissible
Alternative, 30 Loy. L. REV. 377 (1984); William Green, Depo-Provera, Castration, and the Probation
of Rape Offenders: Statutory and Constitutional Issues, 12 U. DAYTON L. REv. 1 (1986); Icenogle,
supra note 289, John S. Murray, California's Chemical Castration Law: A Model for Massachusetts?,
24 CRiM. & CIVIL CONFINEMENT 731 (1998); Rebish, supra note 289; Larry Helm Spalding, Florida's
1997 Chemical Castration Law. A Return to the Dark Ages, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 117 (1998); Jodi
Berlin, Note, Chemical Castration of Sex Offenders: "A Shot in the Arm" Towards Rehabilitation, 19
WHITTIER L. REV. 169 (1997); Jennifer M. Bund, Comment, Did You Say Chemical Castration?, 59 U.
PITT. L. REV. 157 (1997); Alison G. Carpenter, Comment, Belgium, Germany, England, Denmark and
the United States: The Implementation of Registration and Castration Laws as Protection Against
Habitual Sex Offenders, 16 DICK. J. INT'L L. 435 (1998); Kenneth B. Fromson, Note, Beyond an Eye
for an Eye: Castration as an Alternative Sentencing Measure, 11 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. RTS 311
(1994); Pamela K. Hicks, Comment, Castration of Sexual Offenderr Legal and Ethical Issues, 14 J.
LEGAL MED. 641 (1993); Bryan Keene, Note, Chemical Castration: An Analysis of Florida's New
"Cutting-Edge" Policy Towards Sex Criminals, 49 FLA. L. REV. 803 (1997); Kimberly A. Peters,
Comment, Chemical Castration: An Alternative to Incarceration, 31 DUQ. L. REv. 307 (1993); Kari
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receive chemically castrating injections as a condition of probation in the
United States was Joseph Frank Smith, of San Antonio, Texas, in 1983.)291
Recently six states have enacted legislation allowing (and in some cases
requiring) chemical treatments of certain sex offenders, including rapists.2 2
At least twenty-two other state legislatures have considered similar legis-
lation,293 and bills apparently remain pending in six of them.2 4 While many
different scientific, legal, and policy issues are involved 95 behavioral biol-
ogy is relevant to these developments in at least two ways.
First, the advisability of supporting chemical castration initiatives de-
pends in part on the likelihood that chemical castration will in fact reduce
recidivism. Chemical castration, like surgical castration, reduces the pro-
duction and effects of testosterone. The male brain functions differently in
the presence or absence of different hormones, and in this case decreasing
testosterone decreases sexual desire. Consequently, the likelihood of re-
ducing recidivism through chemical castration depends, in part, on the ex-
tent to which the likelihood of raping is in fact influenced by sexual desire.
From the evolutionary perspective, sexual desire is likely to be a sig-
nificant contributor to rape patterns. Chemical castration should therefore
be effective at lowering rape recidivism rates. Empirically, existing data on
recidivism rates after chemical castration are few and unclear.296 Recidi-
vism of previously incarcerated rapists is generally considered to be quite
high,297 although here, too, studies employing different methodologies vary
considerably.298 Data on paraphiliacs, who exhibit a pattern of sexual
arousal characterized by a specific fantasy, clearly indicate that chemical
treatments dramatically reduce recidivism rates. 29 But there are far less
A. Vanderzyl, Comment, Castration as an Alternative to Incarceration: An Impotent Approach to the
Punishment of Sex Offenders, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 107 (1994).
291. See ALLISON & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 5, at 239.
292. These states include California, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Montana, and Wisconsin. For a
helpful overview of pending legislation, as of its date of publication, see Beth Miller, A Review of Sex
Offender Legislation, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 40 (Spring 1998).
293. Bills allowing chemical castration have been introduced in the legislatures of Alabama,
Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Mississippi, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Nevada, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia.
294. These six states are: Delaware, Hawaii, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, South Carolina.
295. These include, for example, the extent to which chemical treatments affect different kinds of
sex offenders, the extent to which side effects of chemical treatment are reversible, whether chemical
castration is cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment, whether there is a
First Amendment right to fantasize sexually, and whether chemical castration transgresses privacy and
individual liberty rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. See generally sources cited supra note 290.
296. See Vanderzyl, supra note 290, at 116-17 (citing studies).
297. See, e.g., Gene G. Abel et al., The Components of Rapists' Sexual Arousal, 34 ARCHIVES
GEN. PSYCHATRY 895 (1977) (estimating recidivism rate at 35%).
298. See Mamie E. Rice et al., A Follow-up of Rapists Assessed in a Maximum-Security
Psychiatric Facility, 5 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 435 (1990) (discussing studies, statistics, and
variables).
299. See Icenogle, supra note 289, at 287, and sources cited therein.
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data on rapists generally. Norwegian and Danish studies tend to support the
conclusion that surgical castration, at least, lowers rapist recidivism rates
dramatically."° But most such studies are dated, based on small samples, or
both. Studies on chemically treated "sexual aggressives," some of whom
were rapists, suggest recidivism rates lower than those for untreated sexual
aggressives3 0 But the results, while generally consistent with prediction,
are not fully compelling. So the effectiveness of existing state chemical
castration initiatives remains to be convincingly demonstrated. Behavioral
biology does, however, suggest a firm theoretical basis for further explor-
ing the use and effectiveness of chemical castration as a means of reducing
recidivism. Indeed, if rape behavior is at all increased by reduced access to
willing sex partners, and if having been incarcerated makes one a less de-
sirable sex partner than before (through decreased status and opportunity
cost to lifetime earnings) incarceration might marginally increase the like-
lihood of recidivism.
One difficult aspect of weighing the advisability of chemical castra-
tion alternatives to preexisting legal treatment of rapists is that while evo-
lutionary biology predicts that chemical castration will decrease recidivism
among treated rapists generally, because sexual desire plays some role in
the average rape, it may not prevent recidivism in all cases. We therefore
may anticipate that one cost of chemical castration policies will be those
rapes that would not have occurred under traditional sentencing and parole
procedures. This cost, however, must be compared to the cost to society,
measured by the recidivism of released rapists not chemically castrated.
Second, behavioral biology is relevant to the permissibility of chemi-
cal castration. Challenges to chemical castration statutes (including one
apparently planned by the American Civil Liberties Union)3"a are expected
to raise First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments issues, among others.
Under the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment, for example, if chemical castration is an aspect of state punish-
ment, it could be held unconstitutional if it is either unnecessary or applied
300. See Baker, supra note 290, at 384 (citing and discussing studies). One more recent report
suggests that surgically castrated sex offenders have a 3% recidivism rate, while uncastrated sex
offenders have a recidivism rate of roughly 46%. See Jennifer Nadel, Castration Was My Cure,
SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (LONDON), July 24, 1994, at 12. The latter figure approximates a 52% re-arrest
rate, within three years of prison release, for convicted rapists in the United States. See David Gelman
et al., The Mind of the Rapist, NEWSWEEK, July 23, 1990.
301. See Fred S. Berlin et al., A Five-Year Plus Follow-Up Survey of Criminal Recidivism Within
a Treated Cohort of 406 Pedophiles, 111 Exhibitionists and 109 Sexual Aggressives: Issues and
Outcome, 12 AM. J. FOReENSIC PSYCHIATRY 5, 22 (1991); Walter J. Meyer III et al., Depo Provera
Treatment for Sex Offending Behavior: An Evaluation of Outcome, 20 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY
L. 249,254-55 (1992).
302. See Miller, supra note 292, at 57. For speculation about legal arguments likely to be raised,
see id.; Murray, supra note 290.
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arbitrarily. 3 Again, whether chemical castration is sufficiently necessary
and nonarbitrary depends, in part, on the extent to which rape is in fact
typically influenced by sexual desire.
When legal thinkers assess the advisability and constitutional permis-
sibility of chemical castration, the theory of rape causation carries great
weight. If rape behavior is not significantly influenced by the biology
and evolutionary history of sexual desire, then the advisability and
constitutionality of chemical castration as a sentencing alternative, sup-
plement, or condition of parole is harder to defend. 30 4 A great many com-
mentators today,3 5 including a number of legal thinkers, °6 subscribe to the
following view:
[B]ecause [rapists'] conduct is often motivated by anger and hatred
rather than sexual desire, a treatment that merely curbs sexual
desire bears no reasonable relationship to the offender's criminal
behavior.... [B]ecause [rapists] are motivated not by sexual drive,
but by intense feelings of hatred and hostility, the procedure may
cause an increase in the occurrences of this type of sexual
battery.
307
These critics maintain that the effect of chemical castration on recidivism
is likely to be low because rape is primarily a crime of violence, not sexual
desire (The Error of the False Dichotomy),38 and because treated rapists
are therefore likely to find other ways of expressing the same antipathy
toward women. If, however, rape behavior is significantly affected by male
biology, psychology, and evolutionary history, as the biobehavioral theo-
ries and data seem to suggest, then chemical treatment may reduce the re-
cidivism rate further than incarceration alone. This would render chemical
castration sufficiently effective to be seriouslyr considered, and sufficiently
nonarbitrary to be constitutionally permissible.
Of course, there are other values at work here. We are generally hesi-
tant (in a fashion undoubtedly susceptible of evolutionary analysis) to have
303. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,281-306 (1972) (Brennan, J. concurring) (articulating,
in context of racially-biased death sentences, how these commonly used constitutional tests are
employed); see also Bund, supra note 290 (evaluating a number of constitutional challenges to
chemical castration).
304. For a discussion about how evolutionary analysis might, among other things, make physical
castration an effective deterrent and punishment, see BECKSTROM, supra note 15, at 53-65.
305. See Green, supra note 290, at 8 (reporting views of other commentators that reducing a
rapist's sexual drive will only result in his exercising deviance in other ways); Hicks, supra note 290, at
647 (noting that "[mI]any experts say that castration will not work because rape is not a crime about
sex, but rather a crime about power and violence.").
306. See, e.g., Bund, supra note 290, at 188-89.
307. Spalding, supra note 290, at 132-33 (citations omitted). The quoted language contrasts the
possible utility of chemical castration of paraphiliacs with the chemical castration of other sex
offenders, including most rapists. But see Icenogle, supra note 289, at 281-82 (suggesting that chemical
castration may be useful at least for those rapists who do have sexual fantasies).
308. See supra notes 157-171 and accompanying text.
1999]
HeinOnline  -- 87 Cal L. Rev. 915 1999
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
our legal system interfere with procreative liberties." 9 And to the extent
that chemical castration may do so, we are properly cautioned. Neverthe-
less, the effects of chemical castration are apparently reversible. Therefore
they likely have, at worst, no more effect on a rapist's future reproduction
than does a similar period of incarceration. This makes chemical castration
a more appealing alternative to, for example, surgical castration.
2. Example: Punishments Varying by Victim Age
In some jurisdictions, rapists are statutorily subject to different incar-
ceration periods depending on the age of their victim. In Illinois, for exam-
ple, the victim's age at the time of rape ("criminal sexual assault") has
potentially serious consequences for the rapist's sentence. Far longer
prison terms may be imposed if the victim is under the age of thirteen or
over the age of fifty-nine."'
There are a wide variety of reasons why it might be appropriate for
rapists targeting victims in these age ranges to be singled out for special
punishment. One of those reasons might be the belief that victims in these
age ranges are more likely to be targeted than victims of other ages (on the
theory, perhaps, that rapists preferentially target the most vulnerable
women), and that increasing penalties will increase deterrence of crimes
committed against women of those ages. Another reason might be the be-
lief that victims in these age ranges are likely to be more traumatized by
rape than victims of other ages, and that therefore that the penalty should
be increased as the harm inflicted is increased. A third might be that the
public finds rapes of females in these age groups particularly offensive.
If either of the first two of these rationales is in fact animating the
legislature, behavioral biology could be relevant. First, behavioral biology
makes some sense of statistics, typically misunderstood or ignored, indi-
cating that females outside reproductive ages are in fact far less likely to be
targeted for sexual assault.31' Second, behavioral biology predicts, and at
least one study has found, that women outside the reproductive ages, while
309. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849, 851 (1992) C'[T]he Constitution
places limits on a State's right to interfere with a person's most basic decisions about family and
parenthood," such as "personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, child rearing, and education."); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding state
statute impairing access to contraceptives unconstitutional); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (same); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (holding state statute requiring sterilization
of certain habitual criminals unconstitutional).
310. Compare 720 ILL. Comp. STAT. ANN. 5/12-13 (West 1993 & Supp. 1997) (criminal sexual
assault), with 720 ILL. C iM. STAT. ANN. 5/12-14 (West 1993 & Supp. 1997) (aggravated criminal
sexual assault). Under the Illinois statute, criminal sexual assault, a Class I felony, carries a prison term
of 4 to 15 years, see 730ILL. Coaip. STAT. AN'N. 5/5-8-1(a)(4) (West 1997), while aggravated criminal
sexual assault, a Class X felony, carries a prison term of 6 to 30 years. See 730 ILL. CRUM. STAT. ANN.
5/5-8-1(a)(3) (West 1997).
311. See supra notes 126-132 and accompanying text.
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clearly traumatized, are traumatized less by rape, on average, than are
women inside their reproductive years.312 Obviously, the relevance, if any,
of behavioral biology depends on precisely what values a legislature is at-
tempting to vindicate. But these are examples of values as to which effec-
tive legal policy could be informed by behavioral biology. For if the study
of behavioral biology leads us to data that are in fact consistent with
biobehavioral theory but inconsistent with the assumptions upon which
different sentencing schedules rest, then we may wish either to change the
schedules or rest them on alternative grounds.
B. Contextualizing Trauma: Views of Women and Rape
It has never been quite clear whether the message for today's men is
that they should muster more sympathy or empathy for rape victims. Sym-
pathy risks an objectifying paternalism, because its very essence under-
scores the distinction between the observed and the observing. Empathy
risks the potentially absurd-the spectacle of a man claiming to truly un-
derstand, to feel, or to know precisely what it feels like to be a raped
woman. One's assessment that sympathetic or empathetic responses are
more appropriate likely varies, in part, with the extent to which one be-
lieves that male and female psychologies are the same, and that therefore
there can be an ungendered "reasonable person" reaction to rape.
From the perspective of behavioral biology, however, rape is sui
generis. Male and female brains are overwhelmingly likely to process rape
victimization differently, even though they are likely to process similarly
in the vast majority of other contexts. A biobehavioral perspective, were it
to become more widely understood and appreciated, could have both posi-
tive and negative implications for our legal system.
The positive implications are at least three. First, and most generally,
contextualizing the fear of rape and the psychological pain of having been
raped within the long evolutionary history of the female brain could lead to
more sympathetic support for antirape initiatives, prosecutorial efforts, and
victim services. That is, understanding the historical and evolutionary sig-
nificance of female mate choice, the gross disparities between males and
females in the costs of enforced parenthood, and the extent to which well-
understood evolutionary processes would tend to yield distinct emotional
responses to behavior that threatened female mate choice in ancestral envi-
ronments, would help underscore the very special nature of rape. It would
also help explain why women are more likely than men to harbor a deep,
visceral revulsion to rape and threats of rape. In short, it helps to make rape
a big deal.
312. See supra notes 137-142 and accompanying text.
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To the extent that men previously have been encouraged to believe
that there are no truly significant biobehavioral and psychological differ-
ences between men and women, sympathetic understanding of rape has
likely suffered. Male legislators, judges, and prosecutors encouraged to
discount or disbelieve the existence of male-female differences may
mentally substitute themselves for a rape victim when assessing the rea-
sonableness of her fear of rape or her response to it. They may imagine
their own response to rape or threat of rape and, since they typically will
not experience the same fear of or trauma due to rape that behavioral biol-
ogy predicts an average woman might, they may therefore tend to discount
the significance of rape to the average female.3 3 The behavioral biology
perspective buttresses greater understanding of rape responses by provid-
ing explanatory context for the belief that reasonable women and reason-
able men will likely react differently to rape. To the extent that rape
victims perceive increased legal responsiveness to rape trauma, rape re-
porting may increase.
Second, and more specifically, contextualizing women's emotional
reactions to rape within the evolutionary processes that increased the prob-
ability of those reactions could improve the rational progress and effec-
tiveness of rape trials. Presently, outcomes of rape trials often turn on the
struggle to introduce or exclude evidence of "rape trauma syndrome"
(RTS). This label was created to medicalize and categorize rape reactions
within the larger arena of post-traumatic stress disorders. Prosecutors, for
example, attempt to introduce RTS evidence to justify behavior brought
into question by the defense, such as a delay in reporting the rape, behavior
seemingly inconsistent with being a crime victim, and the like. 314 Defen-
dants occasionally attempt to introduce RTS evidence to undermine the
alleged victim's credibility, on the theory that if she did not exhibit RTS
then it is unlikely that she was in fact raped. 1 5
As courts attempt to parse the scientific acceptability of such syn-
drome evidence, they frequently have been encouraged by the medical pro-
fession and trial attorneys to view RTS as some sort of pathological illness
and dysfunction,36 rather than an often understandable outgrowth of
evolved female psychological mechanisms that tended in ancestral envi-
ronments to improve a woman's chances for meaningful and adaptive mate
choice by associating the lack of such choice with particularly acute
313. Professor Denno makes a similar point in Denno, supra note 273.
314. See, e.g., People v. Taylor, 552 N.E.2d 131 (N.Y. 1990) (holding that prosecutors could
introduce RTS evidence to explain victim's initial unwillingness to identify her attacker).
315. See, e.g., Henson v. State, 535 N.E.2d 1189 (Ind. 1989) (holding that exclusion of expert
testimony that complainant's behavior after alleged rape was inconsistent with RTS is reversible error);
see also Nicole Rosenberg Economou, Note, Defense Expert Testimony on Rape Trauma
Syndrome: Implications for the Stoic Victim, 42 HAsrsNos L. 1143 (1991).
316. See Stefan, supra note 261.
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psychological distress. Doing so may unfairly burden the state or plaintiff,
demanding explanation and evidence in support of what may be a funda-
mental psychological feature shared widely by females of our species and
many others. Moreover, it risks stigmatizing the victim (as a woman with a
"syndrome") in a fashion that overblows its significance, and potentially
deters rape victims from reporting rapes, cooperating fully with prosecuto-
rial efforts, or pursuing civil remedies available to them. The behavioral
biology perspective could afford a rational and intellectually accessible
foundation for judge, jury, and society to accept a female victim's emo-
tional reactions in an un-syndromed, non-aberrational, non-medicalized
context.
Third, postulating evolved differences in the male and female percep-
tions of rape and threats of rape could inject some useful humility into
cross-sex legal pronouncements about what rape means and just how per-
nicious it is. In Coker v. Georgia,37 for example, an all male Supreme
Court concluded that the death penalty was a constitutionally impermissi-
ble punishment for raping an adult woman. 318 To so hold, consistent with
its prior capital punishment decisions, the Court needed to conclude that
death for rape was "excessive"-a standard satisfied by, among other
things, punishments that are "grossly out of proportion to the severity of
the crime." '  This case must be understood, of course, against the back-
drop of racially biased capital punishment. But it strikes me as not insig-
nificant that the Court bolstered its conclusion as follows:
Rape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in
terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the
public, it does not compare with murder .... [Rape] does not
include.., even the serious injury to another person.... We have
317. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
318. The Georgia Code at the time specified that "[a] person convicted of rape shall be punished
by death or by imprisonment for life, or by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years."
lId at 586 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2001 (1972)). Upon conviction, punishment was determined by
a separate sentencing proceeding in which, to impose the death penalty, a jury had to find at least one
of the statutory aggravating circumstances. See id. at 586, 587 n.3 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 26-3102
(1977)). Coker claimed that being executed for his most recent rape conviction would violate his
constitutional right under the Eighth Amendment to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Seven
Justices agreed. (Two of them, Justices Brennan and Marshall, believed the death penalty to be
unconstitutional in all cases, necessarily including this one.) The plurality opinion of Justices White,
Stewart, Blackmun, and Stevens held the death penalty for raping an adult woman unconstitutional in
all such cases not also involving murder. Justice Powell, concurring in part, would have held the death
penalty for raping an adult woman unconstitutional except for "aggravated" rapes, such as those
involving excessive brutality.
319. The Court had recently and firmly reiterated, in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), that
the Eighth Amendment bars not only barbarous punishments, but also punishments that are excessive
in relation to the severity of the crime. The Court also held in Gregg that the death penalty was not a
categorically unconstitutional form of punishment.
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the abiding conviction that the death penalty... is an excessive
penalty for the rapist .... 320
Leaving aside this statement's furtherance of discussion of the death pen-
alty, the point I raise here is that this reasoning relies on a judicially as-
serted fact regarding the magnitude of the harm of rape and the
comparative harmfulness of being raped instead of killed. The claim is
purportedly objective, it employs a "reasonable person" assessment of
rape's harm, and it is likely replicated elsewhere in the legal system. Per-
haps the Justices were right, in the end. But I am not presently convinced
that men in the legal system should be quite so sanguine about their ability
to make such assessments of female psychology in the context of rape. For
everything we know about the biology of behavior suggests that male and
female brains will tend to process and react to rape differently-and not
solely because of the different ways in which they have been socialized.
Consequently, a behavioral biology perspective on the psychology of
rape's harms may prompt us to reevaluate the bases on which we compare
it to other harms.
On the other hand, contextualizing the harm of rape within differently
evolved male and female psychologies could yield potentially unjustifiable
ripple effects of acknowledging male and female differences generally. If
people were to view female psychology as particularly vulnerable in the
context of rape, it might serve to justify otherwise unwarranted discrimi-
nation in hiring contexts regarding jobs that may expose women to rape-
risky environments. More generally, people uninformed about the kinds of
circumstances in which male and female psychologies may differ could
extrapolate the existence of sex differences in the rape contexts into other
contexts less supported or unsupported by the underlying behavioral biol-
ogy. For example, some people might argue that evolved sex differences
were broadly generalizable, rather than narrowly context-specific, and at-
tempt to use such a misarticulation and misapplication of biobehavioral
science in furtherance of even broader discrimination on the basis of sex.
Whether the potential benefits or harms of contextualizing trauma will
be greater will depend, in part, on the extent to which policy makers under-
stand that the existence of differences between the sexes is not only ex-
tremely likely to be evident in the context of rape (and other behaviors
closest in nexus to the reproductive success of our ancestors), but also ex-
tremely unlikely in a great many other contexts.
320. Coker, 433 U.S. at 598 (emphasis added). Interestingly, the court limited its decision to rapes
of adult females, leaving open whether it would be unconstitutional to impose the death penalty for the
rape of a child. So noting, the Louisiana Supreme Court, in State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063 (La.
1996), cert. denied sub nonm, Bethley v. Louisiana, 117 S. Ct. 2425 (1997), upheld the constitutionality
of a statute allowing capital punishment for the rape of a child under the age of twelve.
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C. Rape Motivation: The Violence Against Women Act of 1994
One area in which biobehavioral theories of sexual aggression may
have clear application is in contexts in which the motives for rape them-
selves have direct legal significance. The Violence Against Women Act of
1994 (VAWA)' 21 for example, in a famously controversial provision,
affords civil rights remedies to victims of "crimes of violence motivated by
gender."3" To prove that criminal violence upon her was "motivated by
gender," a woman must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence
that the attack upon her was: (a) "committed because of gender or on the
basis of gender"; and (b) "due, at least in part, to an animus based on the
victim's gender. ''""s Should she succeed,. she may be awarded
"compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory relief,
and such other relief as a court may deem appropriate.""3 4 However well-
intentioned the legislation, biobehavioral perspectives may call into ques-
tion the wisdom of its precise wording, design, and application?' There
are several issues regarding the Act: the scientific accuracy of the general
understanding of human motivation that it reflects; the specific theories of
rape it reflects; and its likely effectiveness.
The extent to which motive is relevant to the law's punishment of bad
acts, or compensation for injurious ones, is a matter as to which theorists
have devoted much ink. Typically, motive is probative of the likelihood
that a defendant committed an act with which he is charged, as in the con-
text of an allegedly premeditated murder, or motive is independently rele-
vant at sentencing. But it is quite rare to make a specific kind of motive a
separately necessary element of an action. When the legal system ventures
to make motive a formal element of an action, as it has in VAWA, two re-
sults may ensue. First, the threshold for demonstrating motive may be suf-
ficiently high, as a practical matter, that few plaintiffs will succeed. This
could be the case, for example, if the courts considered the matter of mo-
tive so complex that the plaintiff' s burden would be quite heavy. Alterna-
tively, since judges may properly presume that Congress had cases in mind
to which a statute costly to create would apply, the threshold for proving
motive may de facto become lower than a scientific reality (at least) may
suggest. This would make it relatively simple to offer persuasive evidence
of motive; else none would be persuasive at all.
321. Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 40111(a)-40611, 108 Stat. 1796, 1903-53 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
322. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(a) (1994). For examples of other contexts in which motive for rape may
be relevant, see Baker, supra note 16.
323. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d), (e)(1) (1994).
324. 42 U.S.C. § 13981.
325. For a view that evolutionary theory supports the argument that bias crime statutes should
encompass gender-related crimes, see Katherine Chen, Note, Including Gender in Bias Crime
Statutes: Feminist and Evolutionary Perspectives, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 277 (1997).
1999]
HeinOnline  -- 87 Cal L. Rev. 921 1999
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
In a number of important cases, the latter path appears to have been
taken. For example, one federal district court opined that cases in which
rape would not have been "motivated by gender," with constituent animus,
"would appear ... to be few and far between 3 26 Another district court,
in the context of an unwanted fondling the court found to be
animus-motivated, applied a standard for animus so low that all rapes
would seem to qualify.327 That court reasoned that
because unwanted or unwelcome sexual advances may be
demeaning and belittling, and may reasonably be inferred to be
intended to have that purpose or to relegate another to an inferior
status, even if the advances were also intended to satisfy the actor's
sexual desires, the allegations of the "animus" element are here
sufficient.3"
These judicial developments implicitly reflect judicial notice of the
claim that sexual aggression cannot be sexually motivated without animus
as if it were indeed fact that sexual aggression cannot be sexually moti-
vated without animus. The momentum of this questionable view is re-
flected in subtitle D of VAWA, entitled The Equal Justice for Women in
the Courts Act of 1994.329 Notwithstanding that it immediately follows
subtitle C, which creates the civil rights cause of action for violence
against women '!motivated by gender," and notwithstanding that the legis-
lative history of sibtitle C makes quite plain that courts were not to assume
that every rape is "motivated by gender," subtitle D reflects the assumption
that rapes are motivated by gender. Specifically, subtitle D authorizes
grants for training judges and court personnel "in the laws of the
States... on rape.., and other crimes of violence motivated by the vic-
tim's gender.""33 The momentum of this empirically questionable assump-
tion that rapes almost always involve gender animus is also reflected in at
least two categories of legal scholarship. One calls for a rebuttable pre-
sumption of animus in rape cases because "gender animus is an underlying
factor in almost all rapes."33' The other argues that VAWA should be
326. Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F. Supp. 531,541 (N.D. M. 1997).
327. See Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp 1375 (N.D. Iowa 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 134 F.3d
1339 (8th Cir. 1998). Specifically, the defendant "came up behind [the plaintiff], grabbed her with both
of his hands and pulled her back into his body, held her tightly and kissed her neck." Doe, 970 F. Supp,
at 1381. Later that evening, he "rubbed Plaintiff's back up and down with his hand." Id.
328.- Doe, 970 F. Supp. at 1408.
329. Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 40401-40422, 108 Stat. 1796, 1942-45 (codified as 42 U.S.C. §§
13701, 13991-14002 (1994)).
330. 42 U.S.C. § 13991 (1994) (emphasis added); see also 42 U.S.C. § 13992(19) (expanding
concern to "gender-motivated crimes of violence other than rape").
331. Gaffney, supra note 26, at 264.
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amended to strike the animus requirement altogether, to make rape per se
actionable under VAWA
3 2
Certainly, much male-female violence, like much violence generally,
is motivated by an amalgam of anger and at least momentary hatred.33
And the legislative history of VAWA provides some guidance as to
circumstances, such as the presence of sexist epithets during the vio-
lence,3" that make meeting the animus "at least in part" requirement fairly
unambiguous to apply. But when the violence in a VAWA action is rape
(rather than the host of other assaults that can, qualify as "crimes of
violence motivated by gender") the empirical-and hence ultimately sci-
entific-question of motivation is likely to be more complex than generally
assumed.
This complexity obtains for two reasons. First, the entire legal con-
struct of motivation is biologically naive, in ways that render its use in the
rape context problematic. This is true even if one acknowledges, as the le-
gal system clearly has,335 that people can have multiple motives for their
acts. By failing to recognize the distinction between, and yet inescapable
interconnectedness of, proximate (immediate) and ultimate (evolutionary)
levels of causation, law treats motive simplistically, as if motives come in
easily disentangled and categorized kinds, which compete in a zero-sum
game for relative proportional influence.
Leaving the biobehavioral theories of rape aside for the moment, bi-
ology makes compellingly clear that sexual behaviors must be understood
as the product of proximate and ultimate causes. They have proximate ori-
gins (such as observation of a potential sex partner) as well as evolutionary
origins (such as the nonrandom patterning of psychological desires for sex
partners exhibiting certain kinds of characteristics). Thus biobehavioral
causes of sex behavior, even sexual aggression, can exist at the same time
that other contributors, such as political powerlessness of victims, do.
These multiple causes coexist in the same way that an infinite variety of
blueprinted boxes could all have a constant height, even while their lengths
and widths permuted wildly.
The second reason the question of rape motivation is likely to be more
complicated than commonly presumed is based on the biobehavioral evi-
dence discussed earlier. There is simply a great deal of evidence, consistent
with narrow, falsifiable, and parsimonious predictions, derived from robust
332. See Frazee, supra note 22, at 242-43, 245-47; see also Goldfarb, supra note 26, at 398-99
(citing authors who would prefer that the legislation presume that rape is always gender-motivated).
333. An obvious and extreme example is the 1989 shooting attack, in Montreal, on 27 women.
The gunman's suicide note indicated that he blamed women generally, and feminists in particular, for
his problems. See David E. Pitt, Montreal Gunman Had Suicide Note, N.Y. TWIars, Dec. 8, 1989, at A9.
334. See, e.g., S. RP. No. 103-138, at 51 (1993).
335. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (describing standards for
finding Title VII violations in "mixed-motive" cases).
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foundations of behavioral biology, suggesting that rape is frequently influ-
enced, at least in part, by nonrandom, context-specific, information-
processing predispositions typical to the male brain of many species, in-
cluding humans. This evidence neither excuses rape when it does occur,
nor makes rape determined or inevitable. But it may very well mean that
the popular hypothesis that most rape is a product of misogynistic animus,
quite similar to that present in lynchings, is overcredited" 6
In the end, the biobehavioral perspectives on sexual aggression may
suggest that VAWA is unlikely to be as effective a remedial and deterrent
mechanism as its proponents hoped. VAWA uses a civil rights framework
largely borrowed from hate-crime legislation targeting racially motivated
violence. It thus reflects the assumption that male violence against women
is quite often the same sort of thing-a "hate crime"337 -as racial violence
(or at least that a legal framework intended primarily to deter white vio-
lence against blacks will be equally effective in deterring male violence
against women)?38 While it is possible that a statutory mechanism designed
to deter and fairly compensate for violent hate crimes may be equally ef-
fective in the context of sexual violence, biobehavioral theories suggest
that view may be overly optimistic. The evolved psychology of sexuality
and sexual desire, reflecting roughly 600 million years of sexual dimor-
phism in our lineage, likely renders the psychology of sexual violence a
very different thing than the psychology of racial violence.339 Thus the
336. It is a remarkably popular belief of many legal commentators that rape is to women as
"lynching" is to African Americans-an act motivated by hatred. See, e.g., W.H. Hallock, The Violence
Against Women Act: Civil Rightsfor Sexual Assault Victims, 68 IND. L.J. 577, 609-10 (1993) (making
lynching analogy).
337. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 103-138, at 49 (1993); see also Peggy Miller & Nancy Biele, 7venty
Years Later: The Unfinished Revolution, in TRANSFORMING A RAPE CULTURE 47, 52 (Emilie
Buchwald et al. eds., 1993) ("Rape is a hate crime, the logical outcome of an ancient social bias against
women.").
338. The Senate Report accompanying VAWA stated that "it is time for attacks motivated by
gender basis [sic] to be considered as serious as crimes motivated by religious, racial, or political bias.
The provision's purpose is to provide an effective anti-discrimination remedy for violently expressed
gender prejudice." S. RP. No. 103-138, at 38 (1993). See also id. at 42 ("[VAWA] is designed to
remedy not only the violent effects of the problem, but the subtle prejudices that lurk behind it."); id. at
48-51 (suggesting that VAWA is not intended to make all violent crimes against women, or even all
rapes of women, civilly actionable). Earlier versions of VAWA indeed defined all rapes as crimes
motivated by gender. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 101-545, at 23 (1990). Lastly, the legislative history
frequently uses racial context examples to illustrate gender context points. See id. at 50, 52.
339. Many biologists question the very concept of "race" in the human species, considering it a
social, not a biological, term applied loosely to historically localized breeding populations that can,
nonetheless, interbreed when brought together. To the extent that races do exist, they can only have
existed for about 35,000 years, which is likely too short a time for any significant race-specific
psychological differences or adaptations to have arisen. See, e.g., L. LUCA CAVALLI-SFORZA ET AL.,
THE HISTORY AND GEOGRAPHY OF HUMAN GENES 16-20 (1994). For further discussion, see JONATHAN
MARKS, HUMAN BIODIVERSITY (1995); Jonathan Marks, Science and Race, 40 AM. BEHAVIORAL
SCIENTIST 123 (1996); and Lionel Tiger, Trump the Race Card, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 1996, at A12.
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effectiveness of VAWA may be undercut by its very cross-
conceptualization of race and sex.'
D. Rape Classification in State Criminal Statutes
On the theory that rape may be a crime of violence, not of sex (again,
The Error of the False Dichotomy) 4 most states have formally reclassified
rapes using terms other than "rape."342 Colorado, for example, redefined
rapes as "sexual assaults."'343 While a number of states, Colorado among
them, retain a section on sexual assaults distinct from assaults generally, it
is nonetheless clear that the taxonomic reclassification was intended to
make "rape" and "assault" much closer conceptual cousins. Some authors
have advocated that all former rape law be merged into state statutes' gen-
eral assault regimes." In either case, particularly the latter, reclassifying
rape has consequences, many of them quite laudable. It sends a strong
symbolic message that rape is intolerable. It makes clear that rape is not a
sexual experience for the victim. And it signals that rape is not the kind of
behavior likely to be treated leniently.
It is unclear, however, whether invoking a legal regime that has pen-
alties designed to confront and deter other crimes of violence will be ef-
fective in deterring this kind of violence. The reclassification, therefore,
may prove unwise. If the biobehavioral theories about evolutionary influ-
ences on patterns of rape are accurate, rape behavior is likely to respond to
environmental changes-and the threat of legal penalties-in a very differ-
ent way than, say, violence incidental to either thefts of property or anger
over a confrontation. For example, psychological processing mechanisms
relevant to many rapes may be less sensitive to post-act costs not typically
encountered in the environment of evolutionary adaptation. This may, in
fact, suggest that rape should be subjected to a separate schedule of pun-
ishments, much harsher than ordinary (and harsher than ordinary assaults
carry), to counter behavior that may be somewhat less rationally calculated
than ordinary. Reclassifying rape as a subset of other assaults may make
this separate punishment scheme more difficult to maintain and defend,
because the greater the perceived similarity in the crimes, the more one
expects similarity in penalties.
340. The potential contributions of behavioral biology in this context relate only to the accuracy
of empirical assumptions legislators and courts may bring to the implementation of subtitle C of
VAWA. In no way do they suggest that the meritorious goal of reducing rape that underlies Title IH
should not be pursued in other ways.
341. See supra notes 157-171 and accompanying text.
342. See Bryden, supra note 5 (manuscript at Part V & n.335, on file with author).
343. See, e.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-402 (West 1990 & Supp. 1998).
344. See Bryden, supra note 5 (manuscript Part V, on file with author) (describing this approach
and citing, as an example, Martin D. Schwartz & Todd R. Clear, Toward a New Law on Rape, 26
CRIME & DELINQ. 129, 136-37 (1980)). Bryden is sharply critical of this suggestion.
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It is always relevant to legal reform to estimate the relative difficulties
with which different behaviors can be changed. To date, reformers have
had few tools available to aid their estimates. Often, legal thinkers rely on
a combination of intuition, observation, and trial and error. In certain are-
nas, such as market operations and tax policy, economic tools have helped
law to anticipate and thus to shape legal policies predictably effective at
encouraging or discouraging activities. But economics has its limits, be-
cause humans are notoriously prone to emotional and irrational behavior.4 5
What behavioral biology offers is a systematic way of estimating, be-
havior by behavior, what lawmakers are up against. Understanding how
natural selection has shaped the human brain provides a reliable way of
estimating the relative degree of legal intervention necessary to shift dif-
ferent law-relevant behaviors. Quite simply, when the law encourages be-
havior to which the human brain is already predisposed, it will be more
easily successful than when it attempts the opposite. The degree of diffi-
culty it encounters, in the latter context, will correspond to the magnitude
of the effect that behavior had on the reproductive success of pre-human
and early human ancestors in long-faced environmental conditions.
This difficulty does not mean that rape is inevitable. It does mean,
however, that if the selection theories of biobehavioral influences on rape
are true, then rape behavior will be even more difficult to eradicate than
some theorists estimate2 6 With the exceptions of survival and sexual ma-
turity, copulation with fertile females has long been the principal prerequi-
site behavior for male reproductive success. Resource acquisition, status,
competition for mates, child-rearing, and the like all help. But the human
brain can be expected, on average, to yield increasingly intense emotional
states, predisposing its bearers to increasingly desperate, even forceful
345. For brief discussion of this point, and the utility of evolutionary psychology in understanding
human emotions, see Owen D. Jones, Law, Emotions, and Behavioral Biology, 39 JuRiMETPics J. 283
(1999).
346. Compare, for example, this passage,
The eradication of rape is contingent on educating and sensitizing our society to the meaning
of the crime and the context in which it occurs.... Ultimately, however, the elimination of
rape will require a massive reconsideration and restructuring of social values as well as a
reorientation of the relations between the sexes. It is the thesis of this author that when the
sex roles of both men and women are defined by individual needs and talents rather than by
stereotypic expectations based on sex and power motives, only then will there be an end to
rape.
HILBERMAN, supra note 41, at 62. See also Patricia Searles & Ronald J. Berger, Conclusion to RAPE &
SOCIETY, supra note 30, who call for
radical social structural and cultural change ... [by] redesign[ing] our sex-education
programs so as not to continue to 'rear our sons and daughters in such ignorance of their
sexuality that many confuse pleasure with pain and domination'[; ... confront[ing] rape-
supportive beliefs and attitudes[;] ... challeng[ing] traditional notions of masculinity and
femininity[;] ... advocat[ing] and creat[ing] social and economic reforms designed to
promote gender equality and improve the overall condition of women in society
[and] ... address[ing] the socioeconomic causes of crime and seek[ing] to reduce
unemployment, poverty, and racial discrimination.
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action, as prospects of even minimum reproductive success fail to materi-
alize, or otherwise diminish. Many aspects of our culture are designed to
inhibit the expression of such predispositions. But we should anticipate and
counter environmental stimuli that may disinhibit these predispositions,
however major or minor they may be.
Proposed changes in education, socialization, and culture are useful
and necessary 7 But behavior can in no legitimate way be thought to arise
from culture alone, whether the particular selection theories of rape are or
are not true. The human brain is a specialized information processor-
whose patterns of psychological states will tend, on average, to inspire be-
havior that was adaptive in the environments of evolutionary adaptation.
This is cause for attention, not alarm. If we want to reduce the incidence of
rape, the better we understand the way brains process environmental con-
ditions in ways that increase or decrease the likelihood of rape the better
we can deter it.38
E. Cost-Benefit Analyses: Hidden Policy Tensions Exposed
One of the principal and most useful applications of evolutionary
analysis is its ability to improve cost-benefit estimates. 9 It aids this proc-
ess in two ways. First, because it can reveal interconnectedness between
different behaviors, it can be a powerful tool for exposing hidden conflicts
between seemingly unrelated goals. Second, it increases the comprehen-
siveness of each cost-benefit calculus by providing some sense of the ac-
tual costs of the conflicts.
For example, evolutionary analysis reveals potential tensions between
anti-prostitution policies and anti-rape policies. If we assume that there are
biobehavioral influences on the patterns of rape, then the relative avail-
ability of willing sex partners for men likely has some influence on the
rape rate. (Remember that sexual desire is a proximate mechanism in fur-
therance of evolutionarily adaptive behavior, and that a conscious desire to
reproduce with a given prostitute is unnecessary for the urge to visit a
prostitute to be understood as evolutionarily influenced.) Prostitution
makes a sex partner available to almost any man of even the most modest
means. Consequently, it follows that an aggressive policy against
Id. at 266-67.
347. See, e.g., Stock, supra note 181, at 73 (I hope that males can be reeducated and resocialized
so that they no longer define as in their interests the maintenance of a position of control over women,
particularly using sexual coercion as a means of enforcement.").
348. Professor Donald A. Dripps observes that the causes of rape are largely "irrelevant." See
Dripps, supra note 4, at 1781 n.3. He states, "Whether conduct originates from social or biological
causes, its incidence will be reduced by the law's physical threat and moral condemnation. The
question law must answer is what conduct to punish and condemn." Md. I suggest that the law should
also have systematic processes for choosing how to deter, or how to deter more effectively.
Evolutionary psychology is relevant to those processes.
349. See Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law, supra note 11, at 1236-40.
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prostitution may compromise an aggressive policy against rape. Although
evolutionary analysis can say nothing about whether reducing the inci-
dence of rape or prostitution is the more important social goal, it can high-
light that the effective pursuit of one may come at some cost to full success
in pursuing the other. 5 Specifically, criminalizing prostitution in ways that
effectively decrease its incidence may result in a slightly higher rape rate
than may otherwise have obtained. 5'
There is remarkably little information available that would enable us
to test the hypothesis that the prostitute supply and the rape rate are in-
versely correlated.352 For one thing, it is difficult to make reliable judg-
ments about the number of prostitutes on the basis of prostitution's
illegality alone. Jurisdictions vary widely in the extent to which prostitu-
tion is actively discouraged. For another, it is possible that males may be
less inhibited from raping prostitutes than non-prostitutes, since where
prostitution is illegal a prostitute may be far less likely than non-prostitutes
to report her victimization. There are simply too many variables, eco-
nomic, political, demographic, and the like, for a comparative study to
easily control.
Nonetheless, there is some evidence from Australia that supports this
hypothesis. In a longitudinal study, Barber found that the conviction rate
for rape and attempted rape in the seven-year period following the closure
of brothels in the territory of Queensland was triple the rate for the seven-
year period prior to the closures.3 53 The socio-economic and demographic
characteristics of those convicted correlated positively with those of the
men who had most frequented brothels during more permissive times."
Moreover, the increase was three times the rate of increase for convictions
of other violent crimes.355 This is not dispositive, of course, because the
350. For a brief but useful discussion of some of the many possible costs of over- and
undercommodifying sexual services, see Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L.
Rav. 1849, 1856, 1921-25 (1987).
351. I am presently unaware of any indication that this idea has been seriously considered by legal
policy makers, at least in the United States. One influential researcher dismissed the idea, in a section
subtitled "Myths About the Remedy," with the following reasoning: "[Tihe fact of the matter is that
prostitution does exist and it offers no solution since, again, the offender is not seeking primarily sexual
gratification." GROTH, supra note 33, at 8. This reasoning is unpersuasive. That prostitution exists and
does not eliminate rape affords little confidence to the conclusion that increasing the availability of
prostitution would not decrease the rate of rape.
352. One would think, for example, that before and after data on rape and prostitution in Nevada
or the Netherlands, where prostitution is legal but limited, would be easily accessible. However, I have
been unable, thus far, to locate any sources that would enable straightforward analysis.
353. See R.N. Barber, Prostitution and the Increasing Number of Convictions for Rape in
Queensland, 2 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. CRIMNOLOGY 169, 171 (1969). Brothels, though technically illegal,
had been tolerated until a large-scale crackdown in 1959. See id.
354. See id. at 172.
355. See TEDSCHI & FELSON, supra note 116, at 315 (discussing Barber study). Barber concluded
that the data "show clearly that there was a remarkable increase in the conviction rate for [rape and
attempted rape] after this closing-an increase that was not found in convictions for offences against
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prosecutorial policy and personnel were not constant across the fourteen-
year period, but it is provocatively probative.
Surely not all rape would disappear if prostitution were legal and ac-
cessible. And the potential rape of prostitutes is no less a concern than the
potential rape of non-prostitutes. 56 But to the extent that patterns of rape
reflect male psychological predispositions toward sexual behavior gener-
ally, prostitution rates and rape rates may trade against each other. Al-
though those who support decriminalization of.prostitution have not
commonly argued this,57 biobehavioral theory suggests that legalizing
prostitution might therefore cause the overall rape rate to decline. Conse-
quently, a legislature that valued reduced rape more than reduced prostitu-
tion might experiment with legalizing prostitution.
F. Statistical Evidence of Harm at Civil Rape Trials
That rape is emotionally and often physically damaging is generally
uncontroversial. But the relatively novel civil actions for rape create new
issues certain to be controversial. For example, the civil rights cause of
action created by VAWA (over which the federal and state courts have
concurrent jurisdiction)35 grants some rape victims the right to sue their
attacker for civil remedies, typically monetary damages.3 59 This may ulti-
mately enable a victim-plaintiff seeking damages beyond those incurred in
medical and psychiatric contexts (for example) to proffer evidence quanti-
fying the emotional harm of being raped. She may wish: (a) to testify as
to the extent of her emotional harm; (b) to introduce statistical evidence
suggesting the degree of emotional harm experienced by typical rape vic-
tims; or (c) both.
The reason biobehavioral theories may become relevant in this con-
text is that there now exists some evidence to suggest, consistent with
the person by males in general." Barber, supra note 353, at 171-72. This is, of course, only
correlational evidence, but it is among the only pieces of evidence currently available.
356. See Jody Miller & Martin D. Schwartz, Rape Myths and Violence Against Street Prostitutes,
16 DEvIANT BEHAv. 1 (1995) (persuasively arguing against the myth that prostitutes are unrapeable).
357. See, e.g., Tracy M. Clements, Prostitution and the American Health Care System: Denying
Access to a Group of Women in Need, 11 BERKELEY WOMEN's LJ. 49 (1996); Michael Conant,
Federalism, the Mann Act, and the Imperative to Decriminalize Prostitution, 5 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 99 (1996); Lars 0. Ericsson, Charges Against Prostitution: An Attempt at a Philosophical
Assessment, 90 ETIfICS 335 (1980); Minouche Kandel, Whores In Court: Judicial Processing of
Prostitutes in the Boston Municipal Court in 1990, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 329 (1992); Jessica N.
Drexler, Comment, Governments' Role in Turning Tricks: The World's Oldest Profession in the
Netherlands and the United States, 15 DICK. J. INT'L L. 201 (1996).
358. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(3) (1994).
359. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (1994):
Cause of action A person.., who commits a crime of violence motivated by gender and thus
deprives another of the right declared in subsection (b) ... shall be liable to the party injured,
in an action for the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and
declaratory relief, and such other relief as a court may deem appropriate.
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predictions of biobehavioral theories, that victim trauma, while generally
substantial, tends to vary among victims in predictable ways."6 Differences
in demographic factors, such as victim age, and situational correlates, such
as the kind of sexual assault, tend to affect the magnitude of victim trauma.
It is consequently possible that some parties may seek to introduce such
statistical evidence at trial in support of establishing or diminishing dam-
age awards.
It is unclear to me whether, if this happens, it will be a constructive
development. But it is clear that the biobehavioral perspective affords nei-
ther plaintiff nor defendant automatic advantage in this civil trial context.
In cases of penile-vaginal rapes of females of reproductive age, for exam-
ple, plaintiffs may seek to introduce statistical evidence that this combina-
tion of variables has by far the greatest average likelihood of prompting
extreme distress, and therefore of justifying the highest damage awards. In
cases involving non-penile-vaginal sexual assault or victims outside their
reproductive years, defendants may seek to introduce statistical evidence,
informed by biobehavioral theory, that the average similarly situated vic-
tim tends to be somewhat less harmed than one might otherwise assume.36" '
At least two aspects of these potential scenarios warrant reflection.
First, even if the biobehavioral theories of victim trauma are indeed robust,
it is not necessarily the case that the theories themselves must be intro-
duced to lay the foundation for independently relevant statistics, such as
those showing variation in victim trauma. Credibly gathered statistics can
be evaluated on the same general bases that statistics generally are. On the
other hand, the patterns evident in the statistics may be sufficiently
counter-intuitive that a firm grounding in evolutionary biology is necessary
to make the patterns of rape trauma both admissible and intelligible to
judge and jury. Second, as Professor Steven Goldberg has pointed out, we
must not lose sight of the fact that behavioral biology is generally statisti-
cal, and therefore general in nature, while the charge of the judiciary often
extends into the arena of individualized justice. 62 Statistics about
"average" female trauma may or may not be particularly helpful, and
should not be considered to have sufficiently talismanic scientific qualities
to warrant unreflective reliance on them.
G. The Legal History of Rape Law: A New Lens
Scientists demonstrate that the human brain is an evolved, special
purpose information processor. Natural selection has left it designed to cor-
relate patterns of environmental stimuli with patterns of subjectively per-
ceived emotional states, which tend in turn to increase the likelihood of
360. See supra notes 137-145 and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 143-145 and accompanying text.
362. See Steven Goldberg, Statistics, Law, and Justice, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 255 (1999).
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behavior that was historically adaptive, in the environment of evolutionary
adaptation. Separately, legal historians attempt to describe and make sense
of past legal developments by tracing their origins and consequences. A
behavioral biology perspective can bring these two enterprises together in
interesting and potentially useful ways. Rape affords three windows on this
conjunction.
First, behavioral biology can help explain why some of the current
contours of legal systems came to be the way they are, and why some legal
proscriptions were not randomly likely to arise?63 For example, despite
great theoretical potential for cultural variability, forced penile-vaginal in-
tercourse is an inflammatory and serious offense in every known society.
This is true, despite the fact that there are many acts of physical violence
(say, cutting off a leg) that are, on average, more physically harmful than
rape. All over the planet, rape makes women fearful and angry, and it
makes nonraping males who are fathers, husbands, brothers, sons, and
friends of the raped female livid to the point of the most extreme forms of
violence and retribution-seeking.31 There is no research of which I am
aware to suggest that it has not always been thus. (Even the Coker Court
conceded that "[s]hort of homicide, [rape] is the 'ultimate violation of
self."') 365 Note too that the widest variety of legal systems, including our
own, formally proscribe rape with harsh penalties. Although the complexi-
ties of the crime, the difficulties of proving lack of consent, and the vicis-
situdes of local attitudes have often made rape underreported,
underprosecuted, and underpunished, convicted rapists still tend to be
subject to unusually harsh penalties, including even death. The severity of
these penalties is clear when compared to the physical harm typically in-
flicted, and to the less severe penalties that typically follow from even
more physically severe nonsexual harms.
The extraordinarily widespread proscription against rape, coupled
with the unusually harsh sanctions rape invokes,3" requires explanation.
Absent evolutionary analysis, a comparative legal historian would need to
posit that these legal systems are commonly descended from a legal system
present when all early humans lived together, have arisen in separate
363. The Thornhills explore such an application in Thornhill & Thornhill, supra note 130.
364. Indeed, Michael Dukakis's unemotional response to a question about the hypothetical rape of
his wife, during a televised 1988 presidential campaign debate, struck people as so inhuman that his
campaign manager would later say that it was at that moment she knew Dukakis would lose the
election. See Susan Estrich, The Hidden Politics of Race, WASH. POSr MAG., Apr. 23, 1989, at 20. For
a discussion of evolved male psychology concerning threats by third parties to rape a mate or relative,
see THORNHILL & PALMER, supra note 14, at ch. 4.
365. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (citation omitted); see supra notes 317-320 and
accompanying text (discussing Coker).
366. See TEDESCHI & FELSON, supra note 116, at 334 (1994) ("A cross-cultural survey of 110
societies from the Human Relations Area Files showed that rape is one of the three most heavily
punished crimes.") (citation omitted).
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cultures coincidentally (like so many heads in consecutive coin tosses), or
have mimicked each other through ancient, cross-cultural exposure. Each
is possible and yet, on the basis of current knowledge, unlikely to afford
adequate explanation.
From the evolutionary perspective, the widespread proscription and
harsh penalties were probable. They can be understood to be, in part, the
product of deeply visceral male and female psychologies about reproduc-
tive matters. Natural selection likely swept away any psychological ten-
dencies in female ancestors to be indifferent to being raped, and similarly
swept away any psychological tendencies, in males and females alike, to
be indifferent to daughters, sisters, and female mates being raped. The le-
gal history of rape and the patterns of punishments that have unfolded
therefore can be illuminated significantly, perhaps even largely explained,
by tracing the way evolutionary processes have influenced the psychology
of the human brain. 67 That is, to the extent that our human laws will tend
to reflect what humans care about, evolutionary psychology will enable us
to explain, in part, why certain things were deemed sufficiently important
to warrant collective sanctions, and why certain things tend to be encour-
aged more, or punished more, than others.
Second, and reciprocally, comparative legal history may serve to
identify features sufficiently common to human existence to recommend
research into previously unexplored features of shared human psychology.
Suppose, for example, that we did not already have biobehavioral theories
of sexual aggression. The very discovery of remarkably consistent, cross-
cultural patterns in legal proscriptions against rape and extreme sanctions
for rape might have prompted useful theoretical and empirical work into
the evolved male and female psychologies regarding rape. It is therefore
possible that such comparative legal histories may serve such a function in
other contexts, where common legal features of societies may serve as
markers for common features of evolved human psychology.
Third, understanding the human brain as one with commonly shared,
evolved, and contingent information processing patterns may provide a
richer appreciation of the interplay between legal systems and human na-
ture.3" Legal systems can then themselves be seen as culturally manifested
367. Some initial thinking in this direction is suggested in Thornhill & Thornhill, supra note 130,
at 159-63.
368. See, e.g., JOHN 0. McGINNIs, WE THE PRIMATES (forthcoming); Mark F. Grady & Michael
T. McGuire, A Theory of the Origin of Natural Law, 8 J. CONTErmr. LEGAL ISSUES 87 (1997); John 0.
McGinnis, The Human Constitution and Constitutive Law, 8 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 211 (1997);
John 0. McGinnis, The Once and Future Property-Based Vision of the First Amendmen4 63 U. CHI. L.
REv. 49 (1996); John 0. McGinnis, The Original Constitution and Our Origins, 19 HARV. J.L. & Pua.
POL'Y 251 (1996); see also MARGARET GRUTER & PAUL BOHANNAN, LAW, BIOLOGY &
CULTURE: THE EVOLUTION OF LAW (1983); ROGER D. MASTERS, THE NATURE OF POLITICS (1989);
THE SENSE OF JUSTICE: BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW (Roger Masters & Margaret Gruter eds.,
1992).
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extensions of evolved psychological predispositions-as an increasingly
complex reflection of evolved norm formulating behavior. For example,
legal proscriptions against rape may not only reflect evolved psychological
predisposition to attend to forced copulation, but may also themselves be
evolved psychological mechanisms for confronting the threat of rape.
CONCLUSION
Every legal regime has, as its fulcrum, a behavioral model that pur-
ports to describe causal influences on law-relevant behavior. The law can
obtain no more leverage on that behavior than the solidity of that behav-
ioral model affords. And yet for all that has been written about rape, its
causes remain insufficiently understood-and popular behavioral models
of rape behavior insufficiently robust-for law to prevent it effectively.
This is due, in part, to law's tendency to be a passive consumer of be-
havioral models offered up by others, rather than an active participant in
the process of integrating the best parts of different theories that percolate
separately in historically and arbitrarily divided disciplines. Having gradu-
ally abandoned the previously prevailing psychiatric, medical model of
rape, which led our legislatures to write rape laws in terms of uncontrolla-
ble sexual urges, the law and legal literature have in recent years adopted,
in its stead, a sociocultural and feminist understanding of rape.
This is, in many respects, an improvement. The prevalence, effects,
and multiple meanings of rape have been exposed. And the legal system
has been forced to acknowledge, and to begin remedying, its failures to
protect women and to deter rape behavior. We have vindicated important
principles of bodily autonomy, ended the marital rape exemption, erected
rape shield laws, explored important dimensions of coercion that exist in-
dependent of physical force, eliminated the necessity of evidence of resis-
tance, and ended the trivialization of rape. Nevertheless, legal reforms have
had less impact than hoped. Law will likely sacrifice further improvements
if it forgoes both its opportunity to encourage the eventual integration and
cross-compatibility of relevant disciplinary perspectives, and the gains to
legal prevention of rape this could afford. By any legitimate measure, the
life science and social science perspectives on rape must in the end form a
seamless web of knowledge-inconsistencies resolved, and compatibilities
intertwined and reciprocally strengthened. This Article has explored why
such integration may be far easier than commonly supposed, and why a
model incorporating both sociocultural and biobehavioral influences on
rape may be more accurate and more useful.
Given the history of popular perception of life science perspectives on
sexual aggression, however, one raises them only with risks. And three
have the greatest significance. The first risk is the possibility that invoking
biology as having meaningful things to say about sexual aggression will be
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misperceived as taking issue with what others have said about the mean-
ings and effects of rape. This risk is real, I believe, because rape scholar-
ship to date rarely distinguishes between causes and meanings, and effects
and functions. In examining modem life science perspectives on sexual
aggression, however, I have explored only the causation side of the equa-
tion. One of my principal points has been that we too often have assumed,
rather than seen demonstrated, that actual effects of rape are intended ef-
fects of rape, and therefore causal. We therefore have underexamined rape
causation, overconfident that we understand why it happens as it does.
The second risk of exploring biobehavioral influences on patterns of
sexual aggression is that doing so may seem like an effort to resuscitate the
biological theories of rape that are regularly bashed. It need not seem so.
Biology is not destiny. And there is no such simple thing as a rape gene, or
genetic determinism, or genetic programming, or irresistible impulses, or
uncontrollable urges to rape. Nevertheless, it should now be clear that the
"biological" theories that are regularly and ritually bashed are not in fact
theories flowing from biologists. They are something altogether differ-
ent-generally the incarnation of concerns about what conclusions the
public might draw from any admission that biology is relevant to rape.
These are real concerns, but they are straw positions when misattributed to
biologists and then cathartically demolished.
The third risk is that taking biology seriously may seem a means to
some convenient normative end. There are few things scarier than the
prospects of zealots claiming that biology is "on their side," justifying per-
sonal and political preferences and privilege with a patina of conveniently
annexed scientific facts. But information is explanation, never justification.
One therefore cannot assume that the existence of biobehavioral influences
on patterns of rape, and potential relevance to rape law, leads ineluctably to
conservative, liberal, or any other ends whatsoever. Concluding that sexual
desire is relevant to rape is not to undo the conclusion that rape is not just
sex. A more moderate, and I believe more accurate, view is that there are
multiple causal influences that affect who rapes whom, under what circum-
stances, and how rape or threat of rape affects women.
What I have argued, then, is as follows. First, the legal system im-
proves its ability to prevent rape behavior when it increases its under-
standing of rape behavior. Second, understanding human behavior
generally, as well as rape behavior specifically, requires a model of causa-
tion that reflects the integration of life and social sciences. Otherwise, we
artificially fragment reality (at a cost to law's effectiveness) by forcing it
into artificially circumscribed disciplinary compartments. And third, the
life sciences, carefully studied, properly qualified, and understood on their
own terms can offer us useful information about biological influences on
the sexual aggression we seek to stamp out.
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In science, no theory is static. Future research to test, challenge, re-
vise, and refine biobehavioral theories is both necessary and welcome. At
present, theories of biobehavioral influences on patterns of sexual aggres-
sion-viewed in context and without prejudice--are more plausible than
commonly supposed, and far less deterministic than commonly caricatured.
They do not contest social theories for disciplinary hegemony, but rather
offer a way of seeing how critical environmental influences, such as cul-
ture and socialization and gender norms, are processed in a fundamentally
corporeal brain, evolved to process information in nonrandom, behavior-
influencing patterns. They offer a way of understanding, without justifying
or excusing, the observable patterns of rape, and therefore better arm us to
battle against it.
Like all theories, the biobehavioral theories here explored could be
misunderstood, misapplied, or both. And against those possibilities we
should be vigilant. The important gains of feminism are too long and hard
fought (and perhaps even too easily dislodged) to risk on mere speculation.
On the other hand, further progress in reducing rape could be as easily
jeopardized, perhaps even more jeopardized, by undercrediting biobehav-
ioral theories as by overcrediting them--despite common assumptions to
the contrary.
In this Article, I have aimed to clarify what biological perspectives on
rape behavior do and do not offer, where they are robust or frail, and how,
where robust, they might improve our current legal approaches to what re-
mains a troublingly frequent phenomenon. Surely rape is sufficiently re-
pugnant to warrant seeking useful knowledge wherever it may be had.
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APPENDIX A369
EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL AGGRESSION:
SELECTED SOURCES
Randy and Nancy Thornhill are responsible for a great deal of the lit-
erature offering evolutionary perspectives on sexual aggression. See, for
example, in reverse chronology, RANDY THORNHILL & CRAIG PALMER,
WHY MEN RAPE, WHY WOMEN SUFFER: RAPE, EVOLUTION, AND THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES (forthcoming 1999); Randy Thornhill, The Biology of
Human Rape, 39 JURImMETRICS J. 137 (1999); Randy Thornhill, Rape-
Victim Psychological Pain Revisited, in HUMAN NATURE 239 (Laura
Betzig ed., 1997); Nancy Wilmsen Thornhill, Psychological Adaptation to
Sexual Coercion in Victims and Offenders, in SEX, POWER,
CONFLICT: EVOLUTIONARY AND FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 90 (David M.
Buss & Neil M. Malamuth eds., 1996); Randy Thornhill, Is There
Psychological Adaptation to Rape?, 16 ANALYSE & KRITIK 68 (1994);
Randy Thornhill & Nancy Wilmsen Thornhill, The Study of Men's
Coercive Sexuality: What Course Should it Take?, 15 BEHAV. & BRAIN
Sci. 404 (1992); Randy Thornhill & Nancy Wilmsen Thornhill, The
Evolutionary Psychology of Men's Coercive Sexuality, 15 BEHAV. &
BRAIN SCL 363 (1992) (article followed by extensive peer commentary);
Randy Thornhill & Nancy Wilmsen Thornhill, Coercive Sexuality of
Men: Is There Psychological Adaptation to Rape?, in SEXUAL COERCION
91 (Elizabeth Grauerholz & Mary A. Koralewski eds., 1991); Nancy
Wilmsen Thornhill & Randy Thornhill, An Evolutionary Analysis of
Psychological Pain Following Human (Homo sapiens) Rape: IV. The
Effect of the Nature of the Sexual Assault, 105 J. COMP. PSYCHOL. 243
(1991); Nancy Wilmsen Thornhill & Randy Thornhill, An Evolutionary
Analysis of Psychological Pain Following Rape: II. Effects of Force and
Violence, 16 AGGRESSIVE BEHAV. 297 (1990); Nancy Wilmsen Thornhill
& Randy Thornhill, An Evolutionary Analysis of Psychological Pain
Following Rape: II. The Effects of Stranger, Friend, and Family-Member
Offenders, 11 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 177 (1990); Nancy Wilmsen
Thornhill & Randy Thornhill, An Evolutionary Analysis of Psychological
Pain Following Rape: L The Effects of Victim's Age and Marital Status,
11 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 155 (1990); Randy Thornhill & Nancy
Wilmsen Thornhill, The Evolution of Psychological Pain, in
SOCIOBIOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 73 (Robert W. Bell & Nancy J.
Bell eds., 1989); Randy Thornhill & Nancy W. Thornhill, Human
Rape: The Strengths of the Evolutionary Perspective, in PSYCHOLOGY AND
SOCIOBIOLOGY: IDEAS, ISSUES AND APPLICATIONS 269 (C. Crawford et al.
369. See supra text accompanying note 12.
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eds., 1987); Randy Thornhill et al., The Biology of Rape, in RAPE 102
(Sylvana Tomaselli & Roy Porter, eds., 1986); Randy Thornhill & Nancy
Wilmsen Thomhill, Human Rape: An Evolutionary Analysis, 4 ETHOLOGY
& SOCIOBIOLOGY 137 (1983); Randy Thornhill, Rape in Panorpa
Scorpionflies and a General Rape Hypothesis, 28 ANIMAL BEHAV. 52
(1980).
See also, in alphabetical order according to author: Alan D. Afton,
Forced Copulation as a Reproductive Strategy of Male Lesser Scaup: A
Field Test of Some Predictions, 92 BEHAV. 146 (1985); T.R. BIRKHEAD &
A.P. MOLLER, SPERM COMPETITION IN BIRDS: EVOLUTIONARY CAUSES
AND CONSEQUENCES (1992); Katharine K. Baker, What Rape Is and What
It Ought Not to Be, 39 JuURMETRICs J. 233 (1999); Jeffrey T. Bums et al.,
Forced Copulation in Captive Mallards: L Fertilization of Eggs, 97 AUK
875 (1980); Kimberly M. Cheng et al., Forced Copulation in Captive
Mallards (Anas Platyrhynchos): 11. Temporal Factors, 30 ANIMAL
BEHAV. 695 (1982); Charles Crawford & Birut6 M.F. Galdikas, Rape in
Non-Human Animals: An Evolutionary Perspective, 27 CAN. PSYCHOL.
215 (1986); Charles Crawford & Marc A. Johnston, An Evolutionary
Model of Courtship and Mating as Social Exchange, 39 JURiMETRICS J.
181 (1999); Deborah W. Denno, Evolutionary Biology and Rape, 39
JURiMETUCS J. 243 (1999); Lee Ellis, A Synthesized (Biosocial) Theory of
Rape, 59 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 631 (1991); Lee Ellis,
Gene-Based Evolutionary Theories in Criminology, 35 CRIMINOLOGY 229
(1997); Lee Ellis, Neodarwinian Theories of Violent Criminality and
Antisocial Behavior: Photographic Evidence from Nonhuman Animals
and a Review of the Literature, 3 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 61
(1998); Stephen T. Emlen & Peter H. Wrege, Forced Copulations and
Intra-specific Parasitism: Two Costs of Social Living in the White-fronted
Bee-eater, 71 ETHOLOGY 2 (1986); Birut6 M.F. Galdikas, Orangutan
Adaptation at Tanjung Puting Reserve: Mating and Ecology, in THE
GREAT APES 195 (David A. Hamburg & Elizabeth R. McCown eds.,
1979); Birut6 M.F. Galdikas, Orangutan Reproduction in the Wild, in
REPRODUCTIVE BIOLOGY OF THE GREAT APES 281 (1981); Steven
Goldberg, Statistics, Law, and Justice, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 255 (1999);
Timothy H. Goldsmith & Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Biology and
Behavior: A Brief Overview and Some Important Concepts, 39
JURIMETRICS J. 131 (1999); Cheryl Hanna, Sometimes Sex Matters, 39
JURIMETRICS J. 261 (1999); Owen D. Jones & Daniel S. Strouse,
Introduction to the Symposium on Biology and Sexual Aggression 39
JURinETRICS J. 113 (1999); Martin L. Lalumi~re et al., A Test of the Mate
Deprivation Hypothesis of Sexual Coercion, 17 ETHOLOGY &
SOCIOBIOLOGY 299 (1996); Martin L. Lalumire & Vernon L. Quinsey, A
Darwinian Interpretation of Individual Differences in Male Propensity for
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Sexual Aggression, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 201 (1999); B.J. LeBoeuf & S.L.
Mesnick, Sexual Behavior of Male Northern Elephant Seals, 116
BEHAVIOUR 143 (1991); John MacKinnon, Reproductive Behavior in Wild
Orangutan Population, in THE GREAT APES 257 (1979); Neil M.
Malamuth, The Confluence Model of Sexual Aggression: Feminist and
Evolutionary Perspectives, in SEX, POWER, CONFLICT: EVOLUTIONARY
AND FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 269 (David M. Buss & Neil M. Malamuth
eds., 1996); Neil M. Malamuth, An Evolutionary-Based Model Integrating
Research on the Characteristics of Sexually Coercive Men, in 1 ADVANCES
IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE: SOCIAL, PERSONAL, AND CULTURAL
ASPECTS 151 (John G. Adair et al. eds., 1998); Neil M. Malamuth & Mario
F. Heilmann, Evolutionary Psychology and Sexual Aggression, in
HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY: IDEAS, ISSUES AND
APPLICATIONS 515 (Charles Crawford & Dennis L. Krebs eds., 1998); Neil
M. Malamuth & Eldad Z. Malamuth, Integrating Multiple Levels of
Scientific Analysis and the Confluence Model of Sexual Coercers, 39
JURIMETRICS J. 157 (1999); Frank McKinney et al., Forced Copulation in
Waterfowl, 86 BEHAV. 250 (1983); Linda Mealey, The Multiplicity of
Rape: From Life History Strategies to Prevention Strategies, 39
JURIMETRICS J. 217 (1999); Pierre Mineau & Fred Cooke, Rape in the
Lesser Snow Goose, 70 BEHAV. 280 (1979); John C. Mitani, Mating
Behaviour of Male Orangutans in the Kutai Game Reserve, Indonesia, 33
ANIMAL BEHAV. 293 (1985); Ronald D. Nadler, Laboratory Research on
Sexual Behavior of the Great Apes, in REPRODUCTIVE BIOLOGY OF THE
GREAT APES 191 (1981); Ronald D. Nadler, Sexual Aggression in the
Great Apes, 528 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 154 (1988); Ronald D. Nadler,
Sexual Aggression in the Great Apes: Implications for Human Law, 39
JURIMETRICS J. 149 (1999); Ronald D. Nadler, Sexual Behavior of
Orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus): Basic and Applied Implications, in THE
NEGLECTED APE 223 (Ronald D. Nadler et al. eds., 1995); Craig T. Palmer,
Human Rape: Adaptation or By-Product?, 28 J. SEX RES. 365 (1991);
Craig T. Palmer et al., Is It Sex Yet? Theoretical and Practical Implications
of the Debate Over Rapists' Motives, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 271 (1999); Craig
Palmer, Is Rape A Cultural Universal? A Re-Examination of the
Ethnographic Data, 28 ETHNOLOGY 1 (1989); Craig T. Palmer, The Use
and Abuse of Darwinian Psychology: Its Impact on Attempts to Determine
the Evolutionary Basis of Human Rape, 13 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY
289 (1992); Craig T. Palmer, Twelve Reasons Why Rape is Not Sexually
Motivated: A Skeptical Examination, 25 J. SEX RES. 512 (1988); Craig T.
Palmer, Rape in Nonhuman Animal Species: Definitions, Evidence, and
Implications, 26 J. SEX RES. 355 (1989); Felicia Pratto, Sexual
Politics: The Gender Gap in the Bedroom, the Cupboard, and the Cabinet,
in Buss & MALAMUTH, supra, at 179; Vernon L. Quinsey & Martin L.
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Lalumi~re, Evolutionary Perspectives on Sexual Offending, 7 SEXUAL
ABUSE: J. RES. & TREATMENT 301 (1995); William M. Shields & Lea M.
Shields, Forcible Rape: An Evolutionary Perspective, 4 ETHOLOGY &
SOCIOBIOLOGY 115 (1983); Barbara Smuts, Male Aggression Against
Women, 3 HUM. NATURE 1 (1992); Barbara B. Smuts & Robert W. Smuts,
Male Aggression and Sexual Coercion of Females in Nonhuman Primates
and Other Mammals: Evidence and Theoretical Implications, 22
ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF BEHAV. 1 (1993); Cassia C. Spohn, The Rape
Reform Movement: The Traditional Common Law and Rape Law Reforms,
39 JURIMETRICS J. 119 (1999); DONALD SYMONS, THE EVOLUTION OF
HUMAN SEXUALITY 276-85 (1979); Robert K. Young & Del Thiessen, The
Texas Rape Scale, 13 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 19 (1992); and sources
cited in THORNHILL & PALMER, supra, at ch. 6.
Discussions of the biology of rape are also increasingly appearing in
scholarly books and textbooks on biology. See, e.g., JOHN ALCOCK,
ANIMAL BEHAVIOR: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH 622-24 (6th
ed. 1998); R. ROBIN BAKER & MARK A. BELLIS, HUMAN SPERM
COMPETITION: COPULATION, MASTURBATION, AND INFIDELITY 35-38
(1995); JEROME H. BARKOW, DARWIN, SEX, AND STATUS: BIOLOGICAL
APPROACHES TO MIND AND CULTURE 363-66 (1989); DAVID M. Buss,
THE EVOLUTION OF DESIRE: STRATEGIES OF HUMAN MATING 162-65
(1994); MARTIN DALY & MARGO WILSON, SEX, EVOLUTION, AND
BEHAVIOR 117, 164-66 (2d ed. 1983); LEE ELLIS, THEORIES OF
RAPE: INQUIRIES INTO THE CAUSES OF SEXUAL AGGRESSION (1989);
TIMOTHY H. GOLDSMITH, THE BIOLOGICAL ROOTS OF HUMAN
NATURE: FORGING LINKS BETWEEN EVOLUTION AND BEHAVIOR 61-65
(1991); SARAH BLAFFER HRDY, THE WOMAN THAT NEVER EVOLVED 18
(1981); J.R. KREBS & N.B. DAVIES, AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIOURAL
ECOLOGY 202-04 (3d ed. 1993); MICHAEL McGUIRE & ALFONSO TROISI,
DARWINIAN PSYCHIATRY 116 (1998); ROBERT JAY RUSSELL, THE LEMURS'
LEGACY: THE EVOLUTION OF POWER, SEX, AND LOVE 138-41 (1993);
RICHARD WRANGHAM & DALE PETERSON, DEMONIC MALES: APES AND
THE ORIGINS OF HUMAN VIOLENCE 132-43 (1996); ROBERT WRIGHT, THE
MORAL ANIMAL: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND EVERYDAY LIFE 85
(1994).
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APPENDIX B370
The three other pathways (in addition to the natural and sexual selec-
tion pathway) by which patterns of rape behavior could conceivably be
evolutionarily influenced are summarized below.
(1) Mutation-Selection Balance: The first possible hypothesis of
evolutionary influence on patterns of forced copulation is best introduced
by example. Suppose there was such a thing as a heritable psychological
predisposition that increased the probability of aggressive sexuality
(however slightly) and hence increased, in turn, the probability that those
who bore it would force copulation with unwilling females. Suppose, also,
that such a trait was less adaptive than an alternative, contemporaneously
existing psychological trait, which predisposed the males who bore it to be
more solicitous of females, and more successful in procuring mating op-
portunities.
In theory, even the maladaptive predisposition, which reduced the av-
erage reproductive success of its animal bearers, compared to their con-
temporaries, could persist in a population over time. The necessary
conditions are that the mutation typically resulting in that predisposition re-
arise, independently, at some low rate and that natural selection select
against it each time it appears. (Hence the term "mutation-selection
balance.")
Because mutations at a particular gene locus arise infrequently, at an
average rate of one mutation per 100,000 copies of the gene, see MONROE
W. STRICKBERGER, EvOLuTION 214 (2d ed. 1996), we can deduce that if a
trait is both maladaptive and sustained within a population by mutation-
selection balance, it would appear very infrequently. It is extremely un-
likely, for example, ever to spread to one percent of a population. See
Thornhill, supra note 86, at 141. As a consequence, we can also conclude
that it would be unlikely that a significant proportion of other individuals
within the full population would exhibit evolved counter-adaptations spe-
cific to that trait (that natural selection would have favored because they
function to deflect the imposition of costs forced copulation imposes).
Two things suggest that a hypothetical, genetically influenced propen-
sity to force copulation, in certain general kinds of circumstances, is not
explicable by the mutation-selection balance of a maladaptive trait. First,
rape is simply too common in the animal kingdom to be the product of a
trait that repeatedly resurfaces in the face of negative selection pressure
over evolutionary time. See id. at 141. Rape in other animals is explored in
Part II, supra. Second, the cross-species and cross-human-society patterns
of female resistance to rape, and the increased avoidance of rape-risky
370. See supra text accompanying note 87.
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encounters by reproductive age human females during the fertile parts of
their cycles, suggest specific anti-rape psychological adaptations. See
THORNHILL & PALMER, supra note 14, at ch. 4 (citing Tara J. Chavanne &
Gordon G. Gallup, Jr., Variation in Risk Taking Behavior Among Female
College Students as a Function of the Menstrual Cycle, 19 EVOLUTION &
HuM. BEHAV. 27 (1998)).
(2) Evolutionarily Novel Environment: The second possible hypothe-
sis of evolutionary influence on patterns of forced copulation involves
positing that a predisposition that increases the likelihood of forced copu-
lation is a currently maladaptive by-product of historically adaptive traits,
which happen to be expressed today in suddenly changed environmental
circumstances (such as those precipitated by recent human technological
and population growth). See Thornhill, supra note 86, at 143. Such an ex-
planation might make sense in humans, were it not for the puzzlingly
similar patterns of rape, under seemingly normal conditions, in so many
other species. (Again, patterns of rape in humans and nonhumans are ex-
plored in greater detail, in Part II, supra.) Positing completely unrelated
causal pathways, for humans and nonhumans, without both substantially
more theoretical development, and persuasive evidence of how such simi-
lar patterns could arise independently, would be improperly unparsimoni-
ous.
(3) Genetic Drift. The third hypothesis of evolutionary influence on
patterns of forced copulation derives from the effects of random chance on
distributions of genes in successive generations-so-called "genetic drift."
See GOLDSMITH, supra note 47, at 30-3 1; STRICKBERGER, supra, at 515-18.
For example, a local environmental catastrophe could wipe out individual
animals in a population that might otherwise have had greater reproductive
success than their contemporaries. That certainly would change the pro-
portions of future populations in which copies of the unfortunate individu-
als' genes appeared, compared to what would have obtained in the absence
of the catastrophe.
We can deduce, however, that drift cannot explain the persistence of
heritable traits that impose significant costs on reproductive success. See
Thornhill, supra note 86, at 143. The exponential effects of natural selec-
tion on the proliferation or diminishment of traits that have even small
relative effects on reproductive success relentlessly decrease the proportion
of a population bearing less successful traits. See supra text accompanying
note 61. Consequently, if a propensity to force copulation in some circum-
stances imposed reproductive costs not otherwise compensated for with
average reproductive benefits, genetic drift could not provide adequate ex-
planation.
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